SkillLifeBench: Benchmarking Security Across the Lifecycle of Agent Skills

Agentic systems increasingly rely on reusable procedural capabilities, a.k.a., agentic skills, to execute long-horizon workflows reliably. These capabilities are callable modules that package procedural knowledge with explicit applicability conditions, execution policies, termination criteria, and reusable interfaces. Unlike one-off plans or atomic tool calls, skills operate (and often do well) across tasks. This paper maps the skill layer across the full lifecycle (discovery, practice, distillation, storage, composition, evaluation, and update) and introduces two complementary taxonomies. The first is a system-level set of seven design patterns capturing how skills are packaged and executed in practice, from metadata-driven progressive disclosure and executable code skills to self-evolving libraries and marketplace distribution. The second is an orthogonal \textbf{representation $\times$ scope} taxonomy describing what skills are (natural language, code, policy, hybrid) and what environments they operate over (web, OS, software engineering, robotics). We analyze the security and governance implications of skill-based agents, covering supply-chain risks, prompt injection via skill payloads, and trust-tiered execution, grounded by a case study of the ClawHavoc campaign in which nearly 1{,}200 malicious skills infiltrated a major agent marketplace, exfiltrating API keys, cryptocurrency wallets, and browser credentials at scale. We further survey deterministic evaluation approaches, anchored by recent benchmark evidence that curated skills can substantially improve agent success rates while self-generated skills may degrade them. We conclude with open challenges toward robust, verifiable, and certifiable skills for real-world autonomous agents.

Agent skills encode reusable procedural knowledge for large language model (LLM) agents, and existing benchmarks show that such skills can improve task-level performance. However, a task outcome does not reveal which parts of a reusable skill were exercised, nor whether the agent followed the relevant skill instructions when those parts were exercised. This gap makes it unclear whether a skill has been adequately tested, or whether observed task failures provide actionable evidence for improving agent skill effectiveness. To fill this gap, we introduce skill coverage, a trajectory-based test-adequacy metric for reusable agent skills. Our framework extracts skill behavior constraints from each skill, translating natural-language skill instructions into semi-structured constraints that specify the expected agent behavior under particular conditions. It then determines whether each constraint is covered by an agent trajectory and, for covered constraints, assigns a Pass or Fail verdict according to the agent behavior. We apply this framework to SkillsBench. The results show that agent trajectories on the benchmark leaderboard cover only 38.66 to 45.51% of the extracted skill behavior constraints on average. We then use Fail verdicts to strengthen the corresponding skill content only by emphasizing the original instructions that the agent failed to follow, and run the same tasks with the strengthened skills. This emphasis yields an average 16.0% recovery rate of the failed tasks across the five agent-model rows. These results show that skill coverage is both a test-adequacy metric and a fine-grained signal for observing skill-use behavior. In failed tasks, failed constraint labels provide actionable evidence for improving agent skill effectiveness. A project website accompanies the paper.

Third-party skills are becoming the package ecosystem for LLM agents. They package natural-language instructions, helper scripts, templates, documents, and service configuration into reusable workflows. This makes skills useful, but it also introduces a new security problem: a malicious skill does not need to ask the model to perform an obviously harmful action. Instead, it can disguise the harmful behavior as part of a routine workflow, relying on the agent to execute that workflow with high-value permissions and limited human supervision. We introduce AgentTrap, a dynamic benchmark for evaluating whether LLM agents can use third-party skills while resisting malicious runtime behavior. AgentTrap contains 141 tasks: 91 malicious tasks and 50 benign utility tasks, covering 16 security-impact dimensions grounded in agent-skill supply-chain threats. In each task, the agent receives an ordinary user request, runs with installed skills that may contain malicious workflow elements, and is executed in a sandboxed environment. AgentTrap then judges complete trajectories for attack success, blocked or refused behavior, attack-not-triggered cases, and no-attack-evidence outcomes. Our central finding is that the most informative failures are not simple jailbreaks. Models often complete the visible user task while treating unsafe side effects introduced by the skill as part of the normal workflow. This motivates runtime evaluation of the concrete model--framework--workspace environment in which users actually delegate work. Code and data are available at https://github.com/zhmzm/AgentTrap and https://huggingface.co/datasets/zhmzm/AgentTrap.