cs.MAOct 14, 2026

Exact Cut Complexity of Equal-Length Proportional Cake Cutting

Authors: Yasushi Kawase, Bodhayan Roy, Mohammad Azharuddin Sanpui

Organizations: Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan · Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur, Kharagpur, West Bengal, India

Abstract

We study proportional cake cutting under an equal-length constraint, where each of nn agents must receive a bundle of length exactly 1/n1/n that is worth at least 1/n1/n to that agent. Our main result determines the exact worst-case number of cuts needed to guarantee such an allocation, namely 2n−22n-2 for every nn. This improves on the previously known quadratic upper bound. The proof combines the constrained necklace-splitting theorem with a recursive assignment argument based on Hall's theorem. The same bound extends to the stronger requirement of envy-freeness when nn is a prime power, and an O(n1.525)O(n^{1.525}) upper bound holds for arbitrary nn. We then ask whether such allocations can be computed. We first show that no deterministic protocol in the Robertson--Webb model terminates after finitely many queries on every instance and always returns an exact equal-length proportional allocation, even for two agents with identical valuations. For every ε>0\varepsilon>0, however, O(n2/ε)O(n^2/\varepsilon) queries suffice to produce an allocation in which every agent receives a bundle of length exactly 1/n1/n and value at least 1/n−ε1/n-\varepsilon, again using at most 2n−22n-2 cuts. Finally, we augment the Robertson--Webb model with two-knife queries. We show that recursive balanced halving attains the optimal bound of 2n−22n-2 cuts when nn is a power of two. For arbitrary nn, we give a procedure using O(nlog⁡n)O(n\log n) cuts.

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