cs.LGOct 30, 2026

Cyber-physical attack detection approaches in the wide-area measurement system

Authors: Zakaria El Mrabet, Prakash Ranganathan

Organizations: University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND, USA

Abstract

Improving situational awareness within the Smart Grid is an effective preventive measure to detect potential anomalies, and avoid their adverse consequences. A wide area measurement system (WAMS) based Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) can assist in improving visibility within the grid by collecting relevant measurements including magnitude, phase angle, frequency, voltage, and current, with a precise GPS-based timestamp. So far, there are more than 2500 PMUs deployed in the North American power grid, where each of which generates between 30 and 60 samples/s, roughly 1.5 TB/month of streamed data. Thus, processing such large PMU streams requires expensive computational resources and faster algorithms. This paper provides state-of-the-art cyber and physical anomalies in the WAMS and analyses their impact on the integrity and availability of the system. Next, it investigates the current anomaly detection approach in historical and streaming PMU data, including conventional machine learning and hybrid approaches, and assesses their advantages and main drawbacks. Lastly, it sheds light on the importance of handling missing PMU data and concept drifts.

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