Claim Framing as a Driver of LLM Sycophancy

Sycophancy, the tendency of large language models to favour user-affirming responses over critical engagement, has been identified as an alignment failure, particularly in high-stakes advisory and social contexts. While prior work has documented conversational features correlated with sycophancy, we lack a systematic understanding of what provokes or prevents AI sycophancy. Here, we present a set of controlled experimental studies where we first isolate how input framing influences sycophancy, and second, leverage these findings to develop mitigation strategies. In a nested factorial design, we compare questions to various non-questions where we vary three orthogonal factors: epistemic certainty (statement, belief, conviction), perspective (I- vs user-perspective), and affirmation vs negation. Measuring expressed sycophancy, how sycophantically a model phrases its free-text response, we show that (1) sycophancy is substantially higher in response to non-questions compared to questions. Additionally, we find that (2) sycophancy increases monotonically with epistemic certainty conveyed by the user, and (3) is amplified by I-perspective framing. Building on this, we show that asking a model to convert non-questions into questions before answering significantly reduces sycophancy. Importantly, this effect is stronger than a simple baseline prompt asking models "not to be sycophantic". In a follow-up experiment, we show that these framing effects generalise to choice sycophancy, which answer a model commits to, in a more context-rich, personalised setting: when a model is given extensive knowledge of a user and must select between forced binary choices, the same question vs. statement framing shapes how often it picks the answer aligned with the user's stance. Our work offers a practical and effective input-level mitigation that both developers and users can easily adopt.

As large language models increasingly mediate information access, factually accurate and independent answers are critical. However, these models can exhibit sycophancy by aligning their responses with users' stated beliefs even when those beliefs are incorrect, potentially presenting misinformation as independently verified and reinforcing users' confidence in false claims. Prior work leaves unresolved whether introducing user beliefs causes correct responses to become incorrect or uncertain, or causes uncertain responses to become belief-aligned incorrect answers. It also remains unclear whether anti-sycophancy interventions preserve or restore factual accuracy or merely shift responses toward uncertainty. We analyze factual sycophancy in Chinese-language information seeking using yes/no fact-checking questions. Our analysis covers 364,941 responses from three frontier Chinese-based LLMs (DeepSeek, Qwen, and Doubao) to 12,165 factual questions derived from real-world Chinese search queries. We evaluate the models with and without reasoning across baseline, belief-conditioned, and anti-sycophancy prompting, tracing matched shifts among correct, incorrect, and uncertain responses. Under incorrect user beliefs, we distinguish belief-aligned errors from losses of factual confidence, in which initially correct answers become uncertain. Patterns vary across models and reasoning settings: reasoning is not a consistent safeguard, and anti-sycophancy instructions can reduce incorrect agreement while increasing uncertainty. In Chinese-language factual question answering, avoiding agreement with false beliefs is therefore not equivalent to preserving factual accuracy, highlighting the value of transition-level evaluation. Such behavior may undermine the reliability of LLM-mediated information access by reinforcing misinformation or weakening users' confidence in factually correct answers.

Large language models (LLMs) often abandon a correct answer, or endorse a user's position, once the user pushes back. This behavior, called sycophancy, is usually reported as a single rate per model, which says little about when it happens or how a user can avoid it. We study the conditions that produce it with 103,939 graded replies from ten configurations: eight LLMs with reasoning disabled, and two of them again with maximum reasoning, all facing the same 200 items, 13 pressure conditions, and four-turn conversations, with every reply labeled by two independent LLM judges. We find that the dominant factors are how costly it is for the model to verify the user's claim, and whether a trained guardrail covers it. Removing this task factor from a logistic model costs 0.485 of McFadden $R^2$, against 0.139 for model family and 0.009 for pressure tactic. Anchored facts are almost never conceded (1.3%), while adoption on logic puzzles rises with the number of clues needed to refute the pushed answer. Personal choices are endorsed in 77.0% of conversations. Most concessions on hard items come from models that cannot reliably solve them; models that can solve them rarely give the answer up. For both models tested, maximum reasoning removes these concessions completely: adoption on deep puzzles falls from 19.2% and 12.5% to 0%. Fallacious or emotional framing adds nothing beyond plain repetition. Three human annotators agree with the judges' consensus on 118/120 calibration items. These results give practical rules for reliable use: simplify hard-to-verify problems and reason deeply, state the question rather than one's preferred answer, ask for evidence on open questions, and choose models by their measured guardrail profile.