cs.SDNov 1, 2026

GDBack: A Group-Delay Backdoor Attack on Speaker Identification via Analytic All-Pass Filtering

Authors: Bicheng Xiong, Tao Li, Chenhui Cui, Zedong Xing, Qien Li, Weiping Wen, Rubing Huang, Tsong Yueh Chen

Organizations: Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China · Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China · University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R3, Canada · Peking University, Beijing 100871, China · 

Abstract

Existing phase-based backdoor attacks on speaker identification rely on shared absolute phase patterns for cross-sample trigger consistency, while other audio backdoor attacks have explored shared transformations that produce input-dependent triggers. Whether phase-based triggers can achieve similar consistency without imposing identical output phase patterns remains unclear. We propose GDBack, a poison-only group-delay backdoor attack using cascaded second-order analytic all-pass filters. Applying a shared transformation across utterances ideally preserves spectral magnitude while introducing a consistent frequency-dependent phase response and group-delay contribution, without forcing identical output phases. Experiments on LibriSpeech and VoxCeleb1 with ECAPA-TDNN, x-vector, and RawNet3 achieve attack success rates above 94% across all six settings (97.00% on average), while maintaining benign accuracy close to clean models. Phase and magnitude interventions, inverse compensation, and parameter-sensitivity analyses support the role of the induced phase transformation in backdoor activation. Speech quality and content evaluations indicate limited perceptual and linguistic distortion, while robustness experiments, including real over-the-air tests, reveal varying effectiveness across conditions and architectures. These findings demonstrate that cross-sample trigger consistency can arise from a shared phase transformation without requiring a common absolute phase pattern.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Oct 19, 2026

You Are the Trigger: Speaker-Activated Backdoors

Speech models are increasingly used as an interface to AI systems, from transcription tools to voice agents. Existing audio backdoors require an attacker to introduce triggers at inference time. We study a different threat model in which the attacker compromises the model during fine-tuning but has no access to the victim's inference-time inputs. We introduce the Speaker-Activated Backdoor (SAB) setting, in which a target speaker's natural voice serves as the trigger. We develop a two-phase fine-tuning method that first makes speaker identity more accessible and then binds the target speaker to an attacker-chosen payload. Compared with a one-phase baseline with the same training budget, the two-phase method substantially improves selectivity and clean performance, and is especially important for content-dependent attacks. SAB achieves 90.2% and 97.0% backdoor success on Whisper-medium and Parakeet, with false-positive rates of 1.7% and 0%, respectively using as little as two minutes of real audio from the target speaker. We further demonstrate content-dependent semantic rewriting and downstream tool-use attacks, where malicious instructions are inserted into 96.9% of target-speaker transcripts. When these transcripts are passed to frontier LLM agents, GPT-4o and Claude (Opus, Sonnet, and Haiku), the injected instruction drives the agent to carry out the harmful action in up to 87.5% of cases. The attack generalizes to held-out recordings, multiple target speakers, and common acoustic degradations. These results establish speaker identity as a practical backdoor trigger that requires no inference-time attacker access and is invisible at the transcript layer.
Mar 18, 2026

STEP: Detecting Audio Backdoor Attacks via Stability-based Trigger Exposure Profiling

With the widespread deployment of deep-learning-based speech models in security-critical applications, backdoor attacks have emerged as a serious threat: an adversary who poisons a small fraction of training data can implant a hidden trigger that controls the model's output while preserving normal behavior on clean inputs. Existing inference-time defenses are not well suited to the audio domain, as they either rely on trigger over-robustness assumptions that fail on transformation-based and semantic triggers, or depend on properties specific to image or text modalities. In this paper, we propose STEP (Stability-based Trigger Exposure Profiling), a black-box, retraining-free backdoor detector that operates under hard-label-only access. Its core idea is to exploit a characteristic dual anomaly of backdoor triggers: anomalous label stability under semantic-breaking perturbations, and anomalous label fragility under semantic-preserving perturbations. STEP profiles each test sample with two complementary perturbation branches that target these two properties respectively, scores the resulting stability features with one-class anomaly detectors trained on benign references, and fuses the two scores via unsupervised weighting. Extensive experiments across seven backdoor attacks show that STEP achieves an average AUROC of 97.92% and EER of 4.54%, substantially outperforming state-of-the-art baselines, and generalizes across model architectures, speech tasks, an open-set verification scenario, and over-the-air physical-world settings.
Jul 17, 2026

Natural Backdoor Attacks on Speech Recognition Models

With the rapid development of deep learning, its vulnerability has gradually emerged in recent years. This work focuses on backdoor attacks on speech recognition systems. We adopt sounds that are ordinary in nature or in our daily life as triggers for natural backdoor attacks. We conduct experiments on two datasets and three models to validate the performance of natural backdoor attacks and explore the effects of poisoning rate, trigger duration and blend ratio on the performance of natural backdoor attacks. Our results show that natural backdoor attacks have a high attack success rate without compromising model performance on benign samples, even with short or low-amplitude triggers. It requires only 5% of poisoned samples to achieve a near 100% attack success rate. In addition, the backdoor will be automatically activated by the corresponding sound in nature, which is not easy to be detected and will bring severer harm.