cs.CROct 31, 2026

Threat Modeling Intimate Partner Abuse in Agentic Systems

Authors: Natalie Grace Brigham, Eugene Bagdasarian, Franziska Roesner, Tadayoshi Kohno

Organizations: University of Washington · University of Massachusetts Amherst · Georgetown University

Abstract

Agentic systems are AI-powered technologies capable of autonomous action within digital environments, such as sending emails or making reservations. They are deeply connected to external tools as well as users' data and resources, making them vulnerable to attacks which exploit their access and capabilities. In this work, we apply the technology-facilitated abuse threat model, in the context of intimate partner violence and surveillance, to these systems, revealing threats that require deliberate investigation and mitigation. We categorize attacks based on system ownership: (1) Abuser-as-owner attacks demonstrate how agentic systems make existing forms of technology-facilitated abuse far easier and more scalable. (2) Victim-survivor-as-owner attacks show how agentic systems create a new attack surface which abusers can exploit. In light of these risks, we outline research and development directions for effective mitigation strategies.

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