Where Do Legal Factors Live in LLMs?
Organizations: University of Pittsburgh, USA
Abstract
In case-based legal reasoning, legal professionals identify legally significant fact patterns in a new dispute and compare them with those of decided cases. In AI & Law, HYPO dimensions and CATO factors represent these patterns symbolically, organizing expert knowledge distilled from case narratives as explicit, structured, interpretable, and auditable legal concepts and relations that support case comparison, legal argument, and precedent-based reasoning. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for legal tasks, yet their internal organization of legal knowledge remains difficult to trace. We investigate whether LLMs form internal representations corresponding to all 26 CATO factors. Two research questions examine linear decodability and sparse localization with sparse autoencoders. Experiments cover three open models, Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-8B, and Gemma-2 2B, supported by cross-model comparison and human audit of controlled natural-language passages. Results show that all 26 factors are linearly decodable in all three models. Single-feature sparse readouts cover the complete factor catalog, with best-layer test AUCs ranging from 0.86 to 1.00. Five selected features approach full-vector readout performance. We report 78 model-specific layer-feature coordinates, one for each factor in each model. Together, these results show that information corresponding to expert-defined legal factors can be read from the internal activations of LLMs processing legal narratives. By locating these readouts, our study connects legal language and the symbolic abstractions of HYPO and CATO to learned internal representations.
Figures & tables
| ID | Factor (side) | Meaning (short) |
|---|---|---|
| F1 | Disclosure-in-negotiations (D) | Plaintiff disclosed its information to defendant in negotiations. |
| F2 | Bribe-employee (P) | Defendant paid plaintiff’s employee to defect with its information. |
| F3 | Employee-sole-developer (D) | Defendant’s employee solely developed plaintiff’s product. |
| F4 | Agreed-not-to-disclose (P) | Defendant signed a nondisclosure agreement with plaintiff. |
| F5 | Agreement-not-specific (D) | The agreement did not specify what was confidential. |
| F6 | Security-measures (P) | Plaintiff adopted concrete security measures. |
| Example | Corpus excerpt |
|---|---|
| Example A Supplier network | BlueFern Genetics developed a supplier network for its biotech reagent line. The company kept the specifications on a shared drive with no access controls. |
| Example B Information type | Tessara Analytics developed a formula for industrial chemicals used in polymer curing. The company kept the specifications on a shared drive with no access controls. |
| Example C Industry | Almara Labs maintained a supplier network for its aerospace components on a shared drive with no access controls. The company did not restrict who inside the organization could open the files. |
| Example D Narrative style | Complaint excerpt: Vantor Gaming is said to mirror Veltrix Systems’ textiles pricing steps. The plaintiff took no steps to limit which employees could view the process. |
LLM Interpretability
Large language model (LLM) interpretability studies how internal representations and computations produce outputs, and how they can be explained or controlled.
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