Formal Raising: Embedding Verifiable Ethical Properties into the Development of AI

Do large language models reason morally, or do they merely sound like they do? We investigate whether LLM responses to moral dilemmas exhibit genuine developmental progression through Kohlberg's stages of moral development, or whether alignment training instead produces reasoning-like outputs that superficially resemble mature moral judgment without the underlying developmental trajectory. Using an LLM-as-judge scoring pipeline validated across three judge models, we classify more than 600 responses from 13 LLMs spanning a range of architectures, parameter scales, and training regimes across six classical moral dilemmas, and conduct ten complementary analyses to characterize the nature and internal coherence of the resulting patterns. Our results reveal a striking inversion: responses overwhelmingly correspond to post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5-6) regardless of model size, architecture, or prompting strategy, the effective inverse of human developmental norms, where Stage 4 dominates. Most strikingly, a subset of models exhibit moral decoupling: systematic inconsistency between stated moral justification and action choice, a form of logical incoherence that persists across scale and prompting strategy and represents a direct reasoning consistency failure independent of rhetorical sophistication. Model scale carries a statistically significant but practically small effect; training type has no significant independent main effect; and models exhibit near-robotic cross-dilemma consistency producing logically indistinguishable responses across semantically distinct moral problems. We posit that these patterns constitute evidence for moral ventriloquism: the acquisition, through alignment training, of the rhetorical conventions of mature moral reasoning without the underlying developmental trajectory those conventions are meant to represent.

Large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated based on their stated values, yet these do not reliably translate into their actions, a discrepancy termed "value-action gap." In this work, we argue that this gap persists even under explicit reasoning, revealing a deeper failure mode we call "Pseudo-Deliberation": the appearance of principled reasoning without corresponding behavioral alignment. To study this systematically, we introduce VALDI, a framework for measuring alignment between stated values and generated dialogue. VALDI includes 4,941 human-centered scenarios across five domains, three tasks that elicit value articulation, reasoning, and action, and five metrics for quantifying value adherence. Across both proprietary and open-source LLMs, we observe consistent misalignment between expressed values and downstream dialogues. To investigate intervention strategies, we propose VIVALDI, a multi-agent value auditor that intervenes at different stages of generation.

AI alignment requires AI systems to adhere to human norms, values, or intentions. Under value pluralism there is no correct target, but a shared prerequisite is that the system's behavior expresses a coherent policy: a mapping from situations to verdicts that is invariant while a situation's morally relevant features are preserved, and sensitive when they change. We introduce four structural conditions for such coherent policies: verdict stability, monotonicity, decisiveness, and Pareto viability. Together they measure a form of moral competence that is evaluable from behavior alone, without reference to a moral standard or expert baseline, forming a structural floor for alignment rather than a normative target. We demonstrate the methodology on three simulated deployments featuring LLM-based agents facing moral dilemmas. Evaluating nine frontier models under a factorial design of five paraphrases, five escalation levels, and three dominance conditions, we show no model expresses a coherent policy across the three deployments: surface-form perturbation alone produces verdict-rate shifts of up to $99$ percentage points at a single escalation level, and a model's success on one scenario does not predict its competence on another. This suggests LLM-based agents are not currently the kind of object to which alignment can meaningfully apply.