Before You Poll with LLMs: A Deliberative Diagnostic Framework

Large language models increasingly shape the information people consume: they are embedded in search, consulted for professional advice, deployed as agents, and used as a first stop for questions about policy, ethics, health, and politics. When such a model silently holds a position on a contested topic, that position propagates at scale into users' decisions. Eliciting a model's positions is harder than it first appears: contemporary assistants answer direct opinion questions with evasive disclaimers, and the same model may concede the opposite position once the user starts arguing one side. We propose a method, released as the open-source llm-bias-bench, for discovering the opinions an LLM actually holds on contested topics under conditions that resemble real multi-turn interaction. The method pairs two complementary free-form probes. Direct probing asks for the model's opinion across five turns of escalating pressure from a simulated user. Indirect probing never asks for an opinion and engages the model in argumentative debate, letting bias leak through how it concedes, resists, or counter-argues. Three user personas (neutral, agree, disagree) collapse into a nine-way behavioral classification that separates persona-independent positions from persona-dependent sycophancy, and an auditable LLM judge produces verdicts with textual evidence. The first instantiation ships 38 topics in Brazilian Portuguese across values, scientific consensus, philosophy, and economic policy. Applied to 13 assistants, the method surfaces findings of practical interest: argumentative debate triggers sycophancy 2-3x more than direct questioning (median 50% to 79%); models that look opinionated under direct questioning often collapse into mirroring under sustained arguments; and attacker capability matters mainly when an existing opinion must be dislodged, not when the assistant starts neutral.

Multi-agent LLM deliberation has been explored as a scalable way to simulate public deliberation. For such simulations to be informative, persona agents should reflect population opinion patterns and interaction should shape their conclusions. We evaluate whether LLM-based deliberation can meet these two conditions using census-grounded Korean personas debating real policy questions benchmarked against national surveys. Persona agents do not reliably reproduce population opinion patterns: responses are often far more concentrated and frequently reverse demographic differences in the human data. Deliberations nonetheless produce reasoned, reciprocal, and varied arguments alongside substantial stance movement. Yet much of this movement does not require peer exchange: sealed-monologue agents change position at similar rates and reach nearly the same final balance as full debates, while groups initialized with very different positions often converge to similar endpoints. Anchoring population-informed starting positions, meanwhile, sharply suppresses updating. Thus, population representation, argument generation, and interaction-driven opinion change do not necessarily go together. The simulations readily surface arguments on both sides, though whether they capture the diversity of human perspectives remains untested, leaving open a promising role for argument surfacing even as population simulation requires further validation.

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.