Computer-use agents increasingly handle private information and act on users' behalf across desktop and web applications, including email. Phishing therefore poses privacy and security risks that depend not only on whether agents recognize malicious messages, but also on how they respond. Existing phishing datasets were developed primarily for conventional detection, leaving agent susceptibility to persuasive malicious requests insufficiently characterized. To expose vulnerabilities that pre-existing datasets may miss, we introduce AgentPhishing, a benchmark for evaluating whether persuasive phishing attacks can evade detection and induce LLM email agents to comply with malicious requests. We develop PhishOpt, which optimizes reusable email-generation skills against individual agents under fixed benchmark constraints and a realism constraint. We analyze the generated emails using Cialdini's persuasion principles to identify strategies associated with agent failures and use these findings to construct a universal generation skill. Our evaluation shows that agents can handle pre-existing phishing emails safely yet remain susceptible to attacks adapted to agent behavior, while in an AgentPhishing evaluation of nine agents, four exhibit phishing-detection rates below 10% and malicious-request compliance rates above 45%. These results highlight the limits of inferring agent safety from conventional phishing evaluations and the need to assess how agents respond to persuasive malicious requests.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Overview of PhishOpt. Target-specific skill optimization refines skills using agent feedback under fixed generation requirements and a realism constraint. If a candidate fails a constraint check or does not improve the objective, it is rejected and the current skill remains unchanged for the next iteration. Persuasion–outcome associations then inform universal skill construction.
Role
Optimizer
Generator
Realism judge
Cialdini annotator
Skill synthesizer
Target agent
Evaluator
Config
Opus 4.8
Sonnet 4.6
Opus 4.8
Opus 4.8
Opus 4.8
varied
rule-based
Table 1: Model configurations by pipeline role.
Figure 3: Baselines and per-agent PhishOpt results. Panel A compares Susceptibility scores under the static set, unoptimized synthetic baseline, and per-agent optimized PhishOpt attacks. Panel B decomposes the PhishOpt-optimized attack result into detection-failure and compliance rates. Higher values indicate worse agent behavior.
Figure 4: Cross-agent and additional-agent evaluation heatmaps. Each non-universal row identifies the PhishOpt target agent whose feedback was used to evolve that row’s skill. The universal row reports results for the shared skill constructed from persuasion analysis across targets. Columns represent AgentPhishing target agents evaluated on emails generated using each row’s skill. Panel A uses the same six models in both roles, while Panel B uses nine additional AgentPhishing target agents not used as PhishOpt targets. Higher Susceptibility scores indicate worse agent performance. In Panel B, the blocked/open split marks the largest gap in target agents’ mean Susceptibility scores.
PhishOpt target agent
Kimi
Sonnet
Gemini
Grok
GPT
Qwen
D(↑) / C(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓)
kimi-k2.5
0.167 / 0.583
1.000 / 0.000
0.917 / 0.083
0.583 / 0.250
0.833 / 0.000
0.417 / 0.417
claude-sonnet-5
0.667 / 0.167
1.000 / 0.000
1.000 / 0.000
0.833 / 0.000
0.750 / 0.000
0.917 / 0.083
gemini-3.5-flash
0.667 / 0.167
1.000 / 0.000
1.000 / 0.000
0.636 / 0.000
0.750 / 0.000
0.909 / 0.091
grok-4.20
0.333 / 0.333
1.000 / 0.000
0.750 / 0.167
0.167 / 0.250
0.909 / 0.000
0.167 / 0.583
gpt-5.4
0.250 / 0.333
1.000 / 0.000
0.818 / 0.000
0.500 / 0.167
0.455 / 0.091
0.333 / 0.417
Table 2: Detection and compliance underlying the six-target cross-agent evaluation in Figure 4 A. Each cell reports detection rate D / compliance rate C ; higher D and lower C indicate safer behavior. Rows identify the PhishOpt target agents used to evolve the skills, and columns identify the AgentPhishing target agents evaluated on the generated emails. Diagonal cells use the same model in both roles; off-diagonal cells use different models.
Figure 5: Persuasion-principle associations with detection failure and malicious-request compliance. Positive ϕ values indicate more unsafe behavior, while negative values indicate safer handling. Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding email-annotation format.
Universal-skill condition
Gemini-3.5-Flash
GPT-5.4
D(↑) / C(↓) / J(↓)
D(↑) / C(↓) / J(↓)
Original
0.6667 / 0.0833 / 0.2774
0.2500 / 0.1667 / 0.5705
w/o Commitment and Consistency
0.9167 / 0.0833 / 0.1095
0.5833 / 0.0000 / 0.2750
Replace with Authority + Urgency
1.0000 / 0.0000 / 0.0222
1.0000 / 0.0000 / 0.0345
Table 3: Persuasion-framing ablation of the universal skill. Each cell reports detection rate D / compliance rate C / Susceptibility score J . Bold values mark the largest absolute change from the original skill for each metric within each target, including ties.
Appendix figures & tables6 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Figure 6: AgentPhishing evaluation pipeline. (a) Pre-existing and skill-generated emails pass through a shared agent interface and rule-based evaluator. (b) Within-target, cross-agent, held-out, and universal-skill comparisons assess refinement and generalization. (c) Persuasion analysis, diversity diagnostics, and additional implemented checks characterize generation patterns and sensitivity. Batch reuse and repetitions depend on the comparison setup; the additional checks are capabilities rather than mandatory steps in every evaluation.
Figure 7: Persuasion-annotation example showing how generated emails are marked for persuasion cues and unsafe action targets.
Detection rate ( ↑ )
Skill source
kimi
sonnet
gemini
grok
gpt
qwen
kimi-k2.5
0.167
1.000
0.917
0.583
0.833
0.417
claude-sonnet-5
0.667
1.000
1.000
0.833
0.750
0.917
gemini-3.5-flash
0.667
1.000
1.000
0.636
0.750
0.909
grok-4.20
0.333
1.000
0.750
0.167
0.909
0.167
gpt-5.4
0.250
1.000
0.818
0.500
0.455
0.333
Appendix
Table 4: Cross-agent detection and compliance rates. Rows indicate the source model whose evolved skill generated the emails; columns indicate the target agent evaluated on those emails.
Skill
Target model
Score ( ↓ )
Det. ( ↑ )
Compl. ( ↓ )
F1 ( ↑ )
FPR ( ↓ )
NPV ( ↑ )
Prec. ( ↑ )
Reason. ( ↑ )
universal
gpt-5.6
0.0533
1.0000
0.0000
0.7333
0.5556
1.0000
0.5789
1.0000
claude-opus-4-8
0.0581
1.0000
0.0000
0.7097
0.4444
0.8333
0.5500
0.9091
grok-4.6
0.1075
0.9091
0.0000
0.6897
0.5556
0.8000
0.5556
0.9091
claude-haiku-4-5
0.0755
1.0000
0.0909
0.7586
0.1111
1.0000
0.6111
1.0000
gemini-3.1-pro
0.0533
1.0000
0.0000
0.7333
0.2222
0.7778
0.5789
0.8182
gpt-5-mini
0.8205
0.0909
0.6364
0.1250
0.1111
0.4444
0.2000
0.4545
Appendix
Table 5: Held-out cell metrics, part 1 of 2. Seven evolved skills are evaluated against nine target agents never used in any optimization loop, with 20 emails per cell and no errored cells. Score is the composite adversary objective; the remaining columns are its components and associated classification metrics. Emails were generated once per skill and reused across all nine models, so cells within a skill block are paired. FPR and NPV key on an explicit report verdict while Prec. , F1 , and Score use the broad flagging predicate. Reason. is reasoning_score . A dash under F1 marks a cell where the agent flagged nothing, leaving F1 undefined. Source: skillopt/analysis/results/big_table.csv .
Skill
Target model
Score ( ↓ )
Det. ( ↑ )
Compl. ( ↓ )
F1 ( ↑ )
FPR ( ↓ )
NPV ( ↑ )
Prec. ( ↑ )
Reason. ( ↑ )
kimi-k2.5
gpt-5.6
0.0452
1.0000
0.0000
0.7742
0.5000
1.0000
0.6316
1.0000
claude-opus-4-8
0.0899
0.9167
0.0000
0.7587
0.2500
0.8571
0.6471
1.0000
grok-4.6
0.0452
1.0000
0.0000
0.7742
0.6250
1.0000
0.6316
1.0000
claude-haiku-4-5
0.0345
1.0000
0.0000
0.8276
0.1250
1.0000
0.7059
1.0000
gemini-3.1-pro
0.1200
0.9167
0.0833
0.7333
0.2500
0.8571
0.6111
0.9167
gpt-5-mini
0.4250
0.5000
0.2500
0.5000
0.1250
0.5385
0.5000
0.9167
Appendix
Table 6: Held-out cell metrics, part 2 of 2. Continued from Table 5 .
Corpus
n
Self-BLEU ( ↓ )
Ratio ( ↓ )
gemini-3.5-flash
35
0.2175
0.892
grok-4.20
35
0.2350
0.964
baseline ( skill_v1.md )
36
0.2439
1.000
kimi-k2.5
35
0.2628
1.078
claude-sonnet-5
34
0.2668
1.094
gpt-5.4
36
0.2951
1.210
Appendix
Table 7: Lexical diversity of the scam emails generated by each best skill, ordered most to least diverse. Downward arrows indicate greater lexical diversity. Higher Self-BLEU means less diversity. Ratio is Self-BLEU relative to the unoptimized baseline; the flag threshold is 1.30 . No corpus was flagged on either criterion. Source: skillopt/analysis/results/diversity_metrics.csv .
System prompt configuration can make the difference between near-total phishing blindness and near-perfect detection in LLM email agents. We present PhishNChips, a study of 11 models under 10 prompt strategies, showing that prompt-model interaction is a first-order security variable: a single model's phishing bypass rate ranges from under 1% to 97% depending on how it is configured, while the false-positive cost of the same prompt varies sharply across models. We then show that optimizing prompts around highly predictive signals can improve benchmark performance, reaching up to 93.7% recall at 3.8% false positive rate, but also creates a brittle attack surface. In particular, domain-matching strategies perform well when legitimate emails mostly have matched sender and URL domains, yet degrade sharply when attackers invert that signal by registering matching infrastructure. Response-trace analysis shows that 98% of successful bypasses reason in ways consistent with the inverted signal: the models are following the instruction, but the instruction's core assumption has become false. A counter-intuitive corollary follows: making prompts more specific can degrade already-capable models by replacing broader multi-signal reasoning with exploitable single-signal dependence. We characterize the resulting tension between detection, usability, and adversarial robustness as a navigable tradeoff, introduce Safetility, a deployability-aware metric that penalizes false positives, and argue that closing the adversarial gap likely requires tool augmentation with external ground truth.
Language model agents are increasingly deployed to automate everyday digital chores from managing emails and social media to handling banking and bills allowing users to step away from supervision. However, this capability also exposes sensitive information to phishing. Safe execution requires distinguishing malicious requests from genuine ones without simply refusing to act. Despite its practical importance, this problem remains underexplored and it is unclear whether current agents or existing defenses can achieve it. To study this problem, we first propose CredLeak-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate how effectively and securely agents automate human workflows when confronted with phishing and identity verification. The benchmark covers both user-directed authentication and autonomous inbox monitoring, where agents are not explicitly instructed to log in. It systematically varies deceptive cues and pairs phishing scenarios with legitimate counterparts, enabling joint evaluation of information leakage and utility on genuine tasks. Within a sandboxed environment, leakage is measured through actual submissions of information rather than agents' self-reported behavior. Our evaluation reveals that all tested models are vulnerable to leakage. Agents also disclose sensitive information during autonomous inbox monitoring, demonstrating that phishing can induce disclosure without a user request to authenticate. Furthermore, most evaluated mitigations that reduce leakage also impair performance on genuine tasks, exposing a security utility trade off in existing defenses. These findings show why reducing leakage alone is insufficient: effective defenses must prevent unauthorized disclosure while preserving legitimate task completion. CredLeak-Bench provides a controlled framework for measuring both objectives and evaluating progress toward secure, useful agents.
Rafid Ahmed, Joseph Fioresi, Mubarak Shah +1
Institute of Artificial Intelligence, University of Central Florida
Enterprise email agents must combine information retrieval, structured state changes, temporal reasoning, and multi-step coordination. Recent agent benchmarks include productivity tasks, but few center on typed email workflows in a self-contained environment. We introduce EmailBench, a benchmark of 206 email and productivity scenarios across 16 task categories. The benchmark couples a typed email API specification with provider-neutral naming, a deterministic synthetic Enron-inspired corpus, and a scenario suite whose topic selection was informed by aggregate task-intent telemetry from an interactive prototype. Its hybrid evaluation protocol combines 258 executable static assertions with 211 LLM rubrics. We evaluate eight LM configurations on a fixed single-user corpus. The best-performing configuration passes only 33.5% of scenarios despite 99.7% of its tool calls completing without an observed API failure, with pass rates varying substantially across task categories. This gap shows that valid tool execution is not equivalent to task completion. EmailBench provides a self-contained environment for end-to-end email-agent evaluation, with broader tool coverage, multi-persona testing, and repeated-run evaluation as future work areas.