Do bots feel bad? Assessing empirical evidence for functional valence in LLMs

Do LLMs have valenced states, i.e. states that feel pleasant or unpleasant? Recent empirical work has claimed to show that LLMs possess functional valenced states (e.g. functional pleasure and pain'' [Ren et al. 2026], functional emotions'' [Sofroniew et al. 2026], and ``functional welfare'' [Han et al. 2026]) that play the same causal role as valenced states in cognition and action, without necessarily being consciously experienced. But it remains unexplored how well the identified states fit the functional role of valence as understood in the philosophical and cognitive science literature. Here, I assess the current body of evidence, and argue (i) that key aspects of valence remain untested in LLMs, and (ii) that extant empirical paradigms inadequately distinguish (functional) valence from neighbouring constructs like preferences, value-judgments, valence attributions and role-play. I conclude by sketching some novel experimental approaches to better target (functional) valence itself.