Strategic Tanking in Stable Matching Markets
Organizations: Industrial and Systems Engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, New York, USA
Abstract
Motivated by a broad literature in psychology, organizational behavior, and matching markets, we introduce strategic tanking: an agent deliberately makes themselves less attractive to selected potential partners in order to improve their eventual assignment. Unlike traditional manipulation in stable matching, a tanker does not misreport whom they prefer; instead, they influence how others rank them. We show that tanking has a striking connection to classical preference manipulation. Cutoff tanking, in which an agent tanks with every potential partner below a chosen threshold, has exactly the same effect on the stable set as truncating one's own preference list at that threshold. Thus an agent can reproduce the power of a classical truncation while leaving their own preferences unchanged and every match acceptable. Arbitrary tanking, however, can go substantially further: under proposer-deferred acceptance, tanking equilibria can lie outside the sincere stable set. More broadly, whenever the sincere stable set contains multiple matchings, profitable strategic behavior remains available through either traditional preference manipulation or tanking, even when one side is restricted to honestly reporting their own preferences.
Figures & tables
| Result | Traditional Preference Manipulation | Strategic Tanking (Our Results) |
|---|---|---|
| Profitable manipulation | If there are at least two stable matchings, some receiving-side agent can profitably manipulate [ 7 ] . | If there are at least two stable matchings, some receiving-side agent can profitably tank. |
| Optimal cutoff | Truncating at an agent’s best stable partner attains that partner under any stable selection rule; same-side coalitions can attain these partners simultaneously. | Tanking at an agent’s best stable partner attains that partner under any stable selection rule; same-side coalitions can attain these partners simultaneously. |
| Cutoff filtering | Truncating below an attainable cutoff removes exactly the stable outcomes below that cutoff by shortening the agent’s own list. | Tanking below the same attainable cutoff removes exactly the stable outcomes below that cutoff, while leaving the agent’s own list unchanged . |
| Proposer protection | Under proposer-DA, proposing-side agents cannot benefit from own-list manipulation [ 6 ] . | Under proposer-DA, proposing-side agents cannot benefit from tanking. |
| Cutoff equilibria | Under cutoff truncation, a matching is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is sincerely stable; under proposer-DA with non-strategic proposers, the unique equilibrium outcome is the sincere receiver-optimal stable matching. | Under cutoff tanking, a matching is an equilibrium outcome if and only if it is sincerely stable; under proposer-DA with non-tanking proposers, the unique equilibrium outcome is the sincere receiver-optimal stable matching. |
| Unrestricted equilibria | Under proposer-DA with non-strategic proposers, receiving-side Nash outcomes are exactly the sincere stable matchings [ 7 ] . | Under proposer-DA with non-tanking proposers, tanking equilibria can extend beyond the sincere stable set . |