DYNAS: A Dynamic Network Penetration Testing Framework Using Deep Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning

Penetration testing - the practice of simulating cyberattacks to identify vulnerabilities - is a complex sequential decision-making task that is inherently partially observable and features large action spaces. Existing RL simulators for this domain are CPU-bound and fixed to narrow scenarios, making it infeasible to train policies that generalize across networks. We present NASimJax, a JAX-native framework that formulates penetration testing as a Contextual POMDP and introduces a network generation pipeline producing structurally diverse, guaranteed-solvable scenarios. The framework reaches up to 80$\times$ higher environment throughput than previous simulators, enabling experiments on larger networks and tractable hyperparameter searches. We provide PPO and PQN baselines and conduct the first systematic evaluation of unsupervised environment design for penetration testing. We find that Prioritized Level Replay and ACCEL handle dense training distributions better than Domain Randomization, and that training on sparser topologies yields an implicit curriculum that improves generalization - even to topologies denser than those seen during training. A recurrent PPO variant confirms that these distributional findings are not an artifact of feed-forward policies. The code is available at: https://github.com/raphsimon/NASimJax.

Penetration testing, the simulation of cyberattacks to identify security vulnerabilities, presents a sequential decision-making problem well-suited for reinforcement learning (RL) automation. Like many applications of RL to real-world problems, partial observability presents a major challenge, as it invalidates the Markov property present in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). Partially Observable MDPs require history aggregation or belief state estimation to learn successful policies. We investigate stochastic, partially observable penetration testing scenarios over host networks of varying size, aiming to better reflect real-world complexity through more challenging and representative benchmarks. This approach leads to the development of more robust and transferable policies, which are crucial for ensuring reliable performance across diverse and unpredictable real-world environments. Using vanilla Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) as a baseline, we compare a selection of PPO-based variants designed to mitigate partial observability, including frame-stacking, augmenting observations with historical information, and employing LSTM or TrXL architectures. We conduct a systematic empirical analysis of these algorithms across different host network sizes. We find that this task greatly benefits from history aggregation. Converging up to four times faster than other approaches. Manual inspection of the learned policies by the algorithms reveals clear distinctions and provides insights that go beyond quantitative results.

Autonomous cyber defense systems based on Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) have attracted significant research attention, yet remain evaluated almost exclusively against static, heuristic red agents, leaving their robustness against adaptive threats critically understudied. Meanwhile, recent advances in Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) have improved LLM reasoning, but their integration into cybersecurity remains elusive due to the absence of suitable benchmark environments and interaction datasets. To bridge this gap, we introduce Trident, an agentic LLM red teaming framework comprising three components: a dynamic benchmark with isolated sandbox servers spanning CybORG CAGE 4 and CyberWheel, a dataset comprises over 13,000 high-fidelity red-blue interaction trajectories for RLVR, and a ``Code-as-Policy'' RLVR agentic architecture Trident Agentic). The latter reformulates red agent training as a contextual bandit via a tripartite Log Summarizer--Planner--Coder design, where a trainable Planner generates complete attack strategies from compressed execution logs, which a frozen Coder translates into executable Python policies deployed against live DRL defenders. Empirical evaluations reveal a fundamental brittleness in existing defenses: with a single trainable 7B planner, Trident reduces blue agent defensive performance by an average of 522% compared to static red agent baselines while autonomously discovering emergent behaviors such as decoy avoidance and adaptive state prioritization that static heuristics entirely fail to uncover.