Depth-Dependent Safety Geometry in Vision-Language Models: Layer-Wise Localization and Bidirectional Refusal Control

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly trained to generate structured outputs like points and bounding boxes that downstream interfaces, agents, and robots can act on, yet safety alignment of this output channel has not been systematically analyzed. We study visual grounding safety by repurposing three safety benchmarks spanning direct harm (VLSU), social bias (BBQ-V), and situational safety (Asimov-2.0) into 15,401 matched pairs of harmful requests that differ only in the requested output: a free-text answer (VQA) or a grounding (point or bounding box). Across five VLMs, models that refuse a harmful request posed as a question often comply when the same request asks for a grounding: averaged over models, grounding refusal trails VQA refusal by 31-59 percentage points, depending on the domain, and safety system prompts do not close this gap. We propose a fine-tuning approach that combines grounding-form refusals with capability grounding data and self-distilled benign data to counter over-refusal. For Qwen3-VL-8B and VisionReasoner-7B, it improves grounding refusal by 77-95 percentage points on VLSU and BBQ-V and by 64-85 points on the held-out Asimov-2.0 domain, while also improving VQA refusal, preserving grounding capability, and keeping over-refusal limited. Representation analysis shows that fine-tuning moves harmful requests toward each model's refusal direction, most strongly for grounding, while leaving benign requests near the harmless reference.

Vision-language models (VLMs) can comply with harmful requests delivered through images, even when their LLM backbones would refuse the same content in text. While prior work characterizes these jailbreaks empirically or at the representation level, how visual inputs perturb safety pathways at the neuron level remains uncharted. We close this gap with a causal, neuron-level analysis of safety mechanisms in 10 VLMs. We propose a two-stage detection pipeline with iterative ablation that accounts for self-repair, and introduce two modality-isolated benchmarks, ViSafe-Detect and ViSafe-Eval, which decouple visual and textual safety signals. Our analysis reveals: (i) Text safety in VLMs is localizable: $\sim$88 neurons ($<$0.01%) whose targeted ablation substantially reduces refusal. (ii) Text safety neurons constitute the dominant refusal pathway: ablating them is the only intervention that consistently and substantially reduces refusal across all models. (iii) Visual safety is high-dimensional and diffuse at the single-neuron level: text safety concentrates in $\sim$5 subspace directions while visual safety requires $\geq$50. This gap holds across architectures, explaining why current alignment has not closed the visual safety gap. Project page is at: https://jiaxuan-li.github.io/vlm-safety-neuron/ Warning: this paper may include examples of harmful content.

Aligned vision-language models (VLMs) are designed to balance grounded visual reasoning with safe generation behavior. However, we observe a striking phenomenon: under safety-constrained instruction, models frequently abstain from answering questions that remain correctly answerable under default instruction despite receiving identical image-question inputs. This raises a fundamental question: does safety alignment suppress perceptual grounding itself, or does visual evidence remain internally available while generation is redirected toward abstention? In this work, we investigate the internal decoding dynamics underlying safety-induced abstention in aligned VLMs. Across multiple architectures and multimodal benchmarks, we show that abstained generations remain consistently influenced by visual evidence throughout decoding, indicating that perceptual grounding is largely preserved despite refusal behavior. We further demonstrate that, although the representational organization of refusal differs substantially across architectures, safety-constrained instruction consistently alters late-stage hidden-state dynamics toward refusal-oriented decoding. Finally, through targeted activation-level interventions, we show that suppressing refusal-related representations reliably restores grounded answering behavior across models without retraining or modifying visual inputs. Together, these findings reveal a previously underexplored failure mode in aligned VLMs: safety alignment can override grounded visual expression even when perceptual evidence remains internally preserved.