Applicability and Generalization of Audio Fingerprinting Methods to Speech

With the advancements in AI speech synthesis, it is easier than ever before to generate realistic audio in a target voice. One only needs a few seconds of reference audio from the target, quite literally putting words in the target person's mouth. This imposes a new set of forensics-related challenges on speech-based authentication systems, videoconferencing, and audio-visual broadcasting platforms, where we want to detect synthetic speech. At the same time, leveraging AI speech synthesis can enhance the different modes of communication through features such as low-bandwidth communication and audio enhancements - leading to ever-increasing legitimate use-cases of synthetic audio. In this case, we want to verify if the synthesized voice is actually spoken by the user. This will require a mechanism to verify whether a given synthetic audio is driven by an authorized identity, or not. We term this task audio avatar fingerprinting. As a step towards audio forensics in these new and emerging situations, we analyze and extend an off-the-shelf speaker verification model developed outside of forensics context for the task of fake speech detection and audio avatar fingerprinting, the first experimentation of its kind. Furthermore, we observe that no existing dataset allows for the novel task of verifying the authorized use of synthetic audio - a limitation which we address by introducing a new speech forensics dataset for this novel task.

Modern text-to-speech (TTS) systems are rarely deployed as unchanged pre-trained models. They are often adapted through supervised fine-tuning (SFT) or preference optimization such as DPO and GRPO. This raises a practical question for audio deepfake forensics: do fingerprints learned from a foundation generator remain valid after adaptation? We present GenTraceBench, a controlled benchmark spanning five TTS architectures, 16 pre-/post-training variants, and 49,728 utterances generated with fixed texts and speaker prompts. Under a train-on-foundation, test-on-adapted protocol, we evaluate binary detection, closed-set attribution, and open-set verification. DPO and GRPO generally preserve fingerprints, whereas some SFT and pre-training-data changes cause substantial drift; effect sizes vary across three forensic backbones. Repeated training runs confirm the largest W2V-BERT attribution drop, while a data-mixture control with comparable speech quality shows that composition change need not cause drift. In W2V-BERT verification, multi-shot enrollment reduces EER for the SFT condition from 44.4% to 11.0%, whereas the SingNet-only condition remains at or above 45% EER.

This work presents POLARIS, a training-free audio fingerprinting system that selects landmarks from a locally normalized saliency field and groups them into sparse fingerprints using Delaunay triangulation. To deal with query distortion, POLARIS adds fingerprints from two-hop Delaunay neighborhoods only at query time, without enlarging the reference index. An adaptive configuration applies this expansion only when the original fingerprints do not produce a confident match. We evaluate POLARIS on synthetic distortions from the public PEX Hard Medium benchmark, excluding queries with pitch or tempo shifts, and on a new benchmark of real re-recorded music. POLARIS achieves the best performance among the evaluated training-free methods on both benchmarks. On the real recordings, its adaptive configuration also outperforms the neural NMFP baseline with a comparable measured query time and a smaller logical reference payload. Code, dataset, and instructions for reproducing all experiments are available at https://github.com/JihengLi/POLARIS.git.