AgentSafeEvo: Adversarial Co-Evolution for LLM Agent Safety

LLM agents deployed in real-world environments continually encounter new tasks and safety risks, while execution feedback typically becomes available only after each task is completed. However, existing self-evolving approaches commonly rely on multiple rounds of optimization over fixed and repeatedly accessible task distributions, fundamentally differing from test-time adaptation in real-world deployment, where only experience accumulated from past tasks can be used to improve safety decisions on future unseen tasks. To address this limitation, we propose SafeCoEvo, a test-time Harness-Guard co-evolution framework for LLM agent safety that enables the external safety system to continually adapt from accumulated runtime experience. SafeCoEvo jointly improves two complementary safety capabilities at different timescales: S-Harness rapidly externalizes recent runtime experience into updatable explicit safety knowledge that can promptly influence subsequent tasks, while GuardVPO internalizes accumulated runtime safety experience over a longer timescale into parametric risk-judgment capabilities. By combining short-term rapid adaptation with long-term capability consolidation, SafeCoEvo continually improves the agent's safety capabilities, reducing the unsafe outcome rate by 10.05% while improving the task success rate by 12.15% over the strongest baseline, thereby achieving simultaneous gains in safety and task utility.

Large language models remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts that elicit harmful outputs. Existing safety paradigms typically couple red-teaming and post-training in a closed, policy-centric loop, causing attack discovery to suffer from rapid saturation and limiting the exposure of novel failure modes, while leaving defenses inefficient, rigid, and difficult to transfer across victim models. To this end, we propose EvoSafety, an LLM safety framework built around persistent, inspectable, and reusable external structures. For red teaming, EvoSafety equips the attack policy with an adversarial skill library, enabling continued vulnerability probing through simple library expansion after saturation, while supporting the evolution of adversarial vectors. For defense learning, EvoSafety replaces model-specific safety fine-tuning with a lightweight auxiliary defense model augmented with memory retrieval. This enables efficient, transferable, and model-agnostic safety improvements, while allowing robustness to be enhanced solely through memory updates. With a single training procedure, the defense policy can operate in both Steer and Guard modes: the former activates the victim model's intrinsic defense mechanisms, while the latter directly filters harmful inputs. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of EvoSafety: in Guard mode, it achieves a 99.61% defense success rate, outperforming Qwen3Guard-8B by 14.13% with only 37.5% of its parameters, while preserving reasoning performance on benign queries. Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful text.

Recent advances in foundation models have transformed LLMs from passive conversational systems into autonomous agents capable of reasoning and tool execution. While these capabilities unlock substantial practical value, they also introduce new security risks, as adversaries can manipulate agents into performing harmful actions in real-world environments. Existing defense strategies mitigate such threats but frequently struggle to balance safety and utility, resulting in over-refusal of benign user requests. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.