AI Risk Ontologies for the EU AI Act Compliance: AIRO, VAIR, and their Integration with DPV

The EU AI Act introduces mandatory requirements for high-risk AI systems with the explicit goal of ensuring the development and operation of trustworthy AI. At the same time, AI risk management practices rely on structured risk taxonomies to systematically identify and treat AI-specific risk sources. As both the AI Act and established risk taxonomies aim to address AI-induced risks, a natural question is whether they align in the risk sources they cover. However, no clear mapping exists between the risks implicitly addressed by the Act's high-risk requirements and established taxonomies, leaving practitioners without a structured basis for aligning regulatory obligations with AI risk management practice. This paper presents a systematic classification of the requirements extracted from the EU AI Act Section 2 (Requirements for high-risk AI systems), revealing that only a minority directly address AI-specific risk sources, while the majority impose organizational process and documentation obligations. From the AI risk-related requirements, a consolidated list of distinct AI-specific risk sources is derived. The resulting EU AI Act Risk Source List takes an important step towards bridging the gap between legal obligation and AI risk management practice, providing a structured reference for explicit comparison between existing AI risk taxonomies and the risk sources implicitly addressed by the EU AI Act. Important Note: This is the authors' preprint. The paper was presented at the 4th International Conference on Frontiers of Artificial Intelligence, Ethics, and Multidisciplinary Applications. A link to the conference's official proceedings will be provided upon publication.

The rapid deployment of AI systems across high-stakes domains has created urgent demand for standardized evaluation, yet the field remains fragmented across competing risk taxonomies that catalog risks without showing how an audit is executed. At least 74 AI risk taxonomies exist, and almost all stop at the catalog. The hard part of auditing is not naming a risk but operationalizing it: turning it into a test run against a real system, a measured value, a calibrated severity, and a defensible grade. This paper leads with that bridge. We present the operationalization layer Eticas has built and run, shown end to end on a single risk (PII leakage) against a public benchmark, and then the open taxonomy that makes the method scale. On GPT-4-0314, a disclosure risk that seven external frameworks require be controlled is measured at 0%, 51%, and 84% disclosure as adversarial conditioning increases, mapping through calibrated severity bands to a subcategory grade of E with a SYSTEMIC pattern. Around this example, the Eticas AI Risk Taxonomy v2.0.0 organizes 76 active subcategories across 10 categories and 20 sub-groups, with mappings to 18 external frameworks across compliance, reference, and academic tiers. Its category and sub-group layer is published under CC BY 4.0 as open semantic infrastructure with stable URIs and SKOS/JSON-LD distributions, and a worked subcategory example shows the operational layer down to its severity thresholds. The contribution is the demonstrated bridge from concept to graded finding, anchored by a clean separation of risks from the mechanisms by which they surface, and framed by an open-core model in which the conceptual scaffold is open and the methodology calibration is the practitioner layer. This is the infrastructure the AI auditing field needs: shared, open, and demonstrably operable.

AI agents - i.e. AI systems that autonomously plan, invoke external tools, and execute multi-step action chains with reduced human involvement - are being deployed at scale across enterprise functions ranging from customer service and recruitment to clinical decision support and critical infrastructure management. The EU AI Act (Regulation 2024/1689) regulates these systems through a risk-based framework, but it does not operate in isolation: providers face simultaneous obligations under the GDPR, the Cyber Resilience Act, the Digital Services Act, the Data Act, the Data Governance Act, sector-specific legislation, the NIS2 Directive, and the revised Product Liability Directive. This paper provides the first systematic regulatory mapping for AI agent providers integrating (a) draft harmonised standards under Standardisation Request M/613 to CEN/CENELEC JTC 21 as of January 2026, (b) the GPAI Code of Practice published in July 2025, (c) the CRA harmonised standards programme under Mandate M/606 accepted in April 2025, and (d) the Digital Omnibus proposals of November 2025. We present a practical taxonomy of nine agent deployment categories mapping concrete actions to regulatory triggers, identify agent-specific compliance challenges in cybersecurity, human oversight, transparency across multi-party action chains, and runtime behavioral drift. We propose a twelve-step compliance architecture and a regulatory trigger mapping connecting agent actions to applicable legislation. We conclude that high-risk agentic systems with untraceable behavioral drift cannot currently satisfy the AI Act's essential requirements, and that the provider's foundational compliance task is an exhaustive inventory of the agent's external actions, data flows, connected systems, and affected persons.