UkrMeme: Multimodal Explainable Persuasion Detection in Ukrainian Memes
Authors: Nazar Andrushko, Vera Schmitt, Veronika Solopova
Organizations: Ukrainian Catholic University, Lviv, Ukraine · Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Mainz, Germany · German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI), Berlin, Germany · Centre for European Research in Trusted AI (CERTAIN)
Memes play a central role in modern online communication, especially in contexts of political conflict where visual and textual cues combine to convey persuasive messages. We study persuasive technique detection in Ukrainian memes using vision-language models (VLMs). We introduce UkrMeme, a dataset of 200 organically produced Ukrainian wartime memes annotated for persuasion techniques, and PTM-UA, a Ukrainian translation of a subset of the Propaganda 950 benchmark that preserves original visual content while translating meme text. We evaluate VLMs in a zero-shot prompting setup across image, text, and multimodal inputs using hierarchical F1 metrics. Finally, we compare Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) and model-generated token attributions and analyze the semantic categories of evidence emphasized by each explanation method.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Example from the UkrMeme dataset. Gold labels: Smears , Loaded Language . en: "A monument to “Vladimir Lenin founding Ukraine” bronze, granite, Alzheimer’s"
Figure 2: Example from PTM-UA: original English meme (left) and its Ukrainian translation (right). Text is inpainted and re-rendered while preserving the visual content. Gold labels: Appeal to Authority , Smears .
Measure
Observed
Expected
Adjusted
Boot-match
0.764
0.303
0.661
Boot-precision
0.628
0.184
0.544
Boot-recall
0.698
0.227
0.610
Boot-F1
0.643
0.180
0.565
Augmented- κ
0.535
0.238
0.390
MASI Krippendorff’s α : 0.406
Table 1: Set-level inter-annotator agreement for UkrMeme .
Label
κ
No Propaganda
0.776
Smears
0.511
Appeal to Fear/Prejudice
0.506
Exaggeration/Minimisation
0.415
Causal Oversimplification
0.409
Glittering Generalities (Virtue)
0.394
Table 2: Per-class Cohen’s κ for UkrMeme labels with at least 5 occurrences from either annotator.
Figure 3: Label distribution for the UkrMeme dataset (200 samples).
Figure 4: Label distribution for the translated PTM-UA (158 samples).
hF1
Dataset
Averaging
Mode
Qwen3-VL-4B
Qwen3-VL-8B
GPT-4.1-mini †
Gemma 3 4B †
PTM-UA
Micro
text
0.440
0.416
0.556
0.498
image
0.483
0.524
0.592
0.549
image+text
0.537
0.523
0.613
0.569
Macro
text
0.195
0.198
0.255
0.255
image
0.219
0.257
0.350
0.297
Table 3: hF1 comparison across all four models on PTM-UA ( n=158 ) and UkrMeme ( n=200 ). Best hF1 per averaging method is bolded within each dataset and averaging type. † GPT-4.1-mini and Gemma 3 4B are detection-only baselines; explainability analysis is not conducted for these models (see § 3.2.2 ).
Model
Mode
Orig. EN
Translated
Mi / Ma hF1
Mi / Ma hF1
GPT-4.1-mini
text
0.548 / 0.270
0.556 / 0.255
image
0.615 / 0.362
0.592 / 0.350
image+text
0.603 / 0.347
0.612 / 0.356
Gemma 3 4B
text
0.495 / 0.257
0.498 / 0.255
image
0.542 / 0.309
0.549 / 0.297
Table 4: Original English vs. Ukrainian-translated PTM-UA, hierarchical micro/macro F1, on the 158 retained samples. Translated-condition values for Qwen3-VL-4B/8B are taken from Table 3 ; Mi = micro hF1, Ma = macro hF1.
Figure 5: Confusion matrix for UkrMeme (Qwen3-VL-4B, image+text). The model massively over-predicts Loaded Language and Slogans , particularly for gold No Propaganda samples.
Figure 6: Confusion matrix for PTM-UA (Qwen3-VL-4B, image+text). Loaded Language acts as the dominant attractor class.
Figure 7: Token attribution distributions across dataset settings. Columns correspond to PTM-UA (translated memes) and UkrMeme (native Ukrainian memes), with both multimodal (image+text) and text-only variants.
Figure 8: Agreement between VLM-based and LRP token attributions explanations for low-hF1 samples across dataset settings. The distribution shows moderate overlap across conditions, with higher median agreement for the UkrMeme multimodal setting.
PTM-UA
UkrMeme
Sh.
VLM
LRP
Sh.
VLM
LRP
Entity
22.9
15.8
19.4
20.5
13.0
16.9
Emotional
33.1
33.7
12.7
25.9
32.4
12.7
Rhetoric
17.1
22.7
19.4
15.5
17.6
15.9
Content
23.4
26.4
34.3
33.2
30.9
33.1
Other
3.6
1.1
14.2
4.9
6.2
21.3
Table 5: Category distribution (%) of attributed tokens by source. Total word counts shown as n .
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Qwen3-VL-4B
Qwen3-VL-8B
Dataset
Averaging
Mode
hP
hR
hF1
hP
hR
hF1
PTM-UA
Micro
text
0.538
0.372
0.440
0.492
0.360
0.416
image
0.570
0.419
0.483
0.536
0.512
0.524
image+text
0.569
0.508
0.537
0.519
0.526
0.523
Macro
text
0.308
0.175
0.195
0.328
0.210
0.198
image
0.302
0.249
0.219
0.334
0.295
0.257
Appendix
Table 6: Hierarchical F1 results on PTM-UA ( n=158 ) and UkrMeme ( n=200 ) for Qwen3-VL models. Best hF1 per averaging method is bolded within each model and dataset.
Qwen3-VL-4B
Qwen3-VL-8B
Averaging
Mode
w/ NP
w/o NP
Δ
w/ NP
w/o NP
Δ
Micro
text
0.440
0.475
+.035
0.416
0.432
+.016
image
0.483
0.527
+.044
0.524
0.515
− .009
image+text
0.537
0.550
+.013
0.523
0.529
+.006
Macro
text
0.195
0.214
+.019
0.198
0.211
+.013
image
0.219
0.229
+.010
0.257
0.276
+.019
Appendix
Table 7: PTM-UA results with and without the No Propaganda label ( n=158 ). The largest improvements appear in text-only mode, where No Propaganda is most frequently predicted.
Figure 9: Confusion matrix for PTM-UA without No Propaganda (Qwen3-VL-4B, image+text). Former abstentions are redistributed into partially correct technique labels.