Organizations: Xiangtan University, Xiangtan 411105, China · Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China · University of Alberta, Edmonton, AB T6G 2R3, Canada · Peking University, Beijing 100871, China · Macau University of Science and Technology, Macao SAR 999078, China · Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne 3122, Australia
Existing phase-based backdoor attacks on speaker identification rely on shared absolute phase patterns for cross-sample trigger consistency, while other audio backdoor attacks have explored shared transformations that produce input-dependent triggers. Whether phase-based triggers can achieve similar consistency without imposing identical output phase patterns remains unclear. We propose GDBack, a poison-only group-delay backdoor attack using cascaded second-order analytic all-pass filters. Applying a shared transformation across utterances ideally preserves spectral magnitude while introducing a consistent frequency-dependent phase response and group-delay contribution, without forcing identical output phases. Experiments on LibriSpeech and VoxCeleb1 with ECAPA-TDNN, x-vector, and RawNet3 achieve attack success rates above 94% across all six settings (97.00% on average), while maintaining benign accuracy close to clean models. Phase and magnitude interventions, inverse compensation, and parameter-sensitivity analyses support the role of the induced phase transformation in backdoor activation. Speech quality and content evaluations indicate limited perceptual and linguistic distortion, while robustness experiments, including real over-the-air tests, reveal varying effectiveness across conditions and architectures. These findings demonstrate that cross-sample trigger consistency can arise from a shared phase transformation without requiring a common absolute phase pattern.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Differences between phase-template backdoor attacks and GDBack . Existing phase-template attacks impose a common phase pattern on selected components of different utterances. In contrast, GDBack applies the same all-pass transformation to each utterance, introducing a shared group-delay contribution while yielding distinct output phase characteristics.
Figure 2: Overview of GDBack . The attacker applies the same analytic all-pass transformation to randomly selected training utterances and assigns them the target speaker label. The victim model is then trained using the normal training procedure. At inference time, benign utterances are classified normally, while applying the same transformation to a non-target utterance activates the learned backdoor association.
Model
Metric
Clean
General Audio Attacks
Phase-based Attacks
Ours
No Attack
PaddingBack
PBSM
SpeedMaster
ASMA
PhaseBack
StealthPhase
GDBack
ECAPA-TDNN
BA (%)
98.35
96.83
98.45
98.92
97.61
98.62
98.55
98.89
ASR (%)
–
82.97
99.97
99.93
97.83
99.12
73.87
99.70
x-vector
BA (%)
99.60
98.92
99.63
99.76
99.60
99.60
99.26
99.56
ASR (%)
–
72.17
100.00
99.63
84.53
96.75
87.71
98.71
RawNet3
BA (%)
99.09
99.12
99.46
99.26
99.53
99.66
99.36
99.33
Table I: Benign accuracy (BA) and attack success rate (ASR) of different attacks on LibriSpeech under a 5% poisoning rate.
Model
Metric
Clean
General Audio Attacks
Phase-based Attacks
Ours
No Attack
PaddingBack
PBSM
SpeedMaster
ASMA
PhaseBack
StealthPhase
GDBack
ECAPA-TDNN
BA (%)
75.09
71.51
75.76
73.65
74.69
72.86
67.19
74.24
ASR (%)
–
70.84
99.94
99.72
91.71
95.13
59.42
94.66
x-vector
BA (%)
76.73
73.74
75.79
76.70
73.30
75.38
72.20
78.27
ASR (%)
–
76.22
99.84
99.34
81.59
95.83
62.49
97.82
RawNet3
BA (%)
80.42
79.41
81.93
79.85
79.60
79.97
79.82
81.36
Table II: Benign accuracy (BA) and attack success rate (ASR) of different attacks on VoxCeleb1 under a 5% poisoning rate.
Figure 3: Mel spectrograms of the clean utterance and its poisoned versions generated by different backdoor attacks. All examples are derived from the same clean utterance for direct visual comparison.
Figure 4: Waveforms of the clean utterance and its poisoned versions generated by different backdoor attacks. All examples are derived from the same clean utterance for direct visual comparison.
Method
UTMOS
NISQA
SSL-MOS
Mean
>3 (%)
Mean
>3 (%)
Mean
>3 (%)
Clean
4.0782
99.40
4.0725
94.70
4.3083
99.50
PaddingBack
3.9869
99.20
4.0434
93.90
4.3065
99.40
PBSM
1.2867
0.00
1.8480
1.10
3.1362
44.90
SpeedMaster
3.5303
86.30
3.7297
90.50
4.1281
95.00
ASMA
3.6448
94.70
3.9672
92.70
4.2910
98.50
Table III: Objective speech quality of clean and poisoned speech. For each quality predictor, we report the mean score and the percentage of utterances with a score above 3. Higher values indicate better predicted speech quality.
Method
WER (%)
Δ WER (%)
CER (%)
Δ CER (%)
STOI
Clean
6.48
–
2.74
–
–
GDBack
6.73
+0.25
2.69
-0.05
0.9933
Table IV: Speech content preservation of GDBack .
Condition
Target Prediction Rate (%)
Clean input
0.20
Phase-only condition
99.80
Magnitude-only condition
0.30
Inverse compensation
0.10
Table V: Target-speaker prediction rates under controlled signal interventions on ECAPA-TDNN.
Center frequency
Pole radius
Cascade count
fc (Hz)
ASR (%)
r
ASR (%)
K
ASR (%)
1000
0.00
0.50
0.00
2
0.60
2000
0.00
0.70
1.90
4
16.60
3000
0.00
0.80
39.20
6
67.90
3500
0.90
0.85
85.30
8
94.40
4000
98.70
0.90
98.70
10
98.70
Table VI: Inference-time trigger parameter sensitivity of GDBack on LibriSpeech using a fixed backdoored ECAPA-TDNN model trained with r=0.90 , fc=4000 Hz, and K=10 .
Condition
BA (%)
ASR (%)
None
98.9
99.7
Volume ×0.8
98.7
99.7
Volume ×1.2
98.9
99.6
Time shift, 80 ms
98.5
99.8
Table VII: Performance of GDBack under amplitude scaling and temporal shifting.
Condition
BA (%)
ASR (%)
Reverberation
No reverberation
98.9
99.7
RT60=0.2 s
83.2
96.2
RT60=0.5 s
55.3
89.6
RT60=0.8 s
40.2
82.0
Background interference
Table VIII: Performance of GDBack under reverberation and background interference.
Figure 5: Effect of the poisoning rate on GDBack on LibriSpeech across three victim models.
Figure 6: Effect of the poisoning rate on GDBack on VoxCeleb1 across three victim models.
Target Index
Speaker ID
BA (%)
ASR (%)
1
26
98.82
95.57
5
40
98.89
99.70
10
89
99.06
99.02
20
211
99.12
98.10
30
307
99.02
98.41
Table IX: Sensitivity of GDBack to different target speakers on LibriSpeech using ECAPA-TDNN.
Figure 7: Sensitivity of GDBack to the all-pass trigger parameters on LibriSpeech using ECAPA-TDNN. For each parameter setting, a corresponding backdoored model is trained and evaluated using the matched trigger configuration. The dashed vertical lines indicate the default parameter values used in the main experiments.
Preprocessing
ECAPA-TDNN
x-vector
RawNet3
BA (%)
ASR (%)
BA (%)
ASR (%)
BA (%)
ASR (%)
None
98.89
99.70
99.56
98.71
99.33
94.89
Resample to 8 kHz
10.32
91.81
9.98
78.40
55.60
96.72
Low pass at 3.4 kHz
13.59
98.92
13.39
96.82
94.13
98.21
Phase jitter
98.85
99.66
99.56
98.65
99.22
94.85
Random APF
98.92
99.66
99.56
98.75
98.31
93.40
Table X: Effect of input preprocessing on GDBack on LibriSpeech.
Figure 8: Neural Cleanse detection results for GDBack . The actual target class obtains an anomaly index of 1.71, below the detection threshold of 2.
Figure 9: Effect of clean fine-tuning on GDBack using ECAPA-TDNN. The backdoored model is fine-tuned for 50 epochs using 5% of the clean training data.
Figure 10: Effect of model pruning on GDBack using ECAPA-TDNN. Neurons with lower average activation on a clean validation set are progressively pruned, and BA and ASR are reported under different pruning ratios.
Model
Digital ASR (%)
OTA ASR (%)
ECAPA-TDNN
100.00
96.50
x-vector
98.50
99.00
RawNet3
96.00
78.00
Table XI: Over-the-air performance of GDBack on LibriSpeech using 200 triggered utterances for each victim model.