ClockMark: Adaptive and Host-Dependent Watermarking for Large Language Models
Authors: Yupeng Qiu, Han Fang, Ee-Chien Chang
Organizations: School of Computing, National University of Singapore, Singapore · School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, Anhui, China
Large language model (LLM) watermarking operates on the next-token distribution that evolves during generation. In streaming generation, each sampled token becomes part of the text and affects subsequent distributions. Embedding therefore proceeds with a changing host, unlike classical watermarking, which adapts embedding to an existing host signal. To accommodate this difference, we formulate a novel embedding framework for LLM watermarking based on two principles. We first argue that embedding should be adaptive, retaining the state of previous sampling decisions to better guide subsequent choices. We further argue that embedding should be host-dependent, using the current LLM distribution to constrain both token selection and state updates. Guided by these principles and the two requirements of distribution preservation and robustness to text editing, we propose ClockMark. It combines adaptive and host-dependent embedding with message spreading, embedding the full payload in each watermarked token. Theoretically, we prove that ClockMark preserves the original LLM sequence distribution, thereby maintaining generation quality. Empirically, extensive experiments against 12 baselines demonstrate improved robustness to text editing, with gains of up to 16.08 percentage points in bit accuracy over the strongest tested baseline.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: ClockMark embedding. Each candidate countdown depends on all message bits and advances at its LLM probability. The sampler selects the first to finish, updates all active countdowns, and renews only the winner. Remaining countdowns are saved for repeated contexts. The indices c and v denote the context and candidate, and nc,v counts their pair selections.
Figure 2: ClockMark recovery and detection. The key reconstructs one initial vector for each of N distinct adjacent token pairs. Their sum S yields the message through coordinate signs (VSR) and a detection statistic through normalized energy ∥S∥2/N (ED). A surviving (A,B) preserves access to the same initial vector after deletion. Each pair is counted once.
Method
C4 (32 bits)
C4 (64 bits)
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
No watermark
14.17
–
–
–
14.17
–
–
–
BalanceMarking
14.35
78.74
–
–
14.11
62.34
–
–
CredID
15.76
79.06
–
–
15.38
64.49
–
–
PURA
14.46
98.00
–
–
14.15
93.07
–
–
RSBH
15.47
56.16
–
–
14.82
51.68
–
–
Table 1: Clean Qwen results on C4. Bit accuracy (BA), area under the ROC curve (AUC), and true positive rate (TPR) at a 1% false positive rate (FPR) are percentages. Bold marks the best displayed BA, AUC, and TPR. Baselines without reported detection appear first. Dashes indicate unavailable or inapplicable results.
Method
Deletion
10%
30%
50%
BA
AUC
TPR
BA
AUC
TPR
BA
AUC
TPR
BalanceMarking
58.69
–
–
38.40
–
–
24.74
–
–
CredID
60.93
–
–
38.20
–
–
25.27
–
–
PURA
90.17
–
–
69.14
–
–
56.56
–
–
RSBH
53.60
–
–
51.31
–
–
50.87
–
–
Table 2: C4 robustness for 32 bit Qwen watermarks. Bit accuracy (BA), area under the ROC curve (AUC), and true positive rate (TPR) at a 1% false positive rate (FPR) are percentages. Bold marks the best displayed BA, AUC, and TPR. Baselines without reported detection appear first. Dashes indicate unavailable or inapplicable results.
Appendix figures & tables4 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Category
Method
Embedding Setting
Biased
BalanceMarking
δ=1.5 , 8-bit segments
CredID
δ=1.5 , 8-bit segments
MOSAIC
δ=1.5
MPAC
δ=2 , radix 4
RSBH
δ=1
WaterMod
δ=2.5
Appendix
Table 3: Embedding configurations of the twelve baselines, grouped by biased and unbiased embedding. Strength δ and symbol parameter m follow the definitions of each baseline. SPC(5,4) is a single parity-check code with four data bits and one check bit.
Method
LFQA (32 bits)
LFQA (64 bits)
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
No watermark
11.05
–
–
–
11.05
–
–
–
BalanceMarking
11.13
62.78
–
–
11.25
55.63
–
–
CredID
11.56
62.14
–
–
11.54
55.19
–
–
PURA
11.29
85.05
–
–
11.21
73.34
–
–
RSBH
11.56
52.62
–
–
11.61
50.92
–
–
Appendix
Table 4: Clean Qwen results on LFQA with 32 and 64 bit payloads. Bit accuracy (BA), area under the ROC curve (AUC), and true positive rate (TPR) at a 1% false positive rate (FPR) are percentages. Bold marks the best displayed BA, AUC, and TPR. Baselines without reported detection appear first. Dashes indicate unavailable or inapplicable results.
Method
LFQA (32 bits)
C4 (32 bits)
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
PPL ↓
BA ↑
AUC ↑
TPR ↑
No watermark
13.42
–
–
–
12.47
–
–
–
BalanceMarking
14.72
66.91
–
–
13.84
65.92
–
–
CredID
14.84
71.20
–
–
13.98
68.15
–
–
PURA
13.16
69.63
–
–
12.79
68.96
–
–
RSBH
14.28
57.96
–
–
13.20
56.21
–
–
Appendix
Table 5: Clean Gemma-2-9B results on LFQA and C4 with 32 and 64 bit payloads. Bit accuracy (BA), area under the ROC curve (AUC), and true positive rate (TPR) at a 1% false positive rate (FPR) are percentages. Bold marks the best displayed BA, AUC, and TPR. Baselines without reported detection appear first. Dashes indicate unavailable or inapplicable results.
Method
Deletion
10%
30%
50%
BA
AUC
TPR
BA
AUC
TPR
BA
AUC
TPR
BalanceMarking
53.77
–
–
37.35
–
–
25.26
–
–
CredID
53.81
–
–
37.83
–
–
24.41
–
–
PURA
72.51
–
–
58.13
–
–
53.54
–
–
RSBH
51.38
–
–
50.97
–
–
50.28
–
–
Appendix
Table 6: LFQA robustness for 32 bit Qwen watermarks. Bit accuracy (BA), area under the ROC curve (AUC), and true positive rate (TPR) at a 1% false positive rate (FPR) are percentages. Bold marks the best displayed BA, AUC, and TPR. Baselines without reported detection appear first. Dashes indicate unavailable or inapplicable results.
Language model watermarking schemes fall into two broad categories: inference-time methods, which modify the decoding process at generation time, and model-embedded methods, which encode a secret signal directly into the model weights. Inference-time watermarking methods incur additional inference overhead and are not applicable in the increasingly prevalent open-weight model settings. In contrast, model-embedded watermarks introduce no additional inference latency-generation uses the standard sampling pipeline-and are particularly well-suited to open-weight settings. However, existing model-embedded approaches such as GaussMark face a fundamental quality-detectability trade-off: achieving strong detection power typically requires weight perturbations that noticeably degrade generation quality. Our key insight is that regularizing toward a high-quality reference distribution decouples quality preservation from proximity to the base model, enabling a better quality-detectability trade-off. Building on this insight, we introduce MarkTune, a theoretically grounded on-policy fine-tuning framework that uses the GaussMark detection statistic as a reward while preserving generation quality through cross-entropy on high-quality human text or KL divergence to a stronger oracle model. Empirically, MarkTune substantially improves the quality-detectability frontier of GaussMark, approaching the detectability of strong inference-time schemes while preserving generation quality and downstream task performance. Marktune also remains robust under the evaluated text-editing and open-weight attacks and generalizes across datasets, retaining substantial detection power on corpora unseen during training. Code is available at https://github.com/zhyzmath/MarkTune-LLM-Watermarking.
Yizhou Zhao, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Adam Block
University of Pennsylvania · Carnegie Mellon University · Columbia University
Multi-bit watermarking has emerged as a promising solution for embedding imperceptible binary messages into Large Language Model (LLM)-generated text, enabling reliable attribution and tracing of malicious usage of LLMs. Despite recent progress, existing methods still face key limitations: some become computationally infeasible for large messages, while others suffer from a poor trade-off between text quality and decoding accuracy. Moreover, the decoding accuracy of existing methods drops significantly when the number of tokens in the generated text is limited, a condition that frequently arises in practical usage. To address these challenges, we propose XMark, a novel method for encoding and decoding binary messages in LLM-generated texts. The unique design of XMark's encoder produces a less distorted logit distribution for watermarked token generation, preserving text quality, and also enables its tailored decoder to reliably recover the encoded message with limited tokens. Extensive experiments across diverse downstream tasks show that XMark significantly improves decoding accuracy while preserving the quality of watermarked text, outperforming prior methods. The code is at https://github.com/JiiahaoXU/XMark.
Jiahao Xu, Rui Hu, Olivera Kotevska +1
University of Nevada, Reno · Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Watermarking LLM-generated text is an important task for tracing its provenance. Existing LLM watermarks preserve provenance under editing, but this same robustness allows an adversary to alter critical content while retaining attribution, a vulnerability known as piggyback spoofing. We introduce an innovative watermark that jointly provides provenance and tamper evidence. It co-embeds a robust signal and a fragile signal into each generated token. The signals share the same mechanism but use independent keys and different seeding windows over normalized text, making one resilient to edits and the other sensitive to reader-visible changes. Multiple rounds of unbiased tournament reweighting preserve the expected generation distribution, while a periodic round-allocation pattern controls the trade-off between the two signals. At detection, their scores form a two-dimensional space supporting three decisions: Intact, Tampered, and No-Watermark. Across two large language models and two prompt datasets, our method demonstrates the highest tamper-detection rate among the evaluated methods while maintaining competitive attribution robustness and perplexity. Ablation studies show that reliable three-state detection requires a well-defined notion of intactness, co-embedding of the two signals, and complementary sensitivity to edits.