Motivated by a broad literature in psychology, organizational behavior, and matching markets, we introduce strategic tanking: an agent deliberately makes themselves less attractive to selected potential partners in order to improve their eventual assignment. Unlike traditional manipulation in stable matching, a tanker does not misreport whom they prefer; instead, they influence how others rank them. We show that tanking has a striking connection to classical preference manipulation. Cutoff tanking, in which an agent tanks with every potential partner below a chosen threshold, has exactly the same effect on the stable set as truncating one's own preference list at that threshold. Thus an agent can reproduce the power of a classical truncation while leaving their own preferences unchanged and every match acceptable. Arbitrary tanking, however, can go substantially further: under proposer-deferred acceptance, tanking equilibria can lie outside the sincere stable set. More broadly, whenever the sincere stable set contains multiple matchings, profitable strategic behavior remains available through either traditional preference manipulation or tanking, even when one side is restricted to honestly reporting their own preferences.
Figures & tables
Result
Traditional Preference Manipulation
Strategic Tanking (Our Results)
Profitable manipulation
If there are at least two stable matchings, some receiving-side agent can profitably manipulate [ 7 ] .
If there are at least two stable matchings, some receiving-side agent can profitably tank.
Optimal cutoff
Truncating at an agent’s best stable partner attains that partner under any stable selection rule; same-side coalitions can attain these partners simultaneously.
Tanking at an agent’s best stable partner attains that partner under any stable selection rule; same-side coalitions can attain these partners simultaneously.
Cutoff filtering
Truncating below an attainable cutoff removes exactly the stable outcomes below that cutoff by shortening the agent’s own list.
Tanking below the same attainable cutoff removes exactly the stable outcomes below that cutoff, while leaving the agent’s own list unchanged .
Proposer protection
Under proposer-DA, proposing-side agents cannot benefit from own-list manipulation [ 6 ] .
Under proposer-DA, proposing-side agents cannot benefit from tanking.
Cutoff equilibria
Under cutoff truncation, a matching is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is sincerely stable; under proposer-DA with non-strategic proposers, the unique equilibrium outcome is the sincere receiver-optimal stable matching.
Under cutoff tanking, a matching is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is sincerely stable; under proposer-DA with non-tanking proposers, the unique equilibrium outcome is the sincere receiver-optimal stable matching.
Unrestricted equilibria
Under proposer-DA with non-strategic proposers, receiving-side Nash outcomes are exactly the sincere stable matchings [ 7 ] .
Under proposer-DA with non-tanking proposers, tanking equilibria can extend beyond the sincere stable set .
Table 1: Comparison of traditional preference manipulation and strategic tanking. Key differences are underlined.
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching markets, widely adopted in applications such as school choice and labor market clearing. In practice, however, these markets are invariably governed by complex distributional constraints, ranging from diversity quotas and regional balance to global capacity slacks, under which stable matchings often fail to exist. This raises a fundamental question: how to distribute unavoidable instability across agents while preserving strategy-proofness? To address this, we propose MenuNet, a strategy-proof mechanism design framework based on a neural representation of menus. Rather than directly constructing assignments, MenuNet learns to generate personalized probabilistic menus, from which assignments are realized via a structured sequential choice rule that guarantees strategy-proofness by construction. By decomposing stability into fairness (no envy) and non-wastefulness, our approach models these properties as vector-valued quantities and optimizes their distribution through differentiable objectives, providing a principled trade-off between competing axioms. Empirically, MenuNet navigates this trade-off effectively: it consistently outperforms Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) in terms of envy and Deferred Acceptance (DA) in terms of waste, while maintaining scalability and computational efficiency. These results suggest that learning-based menu mechanisms provide a flexible and scalable paradigm for mechanism design in highly constrained, real-world environments.
We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an algorithm matches agents at each time step and receives noisy rewards that reflect the preferences of the matched agents, following a semi-bandit feedback structure. We adopt a pure exploration perspective, aiming to efficiently identify the optimal stable matching with high probability. Our work extends prior results by handling two-sided uncertainty and by exploiting partial preference information. A central ingredient is the notion of pervasive stable matching, which enables the identification of optimal stable matchings under partial preferences. We propose elimination-based algorithms whose stopping criteria exploit the structure of the learned partial preferences, and provide a refined sample-complexity analysis. Beyond pure exploration, we extend our approach to regret minimization and establish regret bounds with respect to the optimal stable matching that avoid dependence on the minimum reward gap Δmin.
Andreas Athanasopoulos, Anne-Marie George, Christos Dimitrakakis
University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland · University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Bipartite matching is a fundamental problem in game theory and market design. Classical approaches such as Gale--Shapley assume complete preferences and centralized computation, whereas many real-world matching processes are decentralized, asynchronous, and shaped by sequential interaction under limited information. We propose a dynamic bipartite matching framework that combines large language model (LLM) agents with contextual bandits. In a simulated Chinese marriage market, economically grounded LLM agents evaluate locally encountered candidates, while agent-specific Logistic-UCB models learn reciprocal acceptance from realized proposal outcomes. The mechanism therefore separates two decisions---whom do I like? and who is likely to like me back?---without requiring ex ante market-wide preference rankings. We first validate LLM-induced mate preferences against the empirical conditional-logit reference across multiple LLM backbones. In the 50×50 matching experiment, Bandit-UCB achieves the highest mean mutual welfare (56.01 versus 54.87 for Gale--Shapley), a smaller gender rank gap than the classical baselines, and the fewest blocking pairs among the LLM-ABM policies. Learned acceptance models show economically interpretable gender-differentiated associations, while counterfactual setups reveal no systematic unilateral advantage from prior search knowledge. Overall, these results support the advantages of decentralized matching with LLM-based behavioral modeling and online learning under incomplete information for economic simulation and computational social science research.