A Graph-Based Analysis of Comparability, Scale, and Attribution in Private Transformer Inference
Organizations: Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Abstract
Rising privacy concerns around large language models have accelerated research in private Transformer inference (PTI). Synthesizing the empirical claims in this line of research, however, is hindered by multi-dimensional cryptographic progress and inconsistent evaluation contracts. In this work, we systematize the field by constructing an empirical graph of 62 PTI systems, mapping system attributes to node features and evaluation compatibility to edges. A three-tiered analysis of this graph illuminates the state of private inference. Node-level attribution shows that cryptographic progress drives performance gains across most systems, yet always co-occurs with other factors (model fidelity, hardware, cost accounting). Edge-level auditing shows that only 1 of 1891 candidate system pairs is directly comparable under shared assumptions. Finally, graph-level analysis shows that the scaling frontier of private inference has plateaued at 13B parameters and projects the cost of deploying current PTI techniques on production-scale Transformers. Overall, this graph-based framework equips the community to evaluate PTI claims transparently and channel technical speedups into deployment-scale private inference.
Figures & tables
| Backbone | Encoder | Decoder |
|---|---|---|
| MPC-based | MPCFormer [ 6 ] , MPCViT [ 29 ] , RNAViT [ 48 ] , SALViT [ 30 ] , SecBERT [ 15 ] , SecFormer [ 49 ] , PrivTF [ 50 ] , Curl [ 51 ] [MM], Ditto [ 52 ] [MM], PUMA [ 4 ] [MM], PrivMLLM [ 31 ] [MM], SHAFT [ 32 ] [MM], SIGMA [ 5 ] [MM], FuseFSS [ 53 ] [MM], Mosformer [ 54 ] [MM] | Comet [ 55 ] , MARILL [ 56 ] , SecureGPT [ 57 ] , SecureTLM [ 58 ] , Curl [ 51 ] [MM], Ditto [ 52 ] [MM], MERGE [ 27 ] [MM], PUMA [ 4 ] [MM], PrivMLLM [ 31 ] [MM], SHAFT [ 32 ] [MM], SIGMA [ 5 ] [MM], FLUTE [ 59 ] , MPCache [ 60 ] , FuseFSS [ 53 ] [MM], Mosformer [ 54 ] [MM] |
| HE-based | EncryptionFriendlyLLM [ 9 ] , THEX [ 8 ] , NEXUS [ 7 ] [MM], PowerSoftmax [ 61 ] [MM], AEGIS [ 39 ] , ATLAS [ 62 ] [MM], ELLMo [ 63 ] , Euston [ 64 ] [MM], Powerformer [ 36 ] , PriTran [ 65 ] , THOR [ 34 ] | ENSI [ 66 ] , EncryptedLLM [ 67 ] , HEDecoding [ 68 ] , PracticalLLM [ 69 ] , NEXUS [ 7 ] [MM], PowerSoftmax [ 61 ] [MM], ATLAS [ 62 ] [MM], Cachemir [ 13 ] , Euston [ 64 ] [MM], ScalingPPML [ 41 ] |
| Hybrid MPC–HE | BOLT [ 11 ] , CipherFormer [ 70 ] , East [ 71 ] , Iron [ 10 ] , LLMEncryptedPrompt [ 72 ] , Nimbus [ 14 ] , Primer [ 73 ] , BLB [ 74 ] [MM], BumbleBee [ 12 ] [MM], CipherPrune [ 75 ] [MM], EncFormer [ 40 ] [MM], SMASH [ 76 ] [MM], SecMoE [ 38 ] [MM] | AERO [ 77 ] , CipherGPT [ 78 ] , PermLLM [ 79 ] , BLB [ 74 ] [MM], BumbleBee [ 12 ] [MM], CipherPrune [ 75 ] [MM], CryptoGen [ 37 ] , CryptoMoE [ 80 ] , EncFormer [ 40 ] [MM], SMASH [ 76 ] [MM], SecMoE [ 38 ] [MM] |
| Other / adjacent | STIP [ 81 ] [MM], CASCADE [ 82 ] [MM] | STIP [ 81 ] [MM], CASCADE [ 82 ] [MM] |
| Contract category | Fields audited |
|---|---|
| Scale and workload | Largest evaluated model, parameter count, inference mode (encoder / decoder / encoder–decoder) |
| Privacy and threat model | Protected asset, leakage scope, adversary model, party model |
| Mechanism and fidelity | Mechanism (MPC / HE / hybrid), fidelity class (exact, approximate, architecture-modified, task-limited) |
| Cost and deployment | Latency, communication, rounds, cost scope (online / offline / end-to-end), amortization, network regime |
| Baseline and reporting | Named baseline, in-corpus or external baseline, missing or limiting fields, sufficiency for cross-paper comparison |
| Gate | PIC category | Evaluation predicate |
|---|---|---|
| G1: Privacy | Privacy and threat model | Protected assets and leakage scope match |
| G2: Threat | Privacy and threat model | Adversary model and party topology match |
| G3: Workload | Scale and workload | Evaluated model architecture and workload match (e.g., encoder vs decoders) |
| G4: Fidelity | Mechanism and fidelity | Model preservation or approximation degree matches |
| G5: Cost | Cost and deployment | Cost accounting boundaries and execution phases match (e.g., end-to-end vs online-only) |
| G6: Amortization | Cost and deployment | Batch and sequence amortization assumptions match |
| Family (env.) | Contract caveat | Metric | 7–13B (published) | 70B (proj.) | 405B (proj.) |
| FSS, 2PC+dealer (SIGMA) | online-only, GPU | time/pass | 23–38 s | 115 s | 384 s |
| comm/pass | 12–19 GB | 58 GB | 188 GB | ||
| FSS key/query | 255–419 GB | 1.4 TB | 4.9 TB | ||
| 3PC secret sharing (PUMA) | end-to-end, 20 Gbps LAN | time/token | 164 s | 27 min | 2.6 h |
| comm/token | 2.1 GB | 21 GB | 119 GB | ||
| Hybrid HE+MPC, 2PC (BumbleBee) | end-to-end, CPU | time/token | 832 s | 2.3 h | 13 h |
Appendix figures & tables8 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Status | Papers | Share |
|---|---|---|
| Sufficient | 1/62 | 1.6% |
| Partial | 43/62 | 69.4% |
| Insufficient | 18/62 | 29.0% |
| Scenario | Competitive relations | Baseline-compatible claims | Protocol/mixed | Non-protocol primary |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Locked labels | 1/1891 | 0/62 | 52/62 | 40/62 |
| Optimistic progress attribution | 1/1891 | 0/62 | 52/62 | 40/62 |
| Strict progress attribution | 1/1891 | 0/62 | 52/62 | 40/62 |
| Optimistic comparability | 93/1891 | 2/62 | 52/62 | 40/62 |
| Strict comparability | 1/1891 | 0/62 | 52/62 | 40/62 |
| Drop moderate/boundary confidence | 1/1891 | 0/62 | 45/49 | 31/49 |
| Contract field | Agree | Disagree | V. silent | Both silent | H. silent | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cryptographic backbone | 61 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 98.4% |
| Inference regime | 37 | 1 | 23 | 1 | 0 | 60.7% |
| Privacy scope | 58 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 93.5% |
| Adversary model | 54 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 87.1% |
| Party model | 39 | 19 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 62.9% |
| Model fidelity | 46 | 16 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 74.2% |
| Dominant deployment constraint | Tends to favor | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Interactive, WAN / high round-trip time | Low-round HE or few-round hybrid | Each interaction round pays the round-trip, so round-heavy MPC inflates wall-clock latency even when its LAN numbers look strong. |
| Batch / high throughput, amortizable | HE with SIMD packing; amortized-offline hybrid | Ciphertext batching and reusable preprocessing amortize across many queries, where per-query latency is secondary. |
| LAN / high bandwidth, low round-trip time | MPC or hybrid | Cheap rounds make interactive protocols competitive or fastest; HE ciphertext and compute overhead rarely pays off here. |
| Bandwidth-constrained link | HE or low-communication designs | MPC communication volume can dominate cost; HE trades bytes for local computation. |
| Model weights must stay private | Input-and-model 2PC (HE or hybrid); avoid weight-revealing split or statistical schemes | Protecting weights is a hard constraint largely orthogonal to speed; some fast schemes assume public weights. |
| A non-colluding helper or third party is acceptable | 3PC or helper-assisted MPC | A helper trusted for non-collusion unlocks cheaper nonlinear and truncation protocols. |
| Year | System | Params | Mechanism | Party model | Model fidelity | Cost scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Iron | 0.34B | Hybrid MPC–HE | 2PC | exact | end-to-end |
| 2023 | PUMA | 7B | MPC | 3PC | approximate | end-to-end |
| 2024 | SIGMA | 13B | MPC | helper-assisted | approximate | online-only |
| Pattern | Why it looks comparable | Contract issue | Gate | Sound reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Online latency vs. end-to-end cost | Both report private-inference latency. | One number is online-only or amortized; the other counts more of the end-to-end cost or assumes different reuse. | G5, G6 | Not directly comparable unless cost scope and reuse assumptions are aligned. |
| LAN result vs. WAN claim | Both report latency for the same broad model family. | The measurement is LAN, simulated, or unspecified while the motivating deployment is WAN-like; rounds convert round-trip time into wall-clock cost. | G7, G8 | Supports a LAN or local-deployment claim, not an unrestricted WAN claim. |
| Encoder classification vs. decoder generation | Both are Transformer systems built on secure-computation primitives. | The workloads differ in regime and in sequence/generation semantics (per-token vs. per-sequence vs. per-batch). | G3 (often G4) | Different comparison neighborhoods unless workload and fidelity are normalized. |
| Model-preserving vs. model-modifying | Both target the same model family or benchmark. | The faster result depends on approximation, retraining, pruning, distillation, quantization, or architecture change. | G4 | Possibly workload/fidelity-shift progress; not pure protocol progress. |
Transformer Inference
Transformer inference studies how trained Transformer models produce outputs efficiently, accurately, and securely across hardware and context lengths.
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