Throughout life, we accumulate knowledge of how typical certain events are. We use this knowledge in daily conversation, often interpreting meaning beyond what has been said explicitly. In this work, we take steps to better understand this meaning recovery, investigating both atypicality and typicality inferences. First, we construct two corpora, EventTyp and the human-validated EventTypGold. We conduct large-scale human and LLM experiments and find that for humans, three CUES predict inferences about typicality: Commonsense Knowledge, Utterance Emphasis, and Snark. However, in most experimental settings, we find that LLMs lack the prerequisite Commonsense Knowledge necessary to accurately assess an event's general typicality, and therefore struggle to follow these CUES.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Examples of what can cause an atypicality or typicality inference. Someone making an atypicality inference would answer the question on the left with unlikely , whereas if they made a typicality inference, they would answer the question on the right with likely .
Definition
Example
Written by
Validated by
LLM
Human
LLM
Human
Context
The first event utterance
Anahita thanks her boss
TypicFollowUp
Event utterance stating something that
Anahita means it
2,062
292
1,226
1,128
is generally typical given Context.
AtypicFollowUp
Event utterance stating something that
Anahita is in tears
1,679
675
0
2,354
is generally atypical given Context.
Table 1: Example (Context, TypicFollowUp, AtypicFollowUp) tuple from EventTyp , along with the number of items per-type written and validated by an LLM and a human. Note that we also count the human-written and human-validated data from Kravtchenko and Demberg (2015) . The total number of tuples in EventTyp is 2,354 .
Figure 2: Setup for our surprisal experiments with examples using the Unlikely likelihood rating option. Surprisal is computed over the Completion, given the Input.
Follow-up
Context example
Question
Anahita thanks her boss
In general, when
someone thanks
their boss, how likely
is it that they
TypicFollowUp
Anahita means it
…mean it?
AtypicFollowUp
Anahita is in tears
…are in tears?
Table 2: Example of the questions we ask in the Commonsense Knowledge Experiment. Two questions are asked per Context, one for the likelihood of the TypicFollowUp and one for that of the AtypicFollowUp.
Chedeline and Kathem are having a conversation about their friend Anahita.
Chedeline: “Anahita thanked her boss.”
Follow-up Setting
Follow-up
NONE
Plain
HeyGW
Question
TypicFollowUp
–
“She meant it.”
“And hey, guess what,
In general, when Anahita thanks her boss, how likely is it that
she meant it!”
she means it? (Very Unlikely, Unlikely, Likely, Very Likely)
AtypicFollowUp
–
“She was in tears.”
“And hey, guess what,
In general, In general, when Anahita thanks her boss, how likely is it that
Table 3: Setup for Event-Typicality Inference experiments ( § 6 ). A participant sees the top dialogue (containing a Context), and ONE Follow-up setting (containing either a TypicFollowUp or a AtypicFollowUp), along with its corresponding question. This means that for each tuple, there are 6 possible experiment conditions.
Figure 3: Human-LLM agreement for the Commonsense Knowledge experiment, with κAtypicFollowUp on the X-axis and κTypicFollowUp on the Y-axis.
Figure 4: Human results for TypicFollowUps vs. AtypicFollowUps, where a point’s size denotes the number of InfScores equal to its X value. InfScore > 0 = atypicality inference, and InfScore < 0 = typicality inference.
Figure 5: Human distributions of responses in the NONE vs. HeyGW settings for TypicFollowUps, with non-snarky scenarios (left) and snarky scenarios (right).
Figure 6: Percentage of Follow-ups in the HeyGW setting where an LLM made a typicality (X-axis) vs. atypicality inference (Y-axis). Points in the gray halo are LLM configurations where the atypicality and typicality inferences were both statistically significant (p < 0.01).
Figure 7: LLM consistency; i.e. the percentage of Follow-ups where responses from the Event-Typicality Inference experiment NONE setting matched those from the Commonsense Knowledge experiment, (X-axis for AtypicFollowUps and Y-Axis for TypicFollowUps).
Appendix figures & tables16 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
TypicFollowUp Event
Example followup to
Category
Mary thanks her boss
State
Mary is at the office
Subaction
Mary means it
Next-action
Mary’s boss says you’re welcome
Appendix
Table 4: Example TypicFollowUp events for the three utterance categories.
Unnatural for dialogue
Wrong typicality
Prompt(s)
Description
Prompt(s)
Description
Malformed Context (2):
Has errors or is
Abstract (3):
Idiomatic, not concrete, or solely
,
awkward/redundant
, ,
happens in one person’s head
Malformed event utterance (3):
Has errors or
Entailed/almost entailed (5):
, ,
is incoherent
Direct (
Death ( ),
Event only false if the person dies
Appendix
Table 5: 27 LLM-filtering prompts and their classes (Unnatural for dialogue vs. Wrong typicality)
Accepted Answer
Norming version
Main version
1
Likely/Very Likely
In general, when someone puts on
Bob and Sarah are having a conversation
a t-shirt and skirt, how likely is
about their friend Sharon. Bob:
it that they put clothes on?
“Sharon put on a t-shirt and skirt.
She put clothes on.” In general,
when Sharon puts on a t-shirt and skirt,
how likely is it that she puts clothes on?
Appendix
Table 6: Attention check questions. These qualify as ‘nonsensical items’ per Prolific’s attention check policy.
LLM
Base
Instruct
Small
Big
GPT-5.4 ( OpenAI, 2026 )
x
✓
nano-2026-03-17
2026-03-05
Llama-3.1 ( Grattafiori et al., 2024 )
✓
✓
8b
70b
Olmo-3 ( Olmo et al., 2025 )
✓
✓
7b
32b
Qwen3 ( Yang et al., 2025 )
✓
✓
8b
30b
gemma-3 ( Gemma Team, 2025 )
✓
✓
12b
27b
Appendix
Table 7: LLMs used. For those where prompting was available, we tried prompting both with and without CoT (see § C.2.2 . For details on model version selection, see § C.2.1 . Since OpenAI has not made GPT-5.4’s parameter number publicly available, we just put the timestamp model IDs.
Figure 8: Example of what human participants saw in our Commonsense Knowledge experiment.
Figure 9: Example of what human participants saw during our Event-Typicality Inference experiment. Each participant answered between 30 and 32 questions.
Figure 10: Example of an implicit request question participants saw in the pragmatics pre-test. The expected answer here is d).
Figure 11: Example of a coherence question participants saw in the pragmatics pre-test. The expected answer here is ‘Incoherent.’
β
z
p
Follow-up
2.87
39.85
< 0.001
Plain.NONE
1.20
26.15
< 0.001
NONE.HeyGW
-0.27
-5.28
< 0.001
Follow-up:Plain.NONE
-1.05
-11.47
< 0.001
Follow-up:NONE.HeyGW
1.95
18.51
< 0.001
Appendix
Table 8: Regression output for the main mixed effects model fit on human data ( Follow-up×setting ).
β
z
p
Follow-up
2.77
40.57
< 0.001
Plain.NONE
1.18
26.50
< 0.001
NONE.HeyGW
-0.24
-4.72
< 0.001
Snark
-0.22
-3.46
< 0.001
Follow-up:Plain.NONE
-1.02
-11.88
< 0.001
Follow-up:NONE.HGW
1.95
22.69
< 0.001
Appendix
Table 9: Regression output for the snark mixed effects model fit on human data, Follow-up×setting×snark .
β
z
p
TypicFollowUp
Plain.NONE
0.66
10.06
< 0.001
NONE.HeyGW
0.64
8.77
< 0.001
AtypicFollowUp
Plain.NONE
1.86
26.50
< 0.001
NONE.HeyGW
-1.34
-17.98
< 0.001
Appendix
Table 10: Regression output for the subset mixed effects models on human data.
LLM
Surprisal
Prompting
CoT-Prompting
AtypInf
TypInf
SnarkEffect
AtypInf
TypInf
SnarkEffect
AtypInf
TypInf
SnarkEffect
GPT-5.4
–
–
–
x
✓
x
✓
✓
✓
Llama-3.1-70B
✓
x
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
Olmo3-32B
✓
x
x
x
✓
x
✓
✓
x
Qwen3-30B
x
✓
x
x
✓
x
x
✓
x
gemma-3-27b
x
x
x
x
✓
x
✓
✓
✓
Appendix
Table 11: Summary of mixed effects models fit on LLM output data. Atypicality and typicality inferences abbreviated to AtypInf and TypInf. Note that the snark effect is only present if atypicality inferences are made.
Figure 12: GPT-5.4 comparison of the distribution of responses to NONE vs. HeyGW settings for TypicFollowUps, with non-snarky dialogues on the left and snarky dialogues on the right.
Figure 13: Correlation (p<0.01) between Commonsense Knowledge (CKnowledge) human-LLM agreement ( κCombined , Appendix G ) and the percentage of Event-Typicality Inference Experiment HeyGW setting tuples where the LLM made both an atypicality inference (on the TypicFollowUp) and a typicality inference (on the AtypicFollowUp).
Figure 14: Percentage of the time a typicality inference was made on events voted as AtypicFollowUp by LLM (X-axis) vs. humans (Y-Axis)
Figure 15: Percentage of the time an atypicality inference was made on events voted as TypicFollowUp by LLM (X-axis) vs. humans (Y-Axis)
Pragmatic reasoning in language models studies how models infer and communicate meanings shaped by context, intent, shared knowledge, and social norms.
Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.
Gaurav Kamath, Sreenath Madathil, Sebastian Schuster +2
McGill University · Mila – Quebec AI Institute · University of Vienna +2
Recent work has questioned whether large language models (LLMs) can be useful for temporal event prediction. Despite vast pretrained world knowledge, LLMs often underperform simpler specialized models. We ask whether this knowledge is truly inaccessible, or whether current methods fail to present event prediction in a form LLMs can use. We argue for the latter and show that LLMs become effective event forecasters when the interface is designed around two choices. The first grounds each event in a natural-language description, and the second separates event semantics from the prediction space to prevent semantic bias from label associations. To test this, we introduce DescribeEvent, a benchmark of ~150K events across seven datasets and six domains with event-level descriptions. We find that capable LLMs substantially benefit from descriptions and symbolic labels, outperforming description-free variants and non-LLM baselines, while weaker models gain little. These results suggest that accessing LLM world knowledge for event prediction is an interface problem, and that event descriptions offer a practical way to elicit the knowledge LLMs already encode.
Users frequently express their beliefs to large language models (LLMs). In some situations, the LLM should accept these contextual beliefs as true. In others, they should stick to their prior knowledge. Notably, users' expressions of belief (EoBs) can take linguistically diverse forms - using presuppositions, evidential and certainty markers, or varied tones - each of which may have a different persuasiveness over the LLMs. We introduce a typology to systematically evaluate how different EoBs affect whether models follow context versus prior knowledge. The typology is grounded in four linguistically motivated dimensions: form, evidentiality, epistemic stance, and tone, spanning 17 fine-grained types. By pairing these EoBs with world knowledge facts, we generate controlled EoB-query pairs that isolate the effect of linguistic variation. Using this benchmark, we evaluate 16 LLMs that differ in architecture (Llama3, Qwen3, Gemma3), scale (1B-30B parameters), and training stages (base vs instruct). We identify meaningful variations in response behavior across these axes, e.g., that bigger models and instruction models tend to be less context-following than smaller models and base models. We further identify specific EoBs that statistically significantly persuade LMs more consistently than others. Our work reveals systematic patterns in how linguistic framing affects LLM context integration, with implications for prompt engineering and model robustness.