When Can LLM Reasoning Reliably Reuse Intermediate Results?

Reasoning traces of large language models are widely read as containing "breakthrough" moments and early-legible fates. Both readings rest on measurements missing a counterfactual control at the level of the claim; we supply both controls. First, a restart-controlled truncation probe separates when a solution fits the continuation budget from when a prefix carries value that fresh computation cannot buy, comparing per-anchor continuation solve rates against from-scratch restart curves at matched total generated-token budget. Applied to 178 problem-model cells (89 MATH problems x two small open models, an outcome-blind but difficulty-targeted cohort), exactly 1 of 178 cells survives as prefix-limited; restart dose-response separates a compute-starved model from a capability-limited one; and wherever the matched budget lies inside the restart grid, continuing the model's own prefix beats restarting (9 of 9) -- predominantly compute compression rather than expanded reachability. Second, a pre-registered, difficulty-controlled test finds no detectable outcome information in early-window internal signals beyond a problem-difficulty baseline, and two generation-free analyses of public corpora show why this control is needed: a trace-blind difficulty proxy reaches AUROC 0.873 on 192K DeepSeek-R1 generations -- inside the published probe range -- and a closely matched reconstruction of the closest published early-window positive recovers a comparable pooled result (0.849) while within problem it is statistically indistinguishable from chance at all ten anchors (0.496 at t=4); a post-hoc within-targeted probe finds only a small average residual, concentrated in three low-failure problems. High pooled probe AUROCs cannot by themselves establish within-attempt information; a question-only baseline or within-problem evaluation is required.

Large language models increasingly tackle hard reasoning problems by spending more test-time compute, yet the dominant strategy remains naive repeated sampling: draw many independent solutions and hope one is correct. Because such sampling explores only through local decoding noise, it tends to produce many near duplicate attempts rather than genuinely different ideas. We ask whether exploration can instead be steered at a semantic level, by first sampling problem specific concepts, hints, or strategies and then conditioning answer generation on them. We refine this into a simple, more exploratory procedure that emits many diverse concepts in a single trajectory, and evaluate it on hard problems where repeated sampling struggles. We then go a step further and make concept generation trainable: a small concept generator is optimized with reinforcement learning so that its concepts maximize the downstream success of a larger, frozen answer generator. On hard mathematical reasoning problems, the trained concept generator substantially improves the answer generator's pass@k over naive repeated sampling at the same answer generation allocation, surpasses concepts drawn from much larger untuned models, and transfers to answer generators it was never trained against, including a model from a different family. A small model can thus be trained into an effective, reusable search policy for a much larger one.

Reasoning-capable large language models solve hard problems by emitting long chains of thought, paying heavily in latency, GPU time, and energy. Casual inspection of their traces reveals extensive reformulation, verification, and circular self-reflection, yet how much of this deliberation is actually necessary has never been measured at scale or explained from first principles. This paper closes both gaps. We formalise reasoning redundancy directly in terms of the reasoning model itself: the redundancy of a correct trace is the largest fraction of its trailing segmented steps that can be truncated while $π$, forced to terminate thinking and emit a final answer, still produces the correct answer. A large-scale quantification across four frontier reasoning models and two mathematical benchmarks shows that step-level redundancy is consistently high -- between 61% and 93% across the 8 (model, benchmark) conditions we study, with the median critical prefix equal to a single segmented step in six of the eight conditions -- that the finding is robust to the choice of judge family, and that although $ρ$ decreases with problem difficulty on MATH-500, all four models remain substantially redundant ($ρ\in [46\%, 85\%]$) even on the hardest Level-5 problems. We then prove that this redundancy is a structural consequence of length-agnostic outcome rewards, not a model-specific artefact: under any such reward, no finite expected stopping time is optimal. The result holds regardless of RL algorithm, base model, data distribution, or whether the policy is obtained via RL or distillation; over-thinking is therefore not a bug to be patched in individual models but a structural property of how current reasoning models are trained. Code: https://github.com/zhiyuanZhai20/how-much-thinking-is-enough