Graph retrieval-augmented generation (GraphRAG) uses document-derived knowledge graphs to assemble evidence for large language model (LLM) answers. Its security depends on both the seed chunks retrieved for a query and the graph evidence assembled from them, yet attacks on this evidence path remain underexplored. We introduce GraphRAG-LTM, a Layered Threat Modeling framework that tests three nested levels of attacker access. BB Query uses ranking feedback to make query edits under a semantic-similarity constraint and demote relevant seed chunks. WB Query uses retriever gradients for the same objective. Graph-aware WB keeps the white-box adversarial query and deletes bridge triplets from the query-specific evidence graph, disrupting multi-hop evidence propagation through localized graph edits. Across datasets, retrievers, and LLM backbones, rank feedback alone reduces answer quality, gradient access strengthens query attacks, and bridge-triplet deletion further impairs supporting-fact retrieval. Further analyses show how seed retrieval and graph evidence jointly contribute to these failures.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Answer and supporting-fact retrieval precision and recall drops (percentage points from Clean) on HotpotQA-Distractor with BGE and LLaMA3-8B. Blue bars show prior baselines; red hatched bars show our BB Query, WB Query, and Graph-aware WB attacks. Lighter and darker shades denote Flat RAG and GraphRAG, respectively. Several baselines cause substantially larger drops in answer precision and recall on Flat RAG than on GraphRAG, whereas our attacks remain effective on GraphRAG.
Figure 2: Three nested attacker access levels in GraphRAG-LTM , from rank feedback to query-specific graph editing. The diagram shows attack components; the table lists each tier’s permissions.
Figure 3: Attack components across the three access tiers of GraphRAG-LTM . The upper-left panel shows the query attacks of Tiers 1 and 2: BB Query uses ranking feedback, whereas WB Query uses the gradient-guided edits shown; both aim to demote seed chunks. Tier 3 retains WB Query and adds the bridge-triplet cuts shown in the upper-right panel. The bottom panel maps these interventions onto the GraphRAG pipeline: query edits affect seed retrieval at all three tiers, while bridge-triplet cuts affect graph-based evidence expansion only at Tier 3.
HotpotQA-Distractor
MuSiQue
2WikiMultihopQA
Overall
Method
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Avg.
LLaMA3-8B
Clean
52.3
55.8
55.2
23.9
25.6
24.8
13.3
12.6
13.4
30.8
PromptInject
42.7 ↓ 9.6
44.8 ↓ 11.0
45.3 ↓ 9.9
19.1 ↓ 4.8
19.8 ↓ 5.8
20.2 ↓ 4.6
6.6 ↓ 6.7
6.7 ↓ 5.9
7.5 ↓ 5.9
23.6 ↓ 7.2
UAT
39.2 ↓ 13.1
42.6 ↓ 13.2
41.4 ↓ 13.8
14.0 ↓ 9.9
15.1 ↓ 10.5
15.3 ↓ 9.5
6.0 ↓ 7.3
6.9 ↓ 5.7
7.0 ↓ 6.4
20.8 ↓ 10.0
IndirectPI
49.4 ↓ 2.9
53.0 ↓ 2.8
52.2 ↓ 3.0
16.5 ↓ 7.4
17.6 ↓ 8.0
17.2 ↓ 7.6
11.7 ↓ 1.6
11.7 ↓ 0.9
12.2 ↓ 1.2
26.8 ↓ 4.0
Table 1: Answer F1 (%) across three datasets and three retrievers under two LLM settings. Arrows show percentage-point changes from the corresponding Clean score. Within each LLM setting, dark/light blue highlight the lowest/second-lowest attacked F1 in each column, and the associated two declines are bold. Avg. is the unweighted mean of the nine dataset–retriever scores. Corresponding Retrieval F1 results are in Appendix A.1 .
Figure 4: Component ablation on HotpotQA-Distractor. Bars show Answer F1, supporting-fact Retrieval F1, and mean retrieved chunks under clean, query-only, graph-only, and combined attacks.
Figure 5: Answer F1 and ROUGE-L versus query substitution budget on HotpotQA-Distractor. Both variants use 5% bridge-triplet cuts, paired with WB Query (Graph-aware WB) or BB Query (BB Query + KG Attack). Main-table results use Tmax=5 .
Figure 6: Answer F1 and supporting-fact Retrieval F1 versus graph deletion ratio α on HotpotQA-Distractor (BGE, LLaMA3-8B; Tmax=5 ). BEC cuts bridge triplets; RND deletes the same number randomly.
PPR
Community
Method
Ans F1
SP F1
Ans F1
SP F1
Clean
50.12
29.62
54.16
32.51
PromptInject
39.23 ↓ 10.89
28.87 ↓ 0.75
43.26 ↓ 10.90
31.93 ↓ 0.58
UAT
36.05 ↓ 14.07
29.35 ↓ 0.27
40.69 ↓ 13.47
32.43 ↓ 0.08
IndirectPI
40.81 ↓ 9.31
28.60 ↓ 1.02
42.77 ↓ 11.39
31.94 ↓ 0.57
PoisonedRAG
36.68 ↓ 13.44
28.14 ↓ 1.48
38.41 ↓ 15.75
31.73 ↓ 0.78
Table 2: Transfer F1 (%) on HotpotQA-Distractor ( N=7,405 ). Arrows beside scores show changes from Clean; blue shades mark the two lowest attacked scores, and bold changes mark the two largest drops in each column.
Appendix figures & tables3 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
HotpotQA-Distractor
MuSiQue
2WikiMultihopQA
Overall
Method
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Avg.
LLaMA3-8B
Clean
33.4
38.3
38.3
37.4
40.4
40.5
29.9
35.8
35.7
36.6
PromptInject
32.2 ↓ 1.2
37.3 ↓ 1.0
37.6 ↓ 0.7
36.8 ↓ 0.6
39.3 ↓ 1.1
39.5 ↓ 1.0
27.0 ↓ 2.9
35.2 ↓ 0.6
34.7 ↓ 1.0
35.5 ↓ 1.1
UAT
32.4 ↓ 1.0
38.1 ↓ 0.2
38.0 ↓ 0.3
36.4 ↓ 1.0
39.9 ↓ 0.5
40.0 ↓ 0.5
29.2 ↓ 0.7
35.9 ↑ 0.1
35.8 ↑ 0.1
36.2 ↓ 0.4
IndirectPI
34.0 ↑ 0.6
39.7 ↑ 1.4
39.7 ↑ 1.4
38.0 ↑ 0.6
41.1 ↑ 0.7
40.9 ↑ 0.4
29.4 ↓ 0.5
36.7 ↑ 0.9
36.4 ↑ 0.7
37.3 ↑ 0.7
Appendix
Table 3: Supporting-fact Retrieval F1 (%) across three datasets and retrievers. Avg. is the unweighted mean of nine settings; arrows show change from Clean within each model. Dark/light blue mark the lowest/second-lowest reported attack scores per column.
Method
Contriever
BGE
mxbai
Clean
22.6
22.6
21.8
PromptInject
19.1 ↓ 3.5
17.4 ↓ 5.2
18.1 ↓ 3.7
UAT
6.2 ↓ 16.4
7.6 ↓ 15.0
7.5 ↓ 14.3
IndirectPI
21.5 ↓ 1.1
23.4 ↑ 0.8
21.2 ↓ 0.6
PoisonedRAG
23.0 ↑ 0.4
22.8 ↑ 0.2
23.8 ↑ 2.0
HotFlip
22.0 ↓ 0.6
19.9 ↓ 2.7
20.5 ↓ 1.3
Appendix
Table 4: Supplementary TriviaQA Answer F1 (%) on 100 questions with LLaMA3-8B across three retrievers. Arrows show changes from Clean ; dark/light blue mark the lowest/second-lowest attacked scores per column.
Figure 7: Answer F1 on HotpotQA-Distractor with five additional readers under the LLaMA3-8B graph-extraction setting.
Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG) enhances the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their responses in structured knowledge graphs. Leveraging community detection and relation filtering techniques, GraphRAG systems demonstrate inherent resistance to traditional RAG attacks, such as text poisoning and prompt injection. However, in this paper, we find that the security of GraphRAG systems fundamentally relies on the topological integrity of the underlying graph, which can be undermined by implicitly corrupting the logical connections, without altering surface-level text semantics. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose LogicPoison, a novel attack framework that targets logical reasoning rather than injecting false contents. Specifically, LogicPoison employs a type-preserving entity swapping mechanism to perturb both global logic hubs for disrupting overall graph connectivity and query-specific reasoning bridges for severing essential multi-hop inference paths. This approach effectively reroutes valid reasoning into dead ends while maintaining surface-level textual plausibility. Comprehensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that LogicPoison successfully bypasses GraphRAG's defenses, significantly degrading performance and outperforming state-of-the-art baselines in both effectiveness and stealth. Our code is available at \textcolor{blue}https://github.com/Jord8061/logicPoison.
Yilin Xiao, Jin Chen, Qinggang Zhang +6
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University · Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) by retrieving relevant information from external knowledge bases to provide more accurate, contextually informed, and up-to-date responses. However, this reliance on external knowledge introduces significant security vulnerabilities, as many RAG systems (e.g., Google Search) rely on large and unsanitized data repositories (e.g., Reddit). In this paper, we unveil a novel threat in which attackers steer the RAG system's response by injecting malicious passages into its knowledge base. When a user's query contains attacker-specified trigger words, the RAG retrieves and refers to these malicious passages, enabling the attacker to steer the response without altering the user input or modifying the RAG weights. BadRAG operates in two phases: (i) malicious passages are optimized to be retrieved exclusively when trigger words appear in user queries; (ii) these passages are meticulously crafted to achieve adversarial generation objectives, including denial of service, sentiment manipulation, context leakage, and tool misuse. Our experiments show that injecting just 10 malicious passages (0.04% of the external corpora) achieves a 98.2% retrieval success rate and increases negative response rates from 0.22% to 72% for queries containing triggers.
Jiaqi Xue, Mengxin Zheng, Yebowen Hu +3
University of Central Florida · Emory University · Samsung Research America
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) improves the factuality of large language models by grounding responses in external documents, but it also exposes a critical security vulnerability: adversarial documents injected into the knowledge database can enter the context window and steer the model toward targeted incorrect answers. Existing post-retrieval defenses rely on instruction following, parametric knowledge, or text-level consistency, all of which can be imitated or optimized against by adaptive attackers. We propose RAGSentinel, a training-free, label-free defense for black-box RAG systems. RAGSentinel uses a surrogate encoder to measure query-conditioned hidden-state shifts induced by retrieved documents, removes shared topic directions, and filters poisoned documents as geometric outliers from a robust majority consensus. We prove that, under an honest-majority assumption and a representation-level separation condition, RAGSentinel exactly recovers a poison-free majority-sized context. Experiments across three question-answering datasets, three LLM families, and multiple poisoning attacks show that RAGSentinel consistently achieves low attack success rates while preserving competitive accuracy and remaining effective against adaptive attacks with full pipeline knowledge.
Yueyang Quan, Anjun Gao, Yufei Xia +2
University of North Texas · University of Louisville