MA-UITD: Offline Multi-Agent Reward Inference for Characterizing Continuous Social Behavior

Multi-agent simulations are widely used to study complex social and ecological systems, where rich and often unexpected emergent behaviors arise from local interactions. A large body of prior work has focused on analyzing such emergent dynamics across domains. In this paper, we move beyond analyzing emergent behavior and introduce a learning-based mechanism for actively shaping it via social reward modeling. We introduce Multi-Agent Reward Prediction (MARP), a simple framework that extends preference-based reward modeling to multi-agent reinforcement learning. While the framework is designed to be applicable across multi-agent settings, the present empirical validation is limited to a single environment, and we therefore present MARP as a proof of concept within the studied domain. Rather than relying on handcrafted rewards, MARP learns a shared reward model from episode-level evaluations of collective outcomes, enabling decentralized agents to align their behavior with global social objectives. We study MARP in the Harvest Game, a canonical sequential social dilemma modeling common-pool resource management and related real-world challenges. Our results show that MARP can be tuned to produce behavior that is more closely aligned with target social metrics than standard reward-based baselines, while the learned reward model captures subtle environmental structure without explicit programming. Crucially, MARP supports multiple and composite social objectives within a single training regime. By modifying only the high-level evaluation metric, the same framework seamlessly aligns agent behavior with diverse goals, including sustainability, equality, and peace, as well as combinations of individual and group-level objectives. These findings demonstrate that emergent multi-agent behavior can be treated not only as a phenomenon to study, but as a target of principled, data-driven regulation.

Humans often acquire new skills by observing others, since observed behaviors implicitly reveal how to act in an environment. However, observations drawn from a heterogeneous population introduce conflicting behavioral signals, making it difficult to determine which behaviors are worth imitating. We address this challenge with General Reward Inference and Disentanglement (GRID), a social learning method that extracts universally useful behaviors from a heterogeneous population of demonstrators pursuing different goals. GRID decomposes per-agent reward functions into a general reward, capturing behaviors shared across all agents, and specific rewards, capturing individual preferences and objectives. Training exclusively on the general reward provides a new paradigm of generalist pretraining. It yields a generalist agent that internalizes universal environmental competencies, such as safety and basic task proficiency, without the mode-averaging bias that afflicts standard learning from demonstration techniques. This generalist serves as a superior prior for fine-tuning to downstream tasks, including preferences unseen during training. Experiments across a synthetic basis function decomposition, multi-agent Craftax, and a continuous autonomous driving simulator (Highway-Env) confirm that GRID successfully disentangles reward structure in a semantically meaningful way, outperforms standard learning from demonstration baselines, and enables more efficient and stable specialization.

Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approach on three sequential social dilemmas, Escape Room, Clean Up, and Commons Harvest, which require volunteering, public-good contribution, and resource restraint, respectively. Across all three environments, agents learn cooperative behavior without observing others' rewards, including in settings where independent learners fail to cooperate, and frequently achieve more equitable divisions of jointly produced returns than agents with access to true rewards. The effective integration point depends on the social preference: inequity aversion works best in the reward together with a value look-ahead, whereas a purely benevolent preference benefits from policy-update weighting. Under partial observability, the policy-update approach continues to support cooperation. These results show that explicit access to other agents' reward signals is not necessary for learning cooperative behavior: social preferences can instead be grounded in self-referenced assessments of others' outcomes derived from their observed behavior.