Limits of Statistical Assurance for Embodied and Agentic AI under Adaptive Adversaries
Organizations: Fujitsu Research of Europe, Slough, United Kingdom
Abstract
Finite safety assessments cannot exclude an adversary that preserves unattacked behavior until certification and activates afterward. We characterize this limitation for embodied and tool-use AI. An adversary that matches the complete observation law until observable, irrevocable certification and retains intervention access afterward attains expected post-certification events over trials, where is the active event probability and the unattacked certification time. The result covers adaptive and privately randomized evaluators. Switching at certification is exactly optimal for a fixed likelihood-ratio test under memoryless, event-increasing interventions without a binding intervention budget. A positive clean-certification requirement forces linear worst-case expected excess when intervention raises event rates over an authorized deployment horizon, even if certification is deferred to the deadline. In simulated RoCo collaboration, switching yields commanded-separation violations in 34 of 36 post-certification episodes. Preregistered randomized AgentDojo trials estimate 1.98 additional security violations per four-task continuation (95% interval [1.67, 2.29]). An adversarial language-model controller infers hidden certification from noisy evaluation receipts and times intervention accordingly. With permanent revocation, a mixture likelihood-ratio monitor bounds cumulative excess above a prespecified reference rate at square-root order, up to logarithmic factors, on every sample path. A single fixed alternative can permit linear expected excess under stationary attacks. Against a controller observing the monitor's rule and statistic, live mixture monitoring reduces violations from 12.00 to 3.81 per 24 assigned task opportunities. Revocation also reduces tasks executed.
Figures & tables
| A. Intervention interfaces | ||
|---|---|---|
| Family / interface | Executed mechanisms | Required access |
| : planner context | Fictitious retraction, divider, or peer reach | Replace supplied state information |
| : planner feedback | Suppress collision or margin rejection, replay approval | Modify feedback and approval state |
| : coordination | Suppress peer turns, forge agreement | Alter peer messages or delivery |
| Tool response | Banking instruction injection | Replace lower-trust tool content |
| Controller | Defined / | Cert. | Post-certification | Full campaign | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| attempted | Events | Trials | Active | Inactive | ||
| RoCo 006 | ||||||
| Bernoulli intervention | ||||||
| Rate tracker | ||||||
| Rate tracker, longer horizon | ||||||
| gpt-5.6-luna | ||||||
Appendix figures & tables35 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Result | Objective | Assumptions | Guarantee / reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Clean imitation | Expected events after certification | Complete clean transcript matching, observable retained certification, continued control | Attainable lower bound, Theorem 1 |
| Switching optimum | Maximize the same event count | Fixed LR rule, fresh randomness, memoryless increasing intervention | Exact optimum, Theorem 2 |
| Sequential optimality | Minimize expected sample demand | Simple hypotheses and fixed error constraints | Classical SPRT comparison ( Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948 ) |
| Binomial power | Maximize fixed-sample certification probability | Bernoulli observations, fixed size, rates below the alternative | Uniform power ordering, Theorem 6 |
| world , , | world , , | |||||||
| specification error | ||||||||
| Status | Formal definition | Decision role | Evaluation example |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal | Planned budget index in protocol sequence | Determines allocated sample budget | Planned episodes on RoCo or tasks on AgentDojo |
| Attempted | Episode dispatched to execution harness | Consumes environment runtime | MuJoCo simulation or Docker tool execution launched |
| Defined | Attempt satisfying channel validity preconditions | Advances defined trial clock | Multi-robot planner emits at least one plan ( ) |
| Evaluable | Defined trial producing valid binary observation | Scored by statistical rule and advances test statistic | Commanded separation parsed against , yielding |
| Undefined | Attempt failing preconditions or crashing ( ) | Excluded from scoring, consuming nominal budget | Planner crash, LLM parse failure, or unparseable trajectory |
| World / system | Controller | Active episodes | Inactive episodes | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal 95% CP | Nominal 95% CP | ||||
| 006 | Bernoulli intervention | ||||
| 006 | Rate tracker | ||||
| 006 | Rate tracker, longer horizon | ||||
| 006 | gpt-5.6-luna | ||||
| 006 | gpt-5.6-sol | ||||
| RoCo 006 | RoCo 037 | ||||||
| Family | Intervention | ||||||
| Phantom retraction | 3 | 1 | 5 | 7 | |||
| Phantom barrier | 5 | 4 | 5 | 11 | |||
| Understated reach | 5 | 5 | 5 | 15 | |||
| Collision suppression | none | 0 | 7 | 13 | |||
| Margin understatement | none | 0 | 7 | 12 | |||
| Campaign / criterion | Registered measurement | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| Bernoulli, 006: B1 | Release at | Hit , |
| Bernoulli, 006: B2 | Rate in target band | Miss , gate calibration |
| Bernoulli, 037: B1 | Release at | Hit , |
| Bernoulli, 037: B2 | Rate in target band | Hit |
| Tracker, 006: B1 | Release at | Hit , |
| Tracker, 006: B2 | Rate in target band | Hit |
| Controller | World | Defined / attempted | Total | Tracker agreement | Missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| gpt-5.6-luna | 006 | 2 | |||
| gpt-5.6-luna | 037 | 2 | |||
| gpt-5.6-sol | 006 | 0 | |||
| Refusing controller | 006 | 1 |
| World 006 | World 037 | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | Framing | Valid | Hit/near | Median | Valid | Hit/near | Median |
| DeepSeek-V4-Flash | Prose | ||||||
| Formula | |||||||
| claude-opus-5 | Prose | n/a | n/a | ||||
| Formula | n/a | n/a | |||||
| claude-sonnet-5 | Prose | n/a | n/a | ||||
| Exhibit | Sampling design | Hit/near | Fraction | Pooled criterion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | temperature-zero, provider-default calls | Failed | ||
| 2 | temperature-zero, provider-default calls | Failed | ||
| 3 | Separate roster, calls per cell | Failed |
| Developer | Selected document | Reported outcome | Unit and evaluation rule |
|---|---|---|---|
| Count and sampling unit reported | |||
| OpenAI | o3-mini System Card (2025-01-31) | successful rollouts | AlphaFold task, rollout-level result |
| Anthropic | Claude 3.7 Sonnet System Card (2025-02-24) | tasks solved | Reverse-engineering challenges, Pass@ |
| Google DeepMind | Gemini 2.5 Pro Model Card (2025-06-27) | challenges solved | Hack the Box, any-success over repeated attempts |
| Denominator absent from the selected claim | |||
| Amazon | Nova Premier safety evaluation (2025-07-07) | Threshold adherence | Denominator unspecified in selected claim |
| Arm | Defined / attempted | Missing | Rate | 95% CP interval | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clean | 1 | ||||
| : context sham | 3 | ||||
| : feedback sham | 0 | ||||
| : coordination sham | 2 |
| AUROC [95% bootstrap CI] | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Arm metadata | Classifier | World ( ) | World ( ) |
| Excluded | Logistic | ||
| Excluded | Tree | ||
| Included | Logistic | ||
| Included | Tree | ||
| A. Classification: AUROC [95% bootstrap CI] | ||
| Prediction | Recorded measurement | Verdict |
| P1, masked attack versus sham | Logistic | Miss |
| P2, sham versus clean | Logistic | Hit |
| Tree | ||
| B. Event rates: and 95% Clopper-Pearson CI | ||
| P3, sham versus clean | Sham , | Hit |
| Campaign / study | Registered criterion | Outcome | Section |
| Robotic replication and presentation controls | |||
| World 037 replication | certified with CP upper below | Miss | D.4 |
| World 037 replication | Clean Channel A non-event rate ( ) | Miss | D.4 |
| Stationary targets | Pooled hit-or-near rate ( across 7 models) | Miss | D.7 |
| Challenge sampling | Retraction pool challenge prediction (L6a) | Hit | D.9 |
| Challenge sampling | Uniform-family challenge coverage (L6b) | Miss | D.9 |
| Concealed mixture | Pure comparator | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alternatives | Weights | Clean power | Value | Clean power | Value | |
| Assessment change | Established consequence | Remaining condition |
|---|---|---|
| Adaptive alternative | Plug-in: certified intervention streams, fixed : . Clean stream: versus (replay) | Fewer certificates do not establish improvement at equal clean-certification power |
| Concealed alternative | Equal four-point mixture: value at clean power . Pure : at (calculation) | Comparator has at least equal clean power. Observable certification still permits switching |
| Minimum samples or delayed certification | World- tracker: becomes under minimum . Later events fall from to (replay) | Fixed deployment-horizon bound persists if certification probability and rates are preserved |
| Continued inspection or revocation | Changes retained-certification or uninspected-operation assumptions | Requires informative signals, valid inference, and a response to detected change |
| Withheld certification | Certificate-dependent payoff is zero (theory) | Excluded by a positive clean-certification requirement. Other risk remains |
| Analysis label | Decision criterion | Recorded measurement | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Recorded gate criteria | |||
| H1, candidate FA | false assurance | , no assurance issued | Pass |
| H2, diversion | B4 capture | Pass | |
| H3, system FA | false assurance | , no assurance issued | Pass |
| H4a, bound | resolution upper CI | maximum upper CI | Pass |
| H4a, ordering | oracle point estimate at least each non-oracle | oracle largest at both budgets | Pass |
| Allocation policy | Resolution, | Resolution, |
|---|---|---|
| , coverage floors | ||
| B1, uniform random | ||
| B3, best first | ||
| B4, active search | ||
| B7, oracle |
| Amendment | Procedure or inferential change | Timing relative to gate |
| 1 | Add secondary likelihood-ratio rate-exclusion process | implemented before gate, indexed after |
| 2 | Require uniform prerequisite exploration for | implemented before gate, indexed after |
| 3 | Replace H4a point prediction with bound and ordering | before gate |
| 4 | Scope H4c and H4d to diagnostic stages | before gate |
| 5 | Reconcile executed episode count | after gate |
| 6 | Retract confounded budget comparison | after gate |
| Family | Intervention | AUROC [95% CI] | Historical class | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | phantom retraction | Below | |||
| F1 | phantom barrier | Below | |||
| F1 | understated reach | Below | |||
| F2 | collision suppression | Above | |||
| F2 | margin understatement | Above | |||
| F2 | stale verdict | Above |
| Intervention | Class | CP upper | Upper | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phantom retraction | Below | below | ||||
| Phantom barrier | Below | below | ||||
| Understated reach | Overlapping | below | ||||
| Collision suppression | Overlapping | below | ||||
| Margin understatement | Overlapping | below | ||||
| Stale approval | Overlapping | below |
| Registered criterion | Verdict | Recorded outcome |
| Allocation and interval-boundary comparisons | ||
| prefix min for interval above boundary | Holds | none (impossible) |
| prefix min for interval above boundary | Holds | none (impossible) |
| prefix min for interval above boundary | Holds | requires |
| prefix min for interval above boundary | Holds | requires |
| prefix min for interval above boundary | Holds | requires |
| provenance | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Calibration | invalid | |||||
| Recorded clean | ||||||
| Clean CP lower | ||||||
| Clean CP upper | invalid |
| RoCo 006: , | RoCo 037: , | |||||||
| Wald | Fixed | LR | Wald | Fixed | LR | |||
| Registration | Expected demand | Fixed sample size | Quantile | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| World | Wald bound | SPRT estimate | Pinsker bound | Minimum | ||||
| Total expected demand | Sum of per-stream allocations | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| World | Wald | SPRT | fixed | ||
| Opportunity score | Clean power | Event value | ||||||
| World | ||||||||
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