ToMStories: Interpreting Theory-of-Mind in Synthetic Narratives

We introduce DialToM, an annotated Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmark built from naturalistic human-human dialogues using a multiple-choice evaluation framework. Concurrent with recent work showing a gap between explicit mental-state inference and applied ToM in synthetic settings~\cite{gu2024simpletom}, we establish a stricter State-Driven Diagnostic Probe in which models must forecast state-consistent dialogue trajectories solely from isolated mental-state profiles without dialogue context. Our evaluation reveals a systematic reasoning asymmetry -- LLMs excel at inferring mental states (Literal ToM) but struggle to leverage them for social forecasting (Functional ToM). Crucially, a domain expert achieves 100% accuracy on this task, proving its validity and establishing a stark human-AI capability gap. Further, a teacher-student reasoning injection probe shows that Gemini 3 Pro -- which establishes the leading baseline -- possesses robust Functional ToM capabilities for context-free forecasting that are transferable to weaker models. DialToM, its evaluation code, and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/Stealth-py/DialToM.

Simulating human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) has been a longstanding problem in natural language processing (NLP). To address this, existing works introduce a reasoning step of event hiding (a.k.a. perspective-taking), where events unknown to a character are removed before question answering. However, resorting to event hiding for ToM reasoning presents a performance degradation issue due to the strict output format constraints involved in event hiding. To mitigate this issue, we propose generating perspective-taking outputs as free-form explanations without event hiding, but this poses a notable yet underexplored challenge: LLMs need to inhibit responses to events unknown to characters, because the absence of event hiding exposes LLMs to these events throughout reasoning. To address this challenge, we hypothesize and empirically verify that LLMs can achieve such inhibition if a character's lack of knowledge about events is made explicit during reasoning. Based on this finding, we introduce PICTURE, a new prompting method that enables LLMs to generate a character's lack of knowledge within free-form Chain-of-Thought (CoT). Experimental results show that PICTURE outperforms existing prompting methods by an average of 7.3% on false-belief tasks.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.