Why machines will still not rule the world

General intelligence, of the kind that underwrites the full range of human cognitive achievement, is not a property of computational architecture alone. This paper advances a single thesis: the structural constraints on general intelligence occupy distinct levels of description and are mutually non-reducible, in the sense that the special-sciences tradition gives to that term. It follows that no single architectural advance, and no continuation of the scaling programme by itself, can produce artificial general intelligence (AGI), and that research programmes must be evaluated against the full constraint profile rather than against performance on any one benchmark. The thesis is developed through a method that reads general intelligence through four evidential lenses, AI systems research, anthropology, law, and economics, each anchored to a distinct level of description, supplemented by speculative fiction used as a disciplined heuristic in the context of discovery rather than the context of justification. Applying the method yields a taxonomy of twenty-three structural constraints organised into eight clusters; six are examined in depth and ordered as an ascending ladder of levels, with explicit bridges showing why progress at one level cannot carry to the next. The argument issues in five falsifiable predictions, each stated with a named benchmark family and a disconfirmation condition, converting a descriptive framework into a research programme with a longer horizon than the scaling hypothesis implies.

This paper proposes, for the first time, a rigorous formal definition of the concept of Machine Theory of Mind, based on principles supported by evidence from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and uses the above as a lens to examine state-of-the-art and current efforts in the field, driving a potential agenda for further research there able to "crack" the problem. It also advances a general holistic meta-model for Machine Theory of Mind, and examines the state of the art when it comes to empirically benchmarking such models.

Intelligence is constituted by \textit{process} (iterative activity through which output emerges), not in the output itself. Generative AI (GenAI) is trained on \textit{traces} (textual and visual residues of human cognitive processes), reproducing samples from a distribution of those traces. Its outputs resemble reasoning, problem-solving, and creativity, yet the activity that produces such outputs in humans remains largely absent. Current GenAI is, therefore, weakly equivalent to the cognition it imitates, matching outputs while process stays absent or opaque. The cognitive sciences have long distinguished between weak and strong equivalence. Here, we define \textit{strong} equivalence across seven process features, assessable against human and machine cognition. Our process-based account addresses a symmetric risk: GenAI tools that outsource a person's generative processes may leave critical capacities unbuilt. We specify design principles for GenAI that instantiate more process and preserve rather than erode human judgment and creativity, and outline process audits that make strong equivalence testable.