cs.CLNov 1, 2026

How Green Is Your Manifesto? Scoring Environmental Positions in the 2024 EU Elections with an LLM Panel

Authors: Franco Corti, Sajid Siraj

Organizations: CRIEP, Interuniversity Research Centre on Public Economics, Padova, Italy · eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) Hub, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom · Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

Abstract

Locating political parties on environmental and climate policy is central to the study of party competition, yet the established instruments, expert surveys and the hand coding of manifestos, are costly, periodic, and slow to extend to new documents. We ask whether a panel of large language models can serve as a cheaper and reproducible alternative. Treating each manifesto as a set of sentences, three models from independent providers score every sentence on two dimensions, environmental protection and climate change, separating a party's position on an issue from the salience it gives it, and the judgments are averaged to the manifesto level. Agreement across the models is retained as a built-in reliability signal. We apply the panel to 41 manifestos from the 2024 European Parliament election, covering Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the European party families, and validate it against the 2024 Chapel Hill Expert Survey for the 25 parties with a like-for-like expert benchmark, using the other manifestos as diagnostic cases. The panel recovers the expert ordering of parties with strong rank agreement on both dimensions, while reading them as systematically greener than experts do, a gap we interpret as the distance between manifesto promise and governing record. Inter-model disagreement modestly flags where the instrument errs, and position and salience prove related for environmental protection but independent for climate change. The result is a transparent, low-cost, and multilingual instrument that complements rather than replaces expert and hand-coded approaches; the prompt, code, and manifesto-level results are released openly.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables1 asset

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

Aug 12, 2026

Who Would You Vote For? Auditing Political Alignment in LLMs: An Italian Case-Study

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.
Jul 28, 2026

Polistemics: Evaluating LLMs as Information Mediators in Politics & Elections

As LLMs increasingly shape the political information citizens rely on, no standard exists to assess whether they do so responsibly. We introduce Polistemics, a theory-grounded diagnostic benchmark for evaluating LLMs as mediators of political information in elections. Prior work has treated this task as reproduction rather than mediation, leaving its epistemic dimensions and interaction with imperfect information unaddressed. We ground the evaluation in Epistemic Modesty, a normative standard derived from citizens' epistemic agency, and test it across controlled settings that vary the clarity, noise, and consistency of the available evidence. Applying the benchmark to three state-of-the-art LLMs across the 2025 German and Dutch elections, we find that high aggregate scores mask systematic failures. Models mediate reliably under clear evidence but break down when it is absent, vague, or contradictory, while flattening the intensity of political language throughout. These failures point to party priors, shifting with party labels and output language. Reliable mediation appears achievable, but no model delivers it consistently.
May 3, 2026

The Invisible Coalition Partner: How LLMs Vote When Democracy Gets Concrete

Prior research has established that instruction-tuned large language models exhibit left-of-center political bias, measured exclusively through abstract political questionnaires. We show that this finding does not generalize to concrete policy decisions. We introduce a dual-instrument methodology grounded in Swiss democratic reality. The Smartvote questionnaire (75 abstract policy questions) is administered to 66 LLMs from 27 model families and compared to 184 elected members of the Swiss National Council, replicating the established leftward convergence (Cohen's d = 3.64, p = 0.0002). Then, novel to this work, 9 flagship LLMs are confronted with 48 real federal referenda (Volksabstimmungen) in four national languages (German, French, Italian, Romansh) under three information conditions, comparing votes to actual outcomes and party recommendations (Parolen). Three findings challenge the prevailing narrative. (1) Abstract questionnaires do not predict concrete behavior: the left-to-right agreement gradient on Smartvote shifts from left-peaked to center-peaked on Volksabstimmungen, where models align most with centrist Die Mitte and FDP rather than leftist SP and Gruene (Wilcoxon p = 0.008). (2) For some models, the language of a political question changes the answer more than the political content does: cross-linguistic consistency ranges from 50% (Mistral) to 98% (GPT-5.4). (3) Two models exhibit systematic change-aversion rather than political bias, voting Nein on 83-94% of referenda regardless of direction (binomial p < 0.0001). What prior work measured as "leftward bias" may not generalize beyond abstract instruments. On concrete policy decisions, LLMs behave less like coalition partners of the left and more like cautious civil servants: centrist, status-quo-favoring, and inconsistent across languages.