S-GAP: Stealthy Graph Attack Primitives for Graph Large Language Models

Text-attributed graphs (TAGs) enhance graph learning by integrating rich textual semantics and topological context for each node. While boosting expressiveness, they also expose new vulnerabilities in graph learning through text-based adversarial surfaces. Recent advances leverage diverse backbones, such as graph neural networks (GNNs) and pre-trained language models (PLMs), to capture both structural and textual information in TAGs. This diversity raises a key question: How can we design universal adversarial attacks that generalize across architectures to assess the security of TAG models? The challenge arises from the stark contrast in how different backbones-GNNs and PLMs-perceive and encode graph patterns, coupled with the fact that many PLMs are only accessible via APIs, limiting attacks to black-box settings. To address this, we propose BadGraph, a novel attack framework that deeply elicits large language models (LLMs) understanding of general graph knowledge to jointly perturb both node topology and textual semantics. Specifically, we design a target influencer retrieval module that leverages graph priors to construct cross-modally aligned attack shortcuts, thereby enabling efficient LLM-based perturbation reasoning. Experiments show that BadGraph achieves universal and effective attacks across GNN- and LLM-based reasoners, with up to a 76.3% performance drop, while theoretical and empirical analyses confirm its stealthy yet interpretable nature.

Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation (GraphRAG) enhances the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) by grounding their responses in structured knowledge graphs. Leveraging community detection and relation filtering techniques, GraphRAG systems demonstrate inherent resistance to traditional RAG attacks, such as text poisoning and prompt injection. However, in this paper, we find that the security of GraphRAG systems fundamentally relies on the topological integrity of the underlying graph, which can be undermined by implicitly corrupting the logical connections, without altering surface-level text semantics. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose LogicPoison, a novel attack framework that targets logical reasoning rather than injecting false contents. Specifically, LogicPoison employs a type-preserving entity swapping mechanism to perturb both global logic hubs for disrupting overall graph connectivity and query-specific reasoning bridges for severing essential multi-hop inference paths. This approach effectively reroutes valid reasoning into dead ends while maintaining surface-level textual plausibility. Comprehensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that LogicPoison successfully bypasses GraphRAG's defenses, significantly degrading performance and outperforming state-of-the-art baselines in both effectiveness and stealth. Our code is available at \textcolor{blue}https://github.com/Jord8061/logicPoison.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have advanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) by enriching node representations with semantic features, giving rise to LLM-enhanced GNNs that achieve notable performance gains. However, the robustness of these models against poisoning attacks, which manipulate both graph structures and textual attributes during training, remains unexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose a robustness assessment framework that systematically evaluates LLM-enhanced GNNs under poisoning attacks. Our framework enables comprehensive evaluation across multiple dimensions. Specifically, we assess 24 victim models by combining eight LLM- or Language Model (LM)-based feature enhancers with three representative GNN backbones. To ensure diversity in attack coverage, we incorporate six structural poisoning attacks (both targeted and non-targeted) and three textual poisoning attacks operating at the character, word, and sentence levels. Furthermore, we employ four real-world datasets, including one released after the emergence of LLMs, to avoid potential ground truth leakage during LLM pretraining, thereby ensuring fair evaluation. Extensive experiments show that LLM-enhanced GNNs exhibit significantly higher accuracy and lower Relative Drop in Accuracy (RDA) than a shallow embedding-based baseline across various attack settings. Our in-depth analysis identifies key factors that contribute to this robustness, such as the effective encoding of structural and label information in node representations. Based on these insights, we outline future research directions from both offensive and defensive perspectives, and propose a new combined attack along with a graph purification defense. To support future research, we release the source code of our framework at~https://github.com/CyberAlSec/LLMEGNNRP.