cs.AIOct 9, 2026

Provenance-Aware Belief Updating in Human-AI Feedback Loops

Authors: Tianyi Huang, Eric Liu, Jay Chong, Emily Yin, Wanqi Zhao

Organizations: Ryquo · App-In Club

Abstract

In repeated human-AI interaction, a single observation can be quoted, summarized, and returned to a model as multiple reports, making repetition look like independent corroboration. We study whether language models can use supplied report lineage to update according to evidence provenance rather than report count. We introduce Latent Quotient Evidence Training (LQET), a relational objective that combines sparse Bayesian supervision with constraints that encourage stable predictions when reports add no new evidence and consistent updates to the same new evidence across relay histories. On a controlled binary benchmark, LQET reduces new-evidence update RMSE by 41-44% and log-odds drift after eight relay steps by 89-91% relative to task-only training across Qwen3-4B and Phi-4-mini, with three paired training seeds per backbone. The gains extend to a closed-loop simulation in which model confidence controls how many relayed reports re-enter the model's context in later rounds. By grounding belief updates in supplied provenance, LQET offers a route toward dynamic human-AI systems in which influence follows new evidence, not the number of times the same evidence returns.

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