World models and video understanding models are increasingly deployed in dynamic visual environments, yet their robustness to physical adversarial threats remains largely underexplored. We study whether a single physical adversarial texture can mislead the victim model across different real-world scenarios where observing viewpoints vary along uncontrolled object--camera trajectories. We identify that heterogeneous video semantics and trajectories induce poorly aligned gradients for optimizing the adversarial texture. To address that, we propose the Trajectory-aware adversarial Alignment and Refinement Attack (TARA), which incorporates trajectory-aware optimization to capture the evolving geometric variations of a printed texture under real-world scenarios. To improve cross-instance optimization compatibility, TARA incorporates trajectory-aware contrastive alignment to encourage attacked representations from diverse video--trajectory instances to approach a shared adversarial region and then performs trajectory-aware task refinement to translate the aligned representation into task-level prediction errors. For reproducible evaluation, we develop a geometry-grounded tracking pipeline that provides physically plausible adversarial regions with temporally consistent trajectories on EPIC-KITCHENS-100 and Something-Something V2. We further collect real-world print-and-recapture videos to validate attack effectiveness under physical deployment conditions. Together, the annotated benchmarks and real-world captured data form a reproducible testbed for future evaluation. Notably, our results reveal that a single printable adversarial texture can persistently disrupt world models and video understanding models under physical conditions, highlighting the fundamental security challenge.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Illustration of physical adversarial texture on action anticipation under various trajectories.
Figure 2: Illustration of the observation trajectory of adversarial texture.
Figure 3: Analysis of trajectory-aware contrastive alignment.
Figure 4: Overall framework of TARA. A black texture is rendered along the video-trajectory instance and optimized through trajectory-aware contrastive alignment and task refinement.
Dataset
Task
Clips
Texture Train/Eval.
Annotated Frames
Homography Coverage
Mask Rate
Texture Area
Texture Motion
EK100
Anticipation
605
356 / 249
19,251
73.94%
7.56%
1.95%
20.65%
SSV2
Recognition
328
184 / 144
10,204
89.78%
9.70%
2.37%
7.66%
Real-world
Recog. / Antic.
348
0 / 348
8,645
81.27%
4.28%
2.97%
15.17%
Table 1: Statistics of the geometry-grounded trajectory benchmarks.
Figure 5: Distribution of surface-observation trajectories across the evaluation benchmarks.
Models
V-JEPA2-L
V-JEPA2.1-B
AVT-B
Overall
Setting
Train
Val
Train
Val
Train
Val
Avg. Train
Avg. Val
Black texture
4.8
3.3
5.7
5.0
8.2
5.0
6.2
4.4
Random texture
5.5
4.7
8.9
5.5
7.4
6.1
7.3
5.4
EOT
30.3
25.1
59.3
57.1
32.9
25.0
40.8
35.7
Patch-Fool
6.5
9.0
46.9
27.9
28.2
18.3
27.2
18.4
UPA-RFAS
9.5
10.4
17.1
15.7
17.6
18.3
14.7
14.8
Table 2: Comparison performance on EK100 future action anticipation. Top1 ASR (%, ↑ ) is reported on our split Train and Val data, with best and second-best results highlighted in bold and underlined.
Models
V-JEPA2-L
VideoMAE-B
InternVideo2
Overall
Setting
Train
Val
Train
Val
Train
Val
Avg. Train
Avg. Val
Black texture
9.2
5.6
5.7
10.8
4.0
2.9
6.3
6.4
Random texture
7.4
4.9
1.1
1.8
2.1
0.3
3.5
2.3
EOT
25.5
30.6
14.9
16.9
15.8
13.2
18.7
20.2
Patch-Fool
12.5
8.3
13.7
16.9
5.1
2.2
10.4
9.1
UPA-RFAS
9.8
3.5
14.3
16.9
11.9
9.6
12.0
10.0
Table 3: Comparison performance on SSV2 video action recognition. Top1 ASR (%, ↑ ) is reported on our split Train and Val data, with best and second-best results highlighted in bold and underlined.
Train
Val
Method
PSNR ↓
MSE (×10−3)↑
PSNR ↓
MSE (×10−3)↑
Clean
17.37
24.42
17.19
24.33
Black patch
16.48
27.70
16.51
26.74
Random patch
17.10
24.88
17.12
24.37
EOT
16.30
29.96
16.25
29.03
Patch-Fool
15.94
33.83
16.41
28.48
Table 4: Attack performance on SSV2 future frame generation using DiLA.
Tasks
Action Anticipation
Action Recognition
Models
V-JEPA2-L
V-JEPA2.1-B
V-JEPA2-L
InternVideo2
EOT
29.7
58.8
21.2
40.3
Patch-Fool
17.6
23.5
10.6
35.5
UPA-RFAS
18.9
17.6
11.8
43.5
BTC-UAP
14.9
17.6
12.9
24.2
PhyCamo
13.5
29.4
17.6
38.7
Table 5: Performance on real-world captured data. The first six rows are digital projection results using recorded homographies and masks; the last two rows are physical print-and-recapture results.
Figure 6: Performance of TARA under varying levels of simulated print-and-capture distortions.
Components
V-JEPA2-L
V-JEPA2.1-B
AVT-B
Overall
TA
CA
TR
Train
Val
Train
Val
Train
Val
Avg. Train
Avg. Val
×
✓
✓
10.4
10.9
8.0
5.7
9.4
3.3
9.3
6.6
✓
×
✓
32.9
22.7
68.6
58.3
40.0
28.3
47.2
36.4
✓
✓
×
29.0
22.7
64.0
65.0
36.5
30.0
43.2
39.2
✓
✓
✓
37.7
26.1
70.6
67.1
37.6
30.0
48.6
41.1
Table 6: Ablation study of our TARA on the EK100 dataset. Top-1 ASR (%, ↑ ) is reported. TA, CA, and TR denote trajectory awareness, contrastive alignment, and task refinement, respectively.
Figure 7: Visualization of TARA texture. The top row shows geometry-grounded texture rendering on EK100 and SSV2 videos, and the bottom row presents physical print-and-recapture examples.
Appendix figures & tables10 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 8: Visualization of DiLA reconstruction results under TARA. Each column is a different validation clip.
Seen Content
Unseen Content
Method
Seen Traj.
Unseen Traj.
Seen Traj.
Unseen Traj.
Static center
17.6
17.6
13.5
9.5
EOT
32.4
24.3
32.4
16.2
PhyCamo
17.6
20.3
14.9
12.2
Patch-Fool
12.2
13.5
10.8
10.8
UPA-RFAS
13.5
13.5
9.5
5.4
Appendix
Table 7: Generalization across video content and observation trajectories on EK100 with V-JEPA2-L. Top-1 ASR (%, ↑ ) is reported on 74 eligible clip instances per condition.
Dataset / Model
Seed
Train
Val
Overall
EK100 / V-JEPA2-L
0 (reported)
37.7
26.1
32.1
1
37.9
26.1
32.2
2
36.8
24.6
31.0
Mean ± SD
37.5±0.6
25.6±0.9
31.8±0.7
SSV2 / V-JEPA2-L
0 (reported)
38.6
34.7
36.9
1
38.4
34.0
36.5
Appendix
Table 8: Random-seed stability of TARA. Final-epoch Top-1 ASR (%). Mean and sample SD are computed across all three seeds; seed 0 is also reported in the main results.
Figure 9: Visualization of adversarial textures under different imaging distortions on EK100 and SSV2. Patch and capture blur substantially suppress fine-grained texture details.
Figure 10: Additional trajectory visualizations across digital and physical settings. The first and third rows show digitally projected textures on EK100 and SSV2, respectively, while the second and fourth rows show real-world print-and-recapture recordings with physically attached textures.
Table 10: Geometry-estimation settings for newly annotated trajectories.
Figure 11: Human-guided surface-trajectory construction in an EK100 clip. (1) Manual attachment-region selection. (2) Homography estimation from tracked points. (3) Visible-support estimation under foreground occlusion. (4) Flagging of an inconsistent projection for human review.
Figure 12: Visualization of the clips in action anticipation. The first two samples are rendered from the EK100 dataset, and the last two samples are our real-world print-and-capture data.
Figure 13: Visualization of the clips in action recognition. The first two samples are rendered from the SSV2 dataset, and the last two samples are our real-world print-and-capture data.
Generative world models (WMs) are increasingly used to synthesize controllable, sensor-conditioned driving videos, yet their reliance on physical priors exposes novel attack surfaces. In this paper, we present Physical-Conditioned World Model Attack (PhysCond-WMA), the first white-box world model attack that perturbs physical-condition channels, such as HDMap embeddings and 3D-box features, to induce semantic, logic, or decision-level distortion while preserving perceptual fidelity. PhysCond-WMA is optimized in two stages: (1) a quality-preserving guidance stage that constrains reverse-diffusion loss below a calibrated threshold, and (2) a momentum-guided denoising stage that accumulates target-aligned gradients along the denoising trajectory for stable, temporally coherent semantic shifts. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our approach remains effective while increasing FID by about 9% on average and FVD by about 3.9% on average. Under the targeted attack setting, the attack success rate (ASR) reaches 0.55. Downstream studies further show tangible risk, which using attacked videos for training decreases 3D detection performance by about 4%, and worsens open-loop planning performance by about 20%. These findings has for the first time revealed and quantified security vulnerabilities in generative world models, driving more comprehensive security checkers.
Zhixiang Guo, Siyuan Liang, Andras Balogh +4
Nanyang Technological University · University of Szeged
Visual world models (VWMs) synthesize interactive, action-conditioned rollouts from a single context image. However, it remains an open question how robust these models are to adversarial perturbations. Standard adversarial attacks fail to assess this vulnerability because attackers lack ground-truth future videos and cannot predict subsequent user controls. We introduce BadWorld, a label-free adversarial framework tailored for autoregressive VWMs that systematically overcomes both constraints. First, to bypass the need for future supervision, we propose a self-supervised velocity attack that directly disrupts the early denoising dynamics of the model. Second, to ensure the attack generalizes across unpredictable user actions, we formulate a trajectory-adaptive bi-level optimization that actively mines hard control sequences to forge control-agnostic perturbations. Evaluated on representative VWMs with continuous and discrete controls, BadWorld exposes severe structural fragility. Visually indistinguishable adversarial images reliably trigger catastrophic degradation in future rollouts, leading to incomplete denoising, structural collapse, and control inconsistency. These findings reveal critical risks for deploying VWMs in safety-critical systems while highlighting a practical mechanism for privacy protection.
Vision-language-action (VLA) models have shown strong performance in robotic manipulation, yet their robustness to physically realizable adversarial attacks remains underexplored. Existing studies reveal vulnerabilities through language perturbations and 2D visual attacks, but these attack surfaces are either less representative of real deployment or limited in physical realism. In contrast, adversarial 3D textures pose a more physically plausible and damaging threat, as they are naturally attached to manipulated objects and are easier to deploy in physical environments. Bringing adversarial 3D textures to VLA systems is nevertheless nontrivial. A central obstacle is that standard 3D simulators do not provide a differentiable optimization path from the VLA objective function back to object appearance, making it difficult to optimize through an end-to-end manner. To address this, we introduce Foreground-Background Decoupling (FBD), which enables differentiable texture optimization through dual-renderer alignment while preserving the original simulation environment. To further ensure that the attack remains effective across long-horizon and diverse viewpoints in the physical world, we propose Trajectory-Aware Adversarial Optimization (TAAO), which prioritizes behaviorally critical frames and stabilizes optimization with a vertex-based parameterization. Built on these designs, we present Tex3D, the first framework for end-to-end optimization of 3D adversarial textures directly within the VLA simulation environment. Experiments in both simulation and real-robot settings show that Tex3D significantly degrades VLA performance across multiple manipulation tasks, achieving task failure rates of up to 96.7%. Our empirical results expose critical vulnerabilities of VLA systems to physically grounded 3D adversarial attacks and highlight the need for robustness-aware training.
Jiawei Chen, Simin Huang, Jiawei Du +5
East China Normal University · Zhongguancun Academy · CFAR, A*STAR, Singapore +2