cs.HCOct 22, 2026

Abstract Priorities, Concrete Rewards: How Stated Preferences Relate to What People Reward in AI Responses

Authors: Zihan Chen, Lei Nico Zheng, Di Zhu

Organizations: Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, USA · University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, MA, USA

Abstract

AI assistants built on large language models (LLMs) are trained on human feedback and increasingly personalized to users' stated preferences. Yet how closely these preferences reflect what people reward in responses remains unclear. We compare stated and revealed preferences in the public PRISM dataset, in which 1,396 participants reported how much seven response attributes mattered to them and then rated 29,347 responses from 21 LLMs. Among responses to the same prompt, features the survey never asked about, such as response length, formatting and refusal language, were at least as strongly associated with ratings as text proxies of the surveyed attributes. Whether stated priorities matched ratings depended on how attributes were measured: participants who prioritized an attribute favoured responses from models that others perceived as strong on it, but not responses that scored higher on text proxies for it. Written feedback was more telling: participants who asked for shorter answers, even in earlier conversations, gave length less weight in their ratings, and those asking for longer answers gave it more. Their relative priorities over the surveyed attributes, however, did not predict this weight. Reasons given for choices reflected perceived attributes more than measured features. Participants also differed stably in how much they weighted several concrete features, especially length, but with a median of 6 conversations per participant, these weights were estimated poorly. The largest gain from personal information in predicting held-out choices was 0.13 percentage points, compared with 1.11 for a stronger pooled model. Stated priorities thus track perceived attributes of AI responses but say little about the concrete features that ratings reward, a distinction that matters for preference elicitation and AI personalization.

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