cs.AIOct 30, 2026

Dependence-Aware Risk Assessment and Optimal Design of AI-Agent Safeguard Systems

Authors: Yijia Li, Maochao Xu, Peng Zhao

Organizations: School of Statistics and Data Science, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, China · Department of Mathematics, Illinois State University, USA · School of Mathematics and Statistics, Jiangsu Normal University, China

Abstract

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on safeguards to prevent unauthorized actions while preserving legitimate service. However, existing risk assessments often focus on individual safeguard performance while overlooking dependence among safeguard decisions. This paper develops a dependence-aware framework for risk assessment and optimal design of multi-component AI safeguard systems, jointly selecting configurations and operating policies for sequential layered screening and selective verification. We establish stochastic comparisons of layered-screening error probabilities and invocation costs under lower-orthant ordering. For selective verification, we characterize exactly which policies have error probabilities and review costs that respond monotonically to stronger dependence under supermodular ordering. For a fixed first stage and reviewer, we show that the optimal routing map is a two-threshold rule in the first-stage likelihood ratio. An accompanying open-source software package, Dependence-Aware Policy Optimization Algorithms (DAPOA), facilitates the practical implementation of the proposed framework. Numerical experiments show that ignoring dependence can lead to inaccurate risk assessments and infeasible safeguard designs, with independence-based selections violating security requirements in six of eight scenarios. An empirical study using four LLM safeguards on benchmark-derived agent actions further demonstrates the practical implications of dependence modeling. Under the principal operating setting, dependence-aware selection lowers held-out total cost by 39.6% relative to independence-based selection.

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