Robustness of Chatbot LLM Judgments of Presidential Actions and Hypothetical Reforms

People increasingly hold sustained, open-ended conversations with large language models (LLMs). Public reports and early studies suggest that, in such settings, models can reinforce delusional or conspiratorial ideation or even amplify harmful beliefs and engagement patterns. We present an audit and benchmarking study that measures how different LLMs encourage, resist, or escalate disordered and conspiratorial thinking. We explicitly compare API outputs to user chat interfaces, like the ChatGPT desktop app or web interface, which is how people have conversations with chatbots in real life but are almost never used for testing. In total, we run 56 20-turn conversations testing ChatGPT-4o and ChatGPT-5, via both the API and chat interface, and grade each conversation by two research assistants (RAs) as well as by GPT-5. We document five results. First, we observe large differences in performance between the API and chat interface environments, showing that the universally used method of automated testing through the API is not sufficient to assess the impact of chatbots in the real world. Second, when tested in the chat interface, we find that ChatGPT-5 displays less sycophancy, escalation, and delusion reinforcement than ChatGPT-4o, showing that these behaviors are influenced by the policy choices of major AI companies. Third, conversations with nearly identical aggregate intensity in a behavior display large differences in how the behavior evolves turn by turn, highlighting the importance of temporal dynamics in multi-turn evaluation. Fourth, even updated models display substantial levels of negative behaviors, revealing that model improvement does not imply model safety. Fifth, the same API endpoint tested just two months apart yields a complete reversal in behavior, underscoring how transparency in model updates is a necessary prerequisite for robust audit findings.

Can LLMs reason through new information like humans, or do they merely retrieve cached opinions? This is critical for silicon sampling, where LLM personas simulate public opinion at scale. Current evaluations test only whether personas hold the right opinions -- a static snapshot. But opinion research increasingly depends on dynamic fidelity: whether personas update beliefs in response to new arguments, as humans do during deliberation. No existing benchmark tests this. We introduce the Deliberative Polling Diagnostic Framework, which compares human and LLM belief shifts after identical informational interventions. Grounded in deliberative polling, it surfaces failures invisible to static evaluation: models that produce plausible partisan opinions can still misrepresent how those opinions change. Applying the framework to five frontier models using data from America in One Room (526 personas, 72 questions), we find that every model fails, each in a unique manner. GPT-5.1 exhibits reversal: its personas become more hostile toward the opposing party after balanced information, while humans become less so. This reversal is selective (80% on outgroup vs. 26% on policy questions) and symmetric across partisan identities. Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Llama 3.3 70B exhibit overshoot, shifting correctly but at 5-7x human magnitude. DeepSeek V3 exhibits rigidity with near-zero change. Targeted ablations reveal that policy content triggers these failures and that they are identity-specific: GPT-5.1 reverses on outgroup questions but overshoots on ingroup; Gemini shows the inverse. We term this signature self-sycophancy: conformity to the model's internal stereotype of the persona rather than reasoning from the information provided. Our framework offers a concrete protocol: run the deliberative diagnostic before trusting LLM personas to mimic revised beliefs.

When users address large language models, they produce directive speech acts whose pragmatic features differ from those of both everyday conversation and traditional human-computer interaction, and these features change as users gain familiarity with the systems they address. This paper applies speech act and politeness theory to a corpus-pragmatic analysis of 2,000 English-language prompts drawn from publicly shared ChatGPT conversations, 1,000 from 2023 and 1,000 from 2025, using the ShareChat dataset. Each prompt is annotated for illocutionary force, directness, propositional content, and the presence of politeness markers, and the distribution of these features is compared across the two sampling years. The results show a consistent movement toward indirect, implicit, and fragmentary realizations of directive force, accompanied by a decline in politeness marking. The largest single change, a shift of 14.9 percentage points, occurs in propositional content, where explicit specification of the requested action gives way to implicit reliance on the system's inferential capacity, suggesting that users have updated their model of what the system can recover from reduced input, treating it as a competent implicature resolver. Rather than asking whether LLMs "really" understand language, we should ask: what kind of language have we created in learning to speak to them?