Diffusion language models (dLLMs) generate by gradually unmasking a canvas, so their samplers decide not only which token to write but also when to commit it. We show that this second decision changes who appears in generated text, a sampler-induced bias on top of the model's own. Common commit rules, including LLaDA's default, commit the positions whose sampled tokens are most probable; this peeking favors majority options. To separate the sampler from the model, we read the model's belief about a fork, such as a protagonist's gender, in one forward pass, and show that this belief matches exact sampling from the model. Measured against it, peeking samplers on LLaDA and Dream amplify occupational gender stereotypes and collapse opinion distributions, and confidence-based ordering shifts gender-balanced occupations toward men, more so under faster parallel decoding. We propose Fork-First Sampling, which decides the fork before anything else is written: it follows the belief or any target distribution, improves fluency, and avoids the stories that remark on the protagonist's gender, which prompt-based fixes produce, at the cost of one forward pass. Fairness evaluations of dLLMs should report the commit rule.
Figures & tables
Rule
Score si
Peeks
Used by
Low-confidence
pi(yi)
✓
LLaDA
Threshold
pi(yi)≥λ
✓
Fast-dLLM
MaskGIT+
qi(yi)
✓
Dream (opt.)
Soft low-conf.
pi(yi)1/T′+ϵ
✓
TLC
Confidence
maxvpi(v)
×
our patch
Entropy
−H(qi)
×
Dream (ex.)
Table 1: Commit rules. ✓ : the score peeks at the drawn token.
Figure 2: One LLaDA step. Peeking ranks the position that drew She 25th of 28; the identity-blind rule ranks it 3rd. FFS plants the fork token first.
Figure 3: (a) Belief against faithful samples. (b, c) Belief against sampler behavior, with GLM slopes β (1: faithful).
Figure 4: LLaDA over temperature (top- p=1 ): (a) slope on the belief, (b) fluency. Only FFS -faithful is faithful and fluent at every temperature.
Figure 5: (a) Majority/minority commit-rate ratio. (b) Pre-fork drift of the fork position’s female share. (c) Male share against tokens per step. Belief-balanced prompts in (b, c).
LLaDA
Dream
Method
Edits prompt
Extra passes
β
TE
Δ Flu.
Mark.
AUC
β
TE
Δ Flu.
Mark.
AUC
Commit rules
• Greedy
2.17
.123
−0.20
0.0
–
3.48
.142
−0.45
0.0
–
• Peeking (default)
1.80
.116
0
0.3
–
2.97
.068
0
0.3
–
• Identity-blind
1.53
.087
−0.59
0.6
.68
2.33
.062
−0.16
0.3
.64
• Random order
1.49
.180
+0.56
0.6
.86
2.16
.048
−0.15
0.5
.93
Table 2: Methods in the default setting. TE: target error; Mark.: % marked narratives; AUC: separability from default outputs (0.5 is best); –: not applicable.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Sampler
k=1
k=2
k=4
• Peeking (low-confidence)
3.34
2.81
1.12
• Identity-blind (confidence)
0.98
1.00
1.01
• Random order
1.00
1.00
1.00
• TLC
1.72
1.64
1.35
FFS -faithful
1.00
1.00
1.01
FFS -fair
−0.01
−0.01
0.00
Appendix
Table 3: Slope β in the synthetic model ( T=1 ; 95% CIs within ±0.08 ).
Labels
LLaDA Δβ
Dream Δβ
Primary judge
0.28 [0.08,0.51]
0.64 [0.26,1.29]
Second judge
0.21 [0.04,0.42]
0.64 [0.25,1.29]
Pronoun rules
0.15 [−0.04,0.38]
0.61 [0.24,1.23]
Appendix
Table 4: Peeking minus identity-blind slope under three label sources.
β
α
Flu.
Peek
Blind
Rand.
Peek
Blind
Rand.
Blind
T=0.3
2.00
1.81
1.82
−0.99
−0.94
−0.21
3.38
T=0.5
1.80
1.44
1.49
−0.90
−0.71
−0.08
3.16
T=0.7
1.78
1.16
1.18
−0.72
−0.64
−0.18
2.75
T=1.0
1.73
0.76
0.77
−0.33
−0.38
−0.19
1.72
T=1.3
1.43
0.57
0.55
−0.09
+0.32
+0.24
1.01
Appendix
Table 5: LLaDA slope and intercept over temperature and tokens per step k .
Model
Sampler
Decided
Drift (balanced)
LLaDA
Peeking
65%
−0.22[−0.30,−0.12]
LLaDA
Identity-blind
65%
−0.20[−0.27,−0.12]
LLaDA
Random order
40%
−0.04[−0.07,−0.01]
Dream
Peeking
77%
−0.28[−0.41,−0.15]
Dream
Identity-blind
80%
−0.26[−0.37,−0.13]
Dream
Random order
70%
−0.25[−0.35,−0.17]
Appendix
Table 6: Fork position already decided at the first pronoun, and its pre-fork drift.
LLaDA
Dream
H ratio
TV
Coll.
H ratio
TV
Coll.
• Peeking
0.42
.252
13.6
0.45
.203
16.0
• Identity-blind
0.78
.189
2.8
0.87
.145
2.0
FFS -faithful
0.93
.111
0.8
0.91
.102
0.4
Sampling floor
0.91
.107
–
0.91
.101
–
Appendix
Table 7: Opinion distributions ( T=1 ). Floor: exact sampling from the belief.
she
he
they
xe
ey
fae
LLaDA
Belief
.05
.17
.22
.96
.92
–
Peeking
.04
.12
.17
.95
.93
.79
Blind
.05
.15
.17
.96
.95
.79
Random
.05
.12
.22
.96
.96
.80
Dream
Belief
.04
.14
.31
.89
.71
–
Peeking
.02
.15
.29
.57
.72
.89
Appendix
Table 8: TANGO misgendering rate by declared pronoun family.
Diffusion language models (DLMs) are emerging as a practical alternative to autoregressive language models (ARLMs), yet their fairness remains largely uncharacterized. DLMs introduce sampling controls with no direct autoregressive counterpart, such as block length and remasking strategy, that directly set their speed--quality operating point. This raises a basic question: does a DLM's measured social bias remain stable across these settings? Across LLaDA, LLaDA-1.5, and Dream on Open-BBQ, we find that all three models exhibit social bias, but both the magnitude of measured bias and the relative ordering of models by bias are highly sensitive to the sampling configuration. This sampling dependence also changes what successful debiasing means. While mitigation strategies established for ARLMs transfer effectively to DLMs and reduce bias without degrading downstream performance, sampling dependence persists even after mitigation. Our results show that fairness in DLMs cannot be characterized independently of the sampling configuration, even after debiasing. Project page is available at https://pakapaka333.github.io/Beyond-Model-Weights/.
Koshiro Saito, Daisuke Oba, Danushka Bollegala +1
Institute of Science Tokyo · University of Liverpool · Amazon +2
Masked diffusion language models (dLLMs) generate text by iteratively denoising masked positions, re-predicting each token multiple times before it is committed. An autoregressive decoder exposes an answer's distribution once, at the step that commits it; a dLLM exposes it at every denoising step before commitment, and we show that an adversary can exploit this. Since an answer remains open to revision over many denoising steps, an adversary with access to internal activations can watch how likely the model is to produce a chosen answer and adjust the intervention accordingly. Building on this observation, we study targeted bias injection, an attack that steers a frozen dLLM toward a demographic answer selected by the adversary. The attack uses a simple proportional-integral (PI) controller that tracks the target-answer probability during denoising and adapts the strength of a steering vector on the fly. On ambiguous BBQ questions where the correct answer is abstention, our attack raises LLaDA-8B-Instruct's preference for the targeted group from 1.8 to 16.7 percentage points, more than three times the strongest fixed-strength steering baseline, and on SocialStigmaQA it raises the selection of stigmatizing answers from 17.6% to 58.1%. Fitted to other demographic targets, the same attack shifts answers by up to 37 percentage points, and each attack takes about 40 minutes on one GPU. On the primary target, feedback is what makes the attack work: constant steering at the same average strength over the token-committing steps produces a far smaller shift while corrupting nearly three times as many outputs, and a constant strength set separately for each example still falls well short. Our findings identify the denoising trajectory as a new control channel in dLLMs and call for bias audits that examine the serving stack rather than the frozen model alone.
Masked diffusion language models (dLLMs) have shown strong potential for faster inference through parallel token generation when combined with confidence-based samplers. However, recent work has shown that such methods can defer unmasking high-entropy fork positions at which multiple plausible continuations exist. This results in reduced generation diversity, as shown by worse pass@k scaling, and limits gains obtainable from RL post-training. To avoid this flexibility trap, prior work advocated for autoregressive (AR) sampling. Here, we show that discarding confidence-based sampling is unnecessary and, once inference cost is taken into account, wasteful. We first propose Fork-dLLM, a simple hybrid sampler that uses AR-style ordering only at uncertain fallback steps while retaining parallel generation otherwise. We then extend the same principle to post-training with ForkGRPO, which uses Fork-dLLM rollouts and applies the GRPO objective only at fallback steps, preserving exact policy-likelihood ratios while substantially reducing rollout and optimization cost. In our experiments, Fork-dLLM matches the strong pass@k scaling of AR sampling while being 2-3x more efficient, and ForkGRPO achieves downstream performance comparable to or better than AR-based GRPO baselines at a substantially lower training cost.
Stipe Frković, Metod Jazbec, Christian A. Naesseth
University of Amsterdam · UvA-Bosch Delta Lab, University of Amsterdam