Rent-Seeking Language Models: Reward Models Set the Prices, Frequent Audits Curb the Rent

Training language models via reinforcement learning often relies on imperfect proxy rewards, since ground truth rewards that precisely define the intended behavior are rarely available. Standard metrics for assessing the quality of proxy rewards, such as ranking accuracy, treat incorrect rewards as strictly harmful. In this work, however, we highlight that not all deviations from the ground truth are equal. By theoretically analyzing which outputs attract probability during policy gradient optimization, we categorize reward errors according to their effect on the increase in ground truth reward. The analysis establishes that reward errors, though conventionally viewed as harmful, can also be benign or even beneficial by preventing the policy from stalling around outputs with mediocre ground truth reward. We then present two practical implications of our theory. First, for reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), we develop reward model evaluation metrics that account for the harmfulness of reward errors. Compared to standard ranking accuracy, these metrics typically correlate better with the performance of a language model after RLHF, yet gaps remain in robustly evaluating reward models. Second, we provide insights for reward design in settings with verifiable rewards. A key theme underlying our results is that the effectiveness of a proxy reward function depends heavily on its interaction with the initial policy and learning algorithm.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Single-axis mitigations of reward-model biases (e.g., reducing proxy reliance on length, sycophancy, or style) can rotate optimization pressure onto correlated proxies rather than eliminate it, a failure mode we call reward bias substitution. The failure is enabled by a measurement-versus-optimization gap between audit and policy-induced distributions during mitigation evaluation and policy training. We formalize mitigation outcomes into a regime taxonomy and prove that successful mitigation, bias substitution, and overcorrection produce identical observables under any audit-distribution scoring, including ranking accuracy and win-rate, even when granted oracle access to the true reward. Across published preference-learning mitigation work, no method we survey reports the evidence needed to certify successful mitigation. Augmenting evaluation with policy-induced distributions while tracking multiple biases provably closes the gap, and we translate this into actionable prescriptions for mitigation methods and benchmarks. We demonstrate bias substitution in language model RLHF, where a length penalty during GRPO training compresses responses as intended yet redirects optimization pressure onto confidence calibration, driving the policy into overconfidence while factual free-form accuracy falls. We also show a published length-debiasing operator that zeroes reward-length correlation on the audit distribution but reintroduces bias under best-of-N selection on three of four SOTA reward models, and a length-sycophancy coupling whose direction reverses under human-LLM judge disagreement.