cs.CLOct 29, 2026

CoFiBreak: A Coarse-to-Fine Diversity Reward for Effective Multi-Turn Jailbreak

Authors: Jialin Song, Xiaodong Liu, Weiwei Yang, Mingqian Feng, Chengquan Guo, Qiyao Ma, Carolyn Buractaon, Anson Ho, 

Organizations: Simon Fraser University · Microsoft Research

Abstract

Automated red teaming trains an attacker large language model (LLM) to elicit harmful responses from a victim LLM, but reinforcement learning can collapse attackers onto a narrow set of prompts when attack success is the only reward. Such a collapse of attack diversity can bias safety evaluation toward repeatedly testing near-duplicate attack patterns rather than the underlying harmful intents. Existing methods often trade off attack success or inference cost for greater content or strategy diversity. We propose CoFiBreak, a coarse-to-fine diversity reward for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) that improves attack diversity while preserving strong attack effectiveness and low inference cost. The coarse reward broadens which strategies the attacker uses by encouraging strategies underrepresented within each GRPO group, while the fine reward broadens how those strategies are realized by discouraging reuse of the same personas, framings, and output formats after harmful-intent information is removed from prompt embeddings. Diversity rewards apply only to attacks that already exceed an effectiveness threshold, so diversity cannot be gained through ineffective attacks. Since both rewards are computed only during training, CoFiBreak also retains inference efficiency. Trained with Llama3.1-8B-Instruct as the victim, CoFiBreak discovers 1.6-2.0x as many distinct successful fine-grained strategies as the strongest baseline across frontier victims on HarmBench. It reaches 98.8% ASR@10 (attack success rate with 10 generations per intent) on AdvBench with the highest diversity score among all compared methods, which is 2.1x that of the strongest-attacking baseline. The resulting attacks transfer to unseen frontier LLMs, reaching 71.0% ASR@10 on AdvBench with the unseen victim Claude-Opus-4.6. The code will be released.

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