Organizations: 1*Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India. · 2*National Institute of Science Education and Research, Bhubaneswar, India. · 3*Institute of Mathematics and Application, Bhubaneswar, India. · 4*Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur, India. · 5*Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India. · 6*Naval Postgraduate School, Applied Mathematics Department, Monterey, CA 93943, USA.
We study fully connected neural-network reconstruction by combining cryptanalytic weight-direction extraction with learning from predicted labels. We adapt a ReLU extraction implementation to Leaky ReLU, compare sign-search methods, and estimate biases and output layers. We prove conditional bounds for direction recovery with approximate prefixes, preservation of local distance votes, prediction changes from aligned parameter errors, and sign selection with independent scoring data. We also specify exact row restoration and distinguish its guarantee from that of gradient masking. The experiments evaluate assisted extraction, with privileged access to gradients, hidden activations, and victim parameters, followed by label-based reconstruction. Across eight search seeds on the largest synthetic architecture, Leaky ReLU recovers 51--57 neurons in the deepest hidden layer, while ReLU recovers none. This advantage does not hold uniformly across architectures and layers. Removing victim-weight access from the sign walk gives less accurate signs, despite high final prediction agreement. Across 40 seeded runs on the two smallest synthetic victims, agreement on 5,000 inputs excluded from fitting and selection ranges from 0.9890 to 0.9992. On two CIFAR-10 victims, the reconstructed models achieve 56.40% and 58.29% agreement and exceed the distillation baseline on three functional metrics. We report label requests separately from privileged access and explain why prediction agreement does not identify network parameters.
Figures & tables
Operation
Reads
Type
Role in the reported implementation
D1 – Boundary detection
Logit gap
A
In the D1 ablation, disabling it reduces accepted directions on the tiny ReLU victim from 142/256 to 24/256. This is an implementation ablation, not an impossibility result.
D2 – Boundary refinement
Exact logit gradients
A
A label-based fallback exists in the reference code. Its use must be specified in a strict-oracle experiment.
D3 – Neuron clustering
Hidden activations
A
The reference code also provides an SVD-based alternative. Its reported higher cost does not make privileged access necessary in principle.
D4 – Prefix initialization
True weight matrices
W
Supplies the prefix used to extract deeper layers. The present experiments do not replace it with a fully reconstructed prefix.
D5 – Signature scaling
True weight vector
W
Corrects scale and checks candidates. In the Leaky ReLU path, ground-truth agreement also determines candidate acceptance.
D6 – Sign-walk parameters
True weights and biases
W
Supplies the prefix used by the sign-recovery walk. The recovered-frame conversion also compares recovered rows with true rows before choosing directions.
Table 1: Privileged accesses in the evaluated extraction implementation.
Slice
Role
Source ( make_blobs / CIFAR-10)
Xtest
Phase-3 training pool
seed 42 / test batch
Xtest2
Phase-3 training pool
seed 99 / train idx 40000–49999
Xtest3
Evaluation and early stopping
seed 123 / train idx 10000–19999
Table 2: Dataset contract for joint-fit experiments. The split-fit comparison uses the separate roles described in Section 7.7 .
Parameter
tiniest
tinier
tiny
full (CIFAR)
dual-search rounds
6
8
20
150
dual workers / batch
7 / 256
7 / 256
7 / 256
1–3 / 256
target triplets / round
3000
2000
10000
10000
sign restarts
1
1
2
0–1
sign pair-lookahead
8
8
8
4
sign refine cycles
3
3
3
1
Table 3: Per-architecture tuned parameters. The CIFAR runs use simulated annealing (SA) with the margin score. PT denotes parallel tempering.
Phase
Parameter
Value
Dual search
implementation
torch , CUDA float64
Sign recovery
runner
batched_sign_recovery.py , float64
Reconstruction
sign-search method
SA+margin (default), PT+margin (comparison)
mini-refine
20 epochs, lr 5×10−3 , wd 10−4
refine optimiser
AdamW, cosine lr, wd 10−4
early stopping
patience 5, evaluation every 10 epochs
Table 4: Pipeline parameters held fixed across all victims.
Metric
Interpretation
C1 – Evaluation-slice agreement
Prediction agreement on the slice also used for early stopping.
C2 – Off-distribution agreement
Prediction agreement under the specified alternative input distributions.
C3 – Margin-conditioned agreement
Prediction agreement in the far bin of the directional search-radius proxy.
Table 5: Functional agreement metrics. None identifies the victim’s parameters.
Model
Recovered
fc1/fc2/fc3/fc4
Sign acc
Victim acc
Ext acc
Agreement
tiniest_relu
20/32 (62.5%)
8/8 ⋅ 7/8 ⋅ 0/8 ⋅ 5/8
0.601
99.90%
99.40%
99.30%
tiniest_leakyrelu
25/32 (78.1%)
8/8 ⋅ 8/8 ⋅ 3/8 ⋅ 6/8
0.771
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tinier_relu
29/56 (51.8%)
16/16 ⋅ 12/16 ⋅ 1/16 ⋅ 0/8
0.347
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tinier_leakyrelu
35/56 (62.5%)
16/16 ⋅ 13/16 ⋅ 4/16 ⋅ 2/8
0.463
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tiny_relu
139/256 (54.3%)
64/64 ⋅ 61/64 ⋅ 14/64 ⋅ 0/64
0.503
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tiny_leakyrelu
226/256 (88.3%)
63/64 ⋅ 60/64 ⋅ 49/64 ⋅ 54/64
0.500
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Table 6: Assisted reconstruction across the victim suite (SA with a margin score). Sign accuracy averages over nonempty hidden layers.
Architecture
ReLU recovered
Leaky recovered
Delta
fc4 ReLU
fc4 Leaky
tiniest
20/32
25/32
+5
5/8
6/8
tinier
29/56
35/56
+6
0/8
2/8
tiny
139/256
226/256
+87
0/64
54/64
cifar
499/832
807/832
+308
0/64
58/64
Table 7: Phase 1–2 recovery, ReLU vs Leaky ReLU.
Layer
Mean
SD
Range
fc1
8.00
0.00
8
fc2
6.97
0.16
6–7
fc3
2.25
1.37
0–5
fc4
4.60
0.54
3–5
Table 8: Per-layer recovered neurons over 40 reported repeated extractions of tiniest_relu .
Model
C1
C2
C3
ext
dis
ext
dis
ext
dis
tiniest_relu
0.9930
0.9610
0.2166
0.3304
0.9910
0.9731
tiniest_leakyrelu
1.0000
0.9860
0.5880
0.3756
1.0000
1.0000
tinier_relu
1.0000
1.0000
0.5297
0.5295
1.0000
1.0000
tinier_leakyrelu
1.0000
1.0000
0.6123
0.5132
1.0000
1.0000
tiny_relu (SA)
1.0000
1.0000
0.4335
0.3338
1.0000
1.0000
Table 9: Per-metric agreement for the extraction arm and a matched distillation baseline.
Arch
Stage
ReLU Agr
Leaky ReLU Agr
tiniest
RAW (Phase 1+2)
12.40%
12.50%
+ bias recovery
22.80%
2.80%
+ output-layer fit
92.40%
98.00%
+ sign search
99.40%
97.90%
+ masked refinement
99.70%
98.90%
distillation baseline
96.00%
98.60%
Table 10: Additive Phase-3 ablation on the six make_blobs victims, evaluated on the selection slice X_test3.
Victim
Accepted rows
Output fit
Sign search
Refinement
tiniest_relu
20/32
99.60%
99.90%
99.90%
tiniest_leakyrelu
20/32
97.90%
99.50%
99.20%
tinier_relu
28/56
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tinier_leakyrelu
31/56
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tiny_relu
142/256
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
tiny_leakyrelu
231/256
100.00%
100.00%
100.00%
Table 11: D1 ON split-fit reconstruction. Accepted rows are counted across all hidden layers. Agreement is measured on the reserved reporting slice.
Phase-3 protocol
Minimum
Maximum
Runs below 0.995
Joint-fit
0.9918
0.9998
4/40
Split-fit
0.9890
0.9992
15/40
Split-fit, restoration and initial checkpoint
0.9910
0.9996
16/40
Also separate stopping pool
0.9910
0.9998
13/40
Table 12: Final agreement on 5,000 held-out inputs across 40 seeded tiniest runs. The extraction and canonical sign walk retain privileged access.
Victim
Total accepted rows
Deepest hidden layer
Tiniest ReLU
20–23 (22.125)
4–5 (4.875)
Tiniest Leaky ReLU
21–25 (22.875)
2–5 (3.250)
Tinier ReLU
29–31 (30.000)
0 (0.000)
Tinier Leaky ReLU
31–34 (32.875)
0–1 (0.250)
Tiny ReLU
131–141 (136.000)
0 (0.000)
Tiny Leaky ReLU
221–229 (225.875)
51–57 (54.375)
Table 13: Accepted rows across eight recorded dual-search seeds per synthetic victim. Parentheses give means.
The importance of deep neural networks (DNNs) is widely recognized, and the parameters obtained through training are regarded as valuable assets. Recently, attacks that extract these parameters using only oracle queries to a DNN have been actively studied at IACR conferences. The hard-label setting is the most challenging setting for model extraction, where an adversary can observe only the final output label, such as "dog" or "cat." At Eurocrypt 2025, Carlini et al. proposed polynomial-time hard-label extraction of ReLU-based MLPs. However, one step of this attack process, i.e., sign recovery, requires a large number of queries and substantial computation. Implementing this step in a black-box setting remains difficult. Consequently, a fully black-box end-to-end demonstration on trained deep ReLU MLPs has remained a challenge. In this paper, we propose a new sign-recovery algorithm based on a completely different principle from the existing method. Our method requires no dedicated queries for sign recovery. In our experiments, it achieves higher sign-recovery accuracy than the existing method. Consequently, it enables efficient sign recovery even for trained models. With our sign-recovery algorithm, all steps of hard-label model extraction can be implemented in a black-box setting. By combining these implementations, we demonstrate end-to-end model extraction from models trained on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, with width 16 and 4 or 6 hidden layers, achieving over 98% label agreement.
Akira Ito, Takayuki Miura, Yosuke Todo
Tohoku University 2–1–1 Katahira, Aoba-ku, Sendai-shi, 980-8577, Japan · NTT Social Informatics Laboratories, 3–9–11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan
Data reconstruction attacks on trained neural networks aim to recover the data on which the network has been trained and pose a significant threat to privacy, especially if the training dataset contains sensitive information. Here, we propose a unified optimization formulation of the data reconstruction problem based on initial and trained parameter values, incorporating state-of-the-art proposals. We show that in the random feature model, this formulation provably leads to training data reconstruction with high probability, provided the network width is sufficiently large; this unprecedented finite-width result uses PAC-style bounds. Furthermore, when the data lies in a low-dimensional subspace, we show that the network width requirement for successful reconstruction can be relaxed, with bounds depending on the subspace dimension rather than the ambient dimension. For general neural network models and unknown data orientations, we propose an efficient reconstruction algorithm that approximates the low-dimensional data subspace through the change in the first-layer weights during training and uses only the last-layer weights for reconstruction, thus reducing the search space dimension and the required network width for high-quality reconstructions. Our numerical experiments on synthetic datasets and CIFAR-10 confirm that our subspace-aware reconstruction approach outperforms standard full-space techniques.
Edward Tansley, Roy Makhlouf, Estelle Massart +1
Mathematical Institute, Woodstock Road, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, OX2 6GG. · ICTEAM Institute, UCLouvain, Euler Building, Avenue Georges Lemaˆıtre, 4 - bte L4.05.01, Louvain-la-Neuve, B - 1348, Belgium.
The inner workings of deep neural networks are still not well understood. The information bottleneck framework, which characterizes deep networks by the mutual information between their hidden representations and the network's input, has been used to identify compression of input information with respect to an input image and output labels. We instead study how much of a layer's own input is recoverable from the layer's output in convolutional neural networks (CNNs). A convolutional layer applies its filters to one input patch at a time, so we evaluate recoverability on sampled input patches with a reconstruction-based probe and not on the entire feature map. The probe's size thus depends on channels and kernel size and not on feature map size, which lets our method scale to deep CNNs with wide feature maps. For each layer, we compare pretrained, random, and reconstruction-optimized encoders, using linear and linear-plus-residual-MLP decoders. We measure recoverability as R2 between input patches and their reconstructions on a held-out set. Across nine ImageNet CNNs, recoverability generally decreases with depth but is more consistently predicted by the compression of the layer. Learning-attributed recoverability, the difference between pretrained and random encoders, is not uniform across architectures. We introduce single-property random controls, which transfer one pretrained property onto a random encoder, and find that each control changes recoverability with a consistent sign across models: copying pretrained singular vectors tends to raise recoverability, while copying the pretrained singular-value spectrum or activation sparsity lowers it.
Maxwell Spiridonov, Alireza Rahmansetayesh, Pierre Baldi
Department of Computer Science, University of California, Irvine