Synthetic data provides the means for more ethical and less biased facial recognition. Nonetheless, the limitations of generative models and the conditioning process they rely on pose a risk of identity leakage, resulting in synthetic samples that are overly similar to those seen in a generator's training set, mitigating privacy benefits. In this work, we show that previously proposed approaches are affected by two key limitations: high classifier dependence and a tendency to identify leakage with respect to real datasets that were not used in training. To address these shortcomings, we propose a novel metric called Scaled Overlap (SO), which adapts a non-parametric data-copying test for facial recognition and extends it to the identity level. By leveraging a multi-model setup that compensates for errors in individual classifiers, it provides insights into the true strength of identity leakage. Our analysis identifies leaking datasets (CemiFace, SFace2, IDNet) with the most acute leakage introduced by generative model conditioning in CemiFace, demonstrates that real datasets do not contribute equally to generator training, and shows that the majority of synthetic images are drawn from multiple identities rather than relying on a single identity. Ultimately, our study provides new insights into the quality of synthetic datasets and gives more reliable techniques to help the community ensure the trustworthiness of synthetic data.
Figures & tables
Synthetic dataset
Total images
Generator training data
Total images
Underlying identity space
Total images
SynFace [ 45 ]
1M
FFHQ
70k
FFHQ †
70k
IDiff-Face [ 8 ]
503k
FFHQ
70k
MS1MV2 ‡
5.8M
SynMulti-PIE [ 12 ]
149k
FFHQ
70k
FFHQ †
70k
IDNet [ 32 ]
1.06M
CASIA-WebFace
494k
CASIA-WebFace ⋆
494k
CemiFace [ 52 ]
550k
CASIA-WebFace
494k
WebFace4M ‡
4.2M
SFace2 [ 9 ]
1.05M
CASIA-WebFace
494k
CASIA-WebFace ⋆
494k
Table 1: Synthetic datasets, their deep generative models’ training datasets, and the real dataset shaping the identity space (i.e., the pretraining data of the FR encoder used for identity conditioning, or the label source when identities are used directly as classes).
Figure 1: Mated and non-mated similarity distributions of CASIA-WebFace compared with its closest non-mated samples and closest CemiFace samples according to EdgeFace. FMR=0.1% threshold (0.2316) is exceeded by both closest pair distributions.
Figure 2: HyperFace with intentionally introduced leakage. SO measured at the image level.
Synthetic Dataset
Test Set
Leakage Candidate
Sample-level SO
Identity-level SO
HyperFace
CelebA
Yes
0.2
0.0
SynMulti-PIE
CelebA
No
0.3
0.0
Digi2Real
CelebA
Yes
0.4
0.1
DCFace
CelebA
No
0.4
0.1
SynFace
CelebA
No
0.6
0.1
CemiFace
CelebA
No
0.6
0.4
Table 3: sample-level and Identity-level SO. Rows are colored by the relationship between real and synthetic dataset: generator training data , identity-space match , and both .
Figure 3: Examples of closest WebFace4M non-mated image vs. closest CemiFace sample (including/excluding samples 51-55) with respect to anchor WebFace4M image.
Figure 4: Average cosine similarity difference for top-k most similar real-real and real-synthetic image-level comparisons.
Figure 5: Average cosine similarity difference for top-k most similar real-real and real-synthetic identity-level comparisons.
Figure 6: Synthetic-to-real image similarity distribution with real data non-mated self-similarity as a percentile scale.
Figure 7: Number of unique identities among top-10 closest real images with respect to synthetic samples.
Synthetic face datasets are increasingly used to reduce privacy exposure and data access constraints in biometric recognition. Yet the generators that produce these datasets are trained on real faces, so synthetic data may still reveal their real source data. We study this risk through a dataset-level membership inference attack that first identifies the synthetic dataset used to train a face recognizer and then infers the real dataset used to train the generator. Across 11 face recognition models, 11 synthetic datasets, and 7 real datasets, the attack recovers the synthetic training dataset in 100% of cases and identifies the generator's source dataset in 54.5% of cases. These results show that synthetic data can retain dataset-level traces of real training data and that privacy-preserving deployment requires stronger leakage mitigation.
Paweł Borsukiewicz, Daniele Lunghi, Wendkûuni C. Ouédraogo +2
The shortage of legally compliant data for face recognition training has sparked growing interest in using synthetic data as an alternative. While recent diffusion-based methods enable the generation of photorealistic face images with strong identity adherence and data diversity, their downstream recognition performance still exhibits a significant synthetic-real gap. This paper identifies visual tendency as a previously underexplored limitation, whereby synthetic data exhibit an unrealistic prevalence of visual attributes and thus deviate from the real-data distribution. Visual tendency can be attributed to the generator's conditioning on identity embeddings, through which co-occurring residual visual cues are unintentionally absorbed into learned identity semantics. To discourage the generator from exploiting such visual cues, this paper proposes SteerFace, a simple and efficient training framework that perturbs identity embeddings by steering them toward random orthogonal directions on the embedding hypersphere. The perturbation serves as an identity-preserving regularizer that penalizes the generator's reliance on non-identity components, as supported by theoretical analysis. This paper further introduces an adaptive strategy that learns perturbation strengths with both sample-wise preference and favorable overall statistics. Extensive experiments show that SteerFace effectively mitigates visual tendency, outperforms prior methods in downstream face recognition, and generalizes well across different training datasets and generation pipelines.
Yuxi Mi, Qiuyang Yuan, Jianqing Xu +5
Fudan University Shanghai, China · Youtu Lab, Tencent Shanghai, China · WeChat Pay Lab33, Tencent Shenzhen, China
Synthetic face datasets have become effective enough to train face recognition models with accuracy rivaling that of models trained on real photographs. This progress sidesteps the ethical and legal burdens of collecting real biometric data, yet evaluation has not kept pace. Even studies that train entirely on synthetic images still rely on real-face benchmarks to measure performance, leaving the privacy problem only half solved. We ask whether synthetic datasets can replace real benchmarks for face recognition evaluation. We test 12 synthetic datasets against 7 established real benchmarks using 24 pre-trained models that span both convolutional and transformer architectures. Our evaluation covers biometric verification metrics, similarity score distributions, cross-model ranking consistency, and the underlying distributional properties of each dataset. Benchmarking fidelity varies widely across the synthetic candidates, but the two strongest, MorphFace and Vec2Face, reproduce the relative behavior of real benchmarks and reach agreement levels that fall within the natural disagreement already observed among the real benchmarks themselves. These results establish that well-constructed synthetic datasets can support reliable comparative evaluation for face recognition, moving the field closer to a fully synthetic and privacy-preserving pipeline for both training and benchmarking.
Paweł Borsukiewicz, Daniele Lunghi, Wendkûuni C. Ouédraogo +2