Entropy-Regularized Mean-Field Games with Average-Reward Criterion: Span-Seminorm Contractions and Model-Free Learning

We study inverse reinforcement learning for discrete-time, infinite-horizon mean-field games (MFGs) under an average-reward criterion. Expert demonstrations are assumed to arise from a stationary mean-field equilibrium under an unknown reward, and the goal is to recover a policy explaining the observed behaviour via the maximum causal entropy principle. We formulate the inverse problem by enforcing consistency with the expert mean-field term and long-run feature expectations, treating two reward classes within a unified occupation-measure framework. For finite-dimensional linear rewards, we give a convex dual reformulation with an explicit log-partition objective, and prove smoothness and curvature properties justifying constant-step-size gradient descent. For infinite-dimensional RKHS rewards, we develop a Lagrangian relaxation whose inner-maximising policy is characterised by a soft Bellman equation. The main obstacle is the absence of a discount-factor contraction. We resolve this by introducing a minorisation-based sub-stochastic kernel that yields a strict contraction of the soft Bellman operator. We establish Fréchet differentiability and Lipschitz smoothness of the log-likelihood score, leading to a gradient ascent algorithm with convergence guarantees. Two numerical examples, a malware-spread MFG and an RKHS-based consumer-choice model, show that the recovered policies closely match expert behaviour.

Fitted $Q$-iteration (FQI) is a standard regression-based method for optimal control in offline reinforcement learning, but its stability under function approximation often relies on Bellman completeness, which requires Bellman images of the fitted class to remain in the class. We study Kullback--Leibler (KL)-regularized, or soft, FQI relative to a fixed reference policy without this assumption. Our key insight is that soft control locally inherits the contraction of policy evaluation in a discounted-occupancy norm. At the soft-optimal fixed point, the linearization of the soft Bellman operator is exactly the Bellman operator for the soft-optimal policy, which contracts in its discounted-occupancy norm; projection in the same norm preserves this contraction. Standard soft FQI instead projects under the offline state-action distribution and need not preserve this property. Motivated by this observation, we propose occupancy-reweighted soft FQI, which retains standard Bellman targets and least-squares updates while reweighting regressions by discounted-occupancy ratios induced by the current soft policy. Under $Q$-function realizability and local regularity, we establish local contraction and finite-sample convergence with estimated ratios, without Bellman completeness. We then use temperature annealing to convert the local result into global convergence from arbitrary initialization: sufficiently high temperature provides a globally contractive starting regime, while gradual cooling connects successive local contraction regions to any prescribed positive target temperature. Under an action-gap margin condition, switching at a fixed positive temperature to hard FQI with refreshed occupancy weights also yields population and finite-sample convergence to the unregularized optimum.

Reinforcement learning has been successful both empirically and theoretically in single-agent settings, but extending these results to multi-agent reinforcement learning in general-sum Markov games remains challenging. This paper studies the convergence of Stackelberg Q-value iteration in two-player general-sum Markov games from a control-theoretic perspective. We introduce a relaxed policy condition tailored to the Stackelberg setting and model the learning dynamics as a switching system. By constructing upper and lower comparison systems, we establish finite-time error bounds for the Q-functions and characterize their convergence properties. Our results provide a novel control-theoretic perspective on Stackelberg learning. Moreover, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this paper offers the first finite-time convergence guarantees for Q-value iteration in general-sum Markov games under Stackelberg interactions.