GeoCloak: An Agentic Framework for Semantics-Preserving Geolocation Privacy via Peripheral Clue Manipulation
Authors: Yixin Wu, Mingjie Li, Yun Shen, Michael Backes, Yang Zhang
Organizations: The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou) · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security · HPE
The rapid advancement of large vision language models (LVLMs) has made geolocation inference from images highly accurate and accessible. This poses serious privacy risks: a passive adversary with black-box LVLM access can infer a user's location from a single photo with no metadata. Existing protection methods rely almost exclusively on adversarial perturbation, which introduces perceptible visual artifacts and utility degradation. We identify the visual-geolocation asymmetry: geolocation-decisive clues, such as street signs, tend to be visually peripheral but dominate location inference. Exploiting this asymmetry, we propose GeoCloak, an agentic framework for semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection. It acts as a clue-aware planner that analyzes each image to identify geolocation-relevant clues, dispatches targeted semantic edits to directly suppress peripheral clues, and autonomously configures adversarial perturbation to further suppress residual geolocation features, all under iterative utility-aware feedback. We evaluate GeoCloak on four diverse datasets spanning 108 countries and 576 cities against five LVLMs and three inference methods. GeoCloak reduces overall city-level accuracy from 41.2% to 9.9%, approximately half of the best-performing baseline, while achieving substantially superior utility preservation both qualitatively and quantitatively. We hope this work takes a meaningful step toward practical, semantics-preserving geolocation privacy protection, giving users greater control over the location information inadvertently embedded in their shared images.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: An illustration of the visual-geolocation asymmetry. The most decisive geolocation clue (ranking score 1.0) is a small, visually peripheral sign in Khmer script.
Figure 2: Overview of GeoCloak . A utility check ensures visual quality, and ClueAgent re-evaluates the image as a protection check, terminating when the correct location can no longer be inferred. See multi-turn examples in Appendix A .
GeoBench
Im2GPS3k
Dataset-GSS
Dataset-PCW
Exempt Rate
37.5%
53.4%
21.0%
55.3%
Table 1: Proportion of images labeled as Exempt (containing intentional landmarks) across the four evaluation datasets.
Level-Wise Acc.
Distance-Based Acc.
Dataset
Type
City
State
Country
@1km
@25km
@100km
Overall
Exempt
73.0%
84.0%
93.9%
30.8%
82.3%
86.0%
Non-Exempt
48.3%
58.9%
87.9%
16.1%
55.2%
61.6%
Table 2: Geolocation prediction performance measured by level-wise accuracy (%) and distance accuracy (%) on exempt images and non-exempt images. We leverage zero-shot inference and Gemini-2.5-Pro.
Zero-Shot
GeoVista
GeoMiner
Dataset
Defense
Gemini-2.5-Pro
Gemini-3.1-Pro
GPT-5.4
o3
Qwen3.5-Plus
GeoVista
Gemini-2.5-Pro
Gemini-3.1-Pro
GPT-5.4
o3
Qwen3.5-Plus
Overall
GeoBench
Initial
74.1%
81.9%
63.1%
71.6%
54.7%
63.7%
70.6%
77.2%
58.8%
62.5%
53.1%
66.5%
M-Attack
54.4%
62.8%
37.2%
47.2%
33.1%
42.8%
50.9%
60.6%
38.8%
36.9%
28.4%
44.8%
GeoShield
53.1%
64.1%
36.2%
40.3%
29.4%
35.9%
50.0%
60.3%
35.0%
30.3%
28.4%
42.1%
GeoCloak
17.5%
22.2%
18.1%
25.3%
11.2%
21.6%
19.1%
22.5%
12.2%
16.9%
7.5%
17.6%
Im2GPS3k
Initial
30.0%
30.9%
24.0%
29.6%
16.3%
18.9%
30.0%
26.6%
21.5%
19.7%
17.2%
24.1%
Table 3: Geolocation inference performance measured by city-level accuracy (%) under no defense (Initial) and three defenses (GeoShield [ 31 ] , M-Attack [ 29 ] , and GeoCloak ). Bold indicates the lowest (best) value within each inference method, model, and dataset group. ↓ lower is better. GeoCloak uses Gemini-2.5-Pro and Gemini-2.5-Flash-Image. Results for additional metrics are provided in Table 13 .
Attacker
Mechanism
Initial
GeoCloak
GeoCLIP [ 4 ]
Embedding-based retrieval
12.1
5.0
GeoSeer [ 10 ]
Commercial black-box tool
30.7
5.7
Table 4: City-level accuracy of extra geolocation attackers.
Figure 3: Qualitative comparison of defense methods. Numbers indicate how many of the 11 attackers, each corresponding to a unique (model, inference method) pair, successfully geolocate the image. We present cases where all defenses largely succeed. Best viewed ( Appendix G ) with zoom to observe severe visual artifacts, such as floating text, superimposed objects, spatial distortions, and unnatural cropping.
Defense
Naturalness ↑
Semantic Preservation ↑
Overall Quality ↑
GeoShield
2.23
3.68
2.53
M-Attack
2.31
3.77
2.63
GeoCloak
4.57
4.45
4.43
Table 5: Human perception ratings on a five-point Likert scale. Higher is better ( ↑ ).
Dataset
Defense
CLIP Sim ↑
BERT Score ↑
BLEU ↑
ROUGE-L ↑
Overall
M-Attack
0.7719
0.9124
0.0968
0.3839
GeoShield
0.4209
0.9047
0.0766
0.3480
GeoCloak
0.9197
0.9158
0.1136
0.4054
Table 6: Utility comparison of defense methods across four datasets. Higher is better ( ↑ higher is better). Bold indicates the best value per dataset.
Figure 4: Visual quality comparison with zoomed-in regions on a Dataset-PCW sample, where adversarial perturbation is the key skill driving GeoCloak ’s successful protection. Zoomed-in crops (top) reveal that GeoCloak introduces imperceptible perturbations compared to GeoShield and M-Attack. Comparison on other datasets are in Appendix G .
Figure 5: Skill usage analysis of GeoCloak . (a) Distribution of all skill invocations and the utility preservation rate for each skill, where Utility OK indicates that the CLIP similarity remains above a pre-defined threshold and the main object is unmodified. (b) Breakdown of skills used in the first successful turn recorded at each exact protection level (city, state, country); runs that directly reach a stronger level are not back-counted at lower levels.
Design Choice
Overall ↓
Initial
24.1%
GeoCloak w/o Semantic Editing
15.4%
GeoCloak w/o Perturbation
5.1%
Closed-source alternative †
6.3%
Open-source alternative ‡
7.4%
GeoCloak (Full)
4.0%
Table 7: Ablation study on GeoCloak design choices. Overall city-level attack success rate (%) is averaged across 11 attacker configurations on the Im2GPS3k.
Figure 6: Cost and elapsed time distribution of GeoCloak . API cost is computed from the total token usage of GeoCloak based on the official Gemini pricing [ 15 ] .
Attacker
Setting
GeoBench
Im2GPS3k
Dataset-GSS
Dataset-PCW
Overall
Naive
Initial
69.1
26.2
34.9
36.1
43.4
GeoCloak
18.9
4.8
9.3
8.2
11.1
GeoCloak (JPEG)
20.0
4.9
9.6
8.2
11.5
Adaptive
Initial
66.6
26.5
32.8
33.0
41.6
GeoCloak
24.0
8.0
15.2
11.9
15.9
Table 8: City-level accuracy (%) over five LVLMs under naive and adaptive attackers with zero-shot prompting, before and after GeoCloak defense, and (for the naive attacker) after additional JPEG compression.
Appendix figures & tables12 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 7: A multi-turn GeoCloak protection example. Starting from Rabat, Morocco, EditAgent first replaces the Moroccan license plate with a French one, shifting ClueAgent ’s prediction to Casablanca, Morocco. A subsequent attempt to change the shop sign fails the utility check twice and is rolled back. EditAgent then switches strategy to replace the Moroccan sofa with a European one, successfully redirecting the predicted location to Oran, Algeria, with minimal visual change across all turns.
Strategy
Application Scenario
Original
Protected
How it protects
Replace Text
Signs, street names, or any visible text reveal the location.
Replacing Romanian sign text on the red shop signs with Polish words shifts the language clue and misleads the predicted location from Chişinău, Moldova to Warsaw, Poland.
Replace Object
Location-specific objects are present (e.g., post boxes and traffic signs).
Replacing the American highway sign with a Canadian highway sign shifts the predicted location from Southfield, Michigan, USA, to Windsor, Ontario, Canada.
Erase Object
An object, sign, text, or logo is too specific to replace but small enough to remove cleanly.
Removing all text from the orange billboard shifts the predicted location from San José, Costa Rica, to San Salvador, El Salvador.
Add Decoy
Dominant clues are too large or structural to edit or perturb directly.
Adding a small Saguaro cactus growing among the rocks shifts the predicted location from Khomas, Namibia to Tucson, Arizona, US.
Style Transfer
Apply only to small or background elements.
Changing the architectural style of the greenish building on the left from Russian neoclassical to German neoclassical shifts the predicted location from Moscow, Russia to Warsaw, Poland.
Appendix
Table 9: Overview of the five Semantic Editing strategies in EditAgent . The EditAgent generates plans for modifying the image based on the clues obtained from ClueAgent . In all cases, modifications are subtle and semantics-preserving, yet sufficient to redirect ClueAgent ’s predicted location.
Dataset
#Samples
#Countries
#Cities
IM2GPS3K
500
74
297
Dataset-GSS
500
61
161
Dataset-PCW
267
6
76
GeoBench
512
64
117
Overall
1,779
108
576
Appendix
Table 10: Geographic coverage of the four benchmark datasets.
#Clues
Initial
GeoCloak
GeoShield
M-Attack
2
3.83/11
0.00/11
1.67/11
1.33/11
3
5.89/11
1.11/11
2.22/11
3.33/11
4
6.39/11
1.35/11
3.36/11
4.00/11
5
6.76/11
1.70/11
3.02/11
3.99/11
6
6.58/11
1.74/11
3.17/11
3.82/11
7
5.12/11
1.29/11
2.35/11
2.29/11
Appendix
Table 11: Mean number of successful attackers per image, stratified by the number of clues extracted by GeoMiner.
Geo-identifiability
Initial
GeoCloak
GeoShield
M-Attack
Low (1–4/11)
2.18/11
0.35/11
0.39/11
0.57/11
Medium (5–7/11)
5.98/11
0.86/11
1.73/11
2.39/11
High (8–11/11)
9.84/11
2.75/11
5.69/11
6.91/11
Overall
6.55/11
1.57/11
3.13/11
3.90/11
Appendix
Table 12: Mean number of successful attackers per image, stratified by initial geo-identifiability. Lower is better for all defense columns.
Level-Wise Acc.
Distance Acc.
Model
Method
Defense
City ↓
State ↓
Country ↓
@1km ↓
@25km ↓
@100km ↓
Gemini-2.5-Pro
Zero-Shot
Initial
48.3%
58.9%
87.9%
16.1%
55.2%
61.6%
M-Attack
32.3%
36.5%
55.2%
11.2%
34.8%
38.0%
GeoShield
26.0%
27.7%
44.4%
9.6%
26.7%
29.8%
GeoCloak
9.5%
10.9%
18.0%
2.8%
9.8%
11.9%
GeoMiner
Initial
46.9%
59.1%
88.2%
30.2%
53.7%
62.1%
Appendix
Table 13: Geolocation accuracy (%) under no defense and each defense (aggregated across all datasets). All metrics ↓ lower is better.
Figure 8: Visual quality comparison with zoomed-in regions on a Im2GPS3k sample. It serves as a supplementary illustration to Figure 3 , providing additional visual comparison details Zoomed-in crops (top) reveal that GeoCloak introduces negligible utility degradation compared to GeoShield and M-Attack.
Figure 9: Visual quality comparison with zoomed-in regions on a Dataset-PCW sample. It serves as a supplementary illustration to Figure 3 , providing additional visual comparison details Zoomed-in crops (top) reveal that GeoCloak introduces negligible utility degradation compared to GeoShield and M-Attack.
Figure 10: Adversarial perturbation quality comparison. Each row shows a case where adversarial perturbation is the key skill in GeoCloak ’s successful protection turn. Numbers indicate attackers that successfully geolocate the image and CLIP similarity. GeoCloak introduces substantially fewer visual artifacts than GeoShield and M-Attack while achieving equal or superior protection.
Defense
Naturalness ↑
Semantic Preservation ↑
Overall Quality ↑
GeoShield
2.23 [2.06, 2.41]
3.68 [3.59, 3.76]
2.53 [2.38, 2.68]
M-Attack
2.31 [2.15, 2.47]
3.77 [3.67, 3.86]
2.63 [2.49, 2.78]
GeoCloak
4.57 [4.44, 4.69]
4.45 [4.34, 4.56]
4.43 [4.30, 4.55]
Appendix
Table 14: Complete human perception results on a five-point Likert scale. Each cell reports the mean and image-level bootstrap 95% confidence interval after averaging the two annotators’ ratings for each source image and defense. Higher is better ( ↑ ).
Initial
M-Attack
GeoShield
GeoCloak
Model
Method
API
Ref.
API
Ref.
API
Ref.
API
Ref.
Gemini-2.5-Pro
Zero-Shot
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
GeoMiner
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Gemini-3.1-Pro
Zero-Shot
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
GeoMiner
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
GPT-5.4
Zero-Shot
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Appendix
Table 15: API error and safety refusal rates (%) per model, inference method, and defense method. API Error : request timeout or image-size limit (infrastructure failure). Safety Refusal : model explicitly declined to geolocalize ( e.g. , “I cannot help with that”).
Privacy protection in vision-language models limits sensitive information exposure while preserving useful image understanding and multimodal reasoning.
Multimodal large reasoning models (MLRMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex visual understanding. However, this very power introduces a critical yet underexplored privacy threat: adversaries can exploit MLRMs to precisely infer users' geographic locations from casually shared photographs, by performing structured reasoning over subtle visual cues such as architectural styles, vegetation, and lighting conditions. In this work, we present a systematic study of MLRM-driven geolocation privacy leakage. We first reveal that refusal-based safeguards are critically insufficient, as carefully crafted jailbreak prompts can raise model response rates to 100%. We further identify that existing defenses, which inject imperceptible perturbations into shared images, suffer from structural limitations intrinsic to their pixel-space optimization, resulting in degraded black-box transferability and pronounced visual artifacts. Motivated by these findings, we propose a diffusion-based framework that provides targeted, proactive defense against geolocation privacy leakage. By injecting perturbations into the latent space of a diffusion model during reverse sampling, our method operates directly on high-level semantic representations, thereby resolving the effectiveness-utility bottlenecks by construction. We further ground our optimization with GeoCLIP, a model explicitly aligned with GPS coordinates, as a surrogate to pinpoint and disrupt the geographic signals that MLRMs exploit for location inference. This targeted semantic disruption yields significantly stronger black-box transferability while preserving perceptual image quality, offering a seamless integration on social media platforms. Code is available at https://github.com/RachelWolowitz/Hiding_in_plain_sight.
Yining Wang, Xi Li, Mi Zhang +4
Fudan University · East China University of Science and Technology · Shanghai University of Electric Power
Recent efforts have demonstrated the strong capabilities of Multimodal Large Reasoning Models (MLRMs) in geographic reasoning. By jointly analyzing subtle visual cues, these models can infer the locations of photos, thus enabling doxing even by non-expert adversaries. Existing defense methods struggle to balance the shareability of photos with effective protection, and often fail to sufficiently disrupt the implicit geo-evidence chains embedded in scene semantics. To this end, we propose GeoEdit, an adversarial de-evidencing framework for silent geoprivacy protection via image editing. Specifically, we apply minimal edits to high-risk evidence anchors in the image, thereby disrupting the underlying spatial reasoning chains while preserving overall scene semantics. We identify these anchors by combining structured knowledge with adversarially discovered geographic cues. To further navigate the large editing action space, we adopt a learnable policy to iteratively refine editing decisions, distilling successful trajectories into transferable natural-language insights for consistent and efficient editing. Evaluated on LifePhotoBench, GeoEdit achieves strong protection against 6 mainstream MLRMs, outperforming visual perturbation baselines by over 0.59 in image fidelity.
Yu Yan, Shengjia Cheng, Fei Ma +2
People’s Public Security University of China, Beijing, China · Guangming Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled accurate image-based geolocation, raising serious concerns about location privacy risks in everyday social media posts. Yet, a systematic evaluation of such risks is still lacking: existing benchmarks show coarse granularity, linguistic bias, and a neglect of multimodal privacy risks. To address these gaps, we introduce KoreaGEO, the first fine-grained, multimodal, and privacy-aware benchmark for geolocation, built on Korean street views. The benchmark covers four socio-spatial clusters and nine place types with rich contextual annotations and two captioning styles that simulate real-world privacy exposure. To evaluate mainstream VLMs, we design a three-path protocol spanning image-only, functional-caption, and high-risk-caption inputs, enabling systematic analysis of localization accuracy, spatial bias, and reasoning behavior. Results show that input modality exerts a stronger influence on localization precision and privacy exposure than model scale or architecture, with high-risk captions substantially boosting accuracy. Moreover, they highlight structural prediction biases toward core cities.
Xiaonan Wang, Bo Shao, Hansaem Kim
Yonsei University, South Korea · CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Germany