LiBRA: Logit Fingerprints for Byzantine-Robust Client Selection in Federated Learning

We study federated learning (FL) with adversarial clients, where the goal is to minimize the average loss of the honest (non-adversarial) clients without knowing their identity. Under heterogeneity, a single shared model parameter is statistically inappropriate: it cannot capture the distinct data-generating processes across clients, incurring an irreducible model-heterogeneity bias and severely limiting robustness to adversarial clients (a.k.a. Byzantine-robustness). We address this problem through representation learning, where each client learns a personalized linear head, while collaboratively estimating a shared nonlinear representation through Byzantine-robust aggregation. We demonstrate that the heterogeneity among honest representation gradients is controlled by the representation error and statistical errors that decay either with the number of data samples per client ($τ$) or the number of iterations ($T$). In particular, our non-asymptotic parameter recovery error bound reveals three terms: (i) an initialization-dependent error that goes away with $T$, (ii) finite-sample noise terms that decreases with $τ$ and the number of honest clients, and (iii) a stochastic gradient variance term that also reduces with $T$. Importantly, with no irreducible model-heterogeneity bias in our bounds. We extend the regression analysis to multiclass classification, and empirically validate it on CIFAR-10, FEMNIST, and School Exam Score datasets.

Federated learning enables multiple parties to train a shared model without centralizing raw data with the help of an aggregator, but introduces integrity risks once participants or infrastructure are not fully trustworthy. Two requirements are particularly important: robustness to poisoned or Byzantine client updates, and verifiability of the aggregator so that clients or third parties can audit the reported aggregation without learning individual updates. Existing work has largely treated these goals separately, and efficient public verifiability for robust, outlier-excluding aggregation remains limited. We present a verifiable federated learning protocol that makes a robust aggregation pipeline publicly auditable. Our design combines cryptographic commitments with non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to certify both (i) cosine-similarity-based outlier exclusion and (ii) aggregation over the selected set, without revealing individual client updates to verifiers. In experiments under representative poisoning attacks, our method maintains high accuracy, with an average accuracy loss below 4% across the evaluated configurations, while keeping verification overhead practical: proof artifacts can be generated and verified within minutes at the scale studied. In summary, our results show that robust outlier exclusion and public verifiability can be jointly achieved in a federated learning setting.

Robust aggregation methods for federated learning quietly rest on a fragile assumption: that whoever shows up in a given round is a fair sample of the full population. In practice, they rarely are. When only a handful of clients participate per round, even a modest fraction of adversaries can dominate that sample and silently invalidate the finite-sample guarantees that coordinate-wise median, Krum, Bulyan, and trimmed mean all depend on. We introduce SWB-DM to address this directly. SWB treats each slice of a client update as a one-dimensional distribution, computes a trimmed Wasserstein barycenter across clients, and recovers coordinate identity via a medoid-based gauge-fixing step -- a heuristic we developed and do not claim it belongs to standard optimal-transport theory. DeMoA-style delayed momentum then caches updates across the full client population each round, decoupling robustness from whoever happened to be sampled. Trim ratio calibration is not cosmetic: under-trimming causes collapse at corruption levels a properly calibrated model survives. Across 448 CIFAR-10 configurations, plus CIFAR-100, FEMNIST, and a 500-client scalability run, we find several mechanistically distinct failure modes. Even-sample coordinate-wise median degrades to a deterministic wrong answer. Krum silently violates its own n greater than 2f+2 precondition and diverges without warning. Bulyan's n greater than or equal to 4f+3 threshold produces a sharp pass/fail boundary. On attacks, IPM defeats order-statistic defenses -- including SWB -- more reliably than ALIE, confirmed through delta-space measurements against a convergence bound. SWB-DM's cache carries a real warm-up cost, but extending all baselines to the same round budget shows its CIFAR-10 gains are disproportionately large. On CIFAR-100, FLTrust benefits more -- for reasons entirely unrelated to caching.