Prior Action Control Causally Alters Language-Model Plasticity
Authors: Marc-Andre Schulz
Organizations: Hertie Institute for AI in Brain Health, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany · Tübingen AI Center, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany · Department of Psychiatry and Neurosciences, Charité – Universitätsmedizin Berlin, Berlin, Germany · German Center for Mental Health (DZPG), partner site Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany
Two copies of one language model start from identical weights and receive the same rewards during training. For one copy the rewards depend on its own answers. The other copy is yoked: it receives the first copy's rewards no matter what it answers, a design taken from the learned-helplessness experiments of animal learning. We ask whether the copy whose rewards depended on its answers, the copy with control, later learns a new task faster, that is, whether control changes the model's plasticity. In Experiment 1, copies of Qwen3-0.6B generated their own answers in a two-turn game and afterwards learned a new task. The copies with control learned the new task faster in every pair, and the advantage held on different starting models as well as on the larger Qwen3-1.7B. Copies with no reward signal, trained only on the updates that every copy shared, learned about as fast as the yoked copies. The advantage is therefore mostly a benefit of control, not damage from lacking it. Control had also changed how the copies answered, so the twins practiced different answers. That practice could carry part of the advantage, and Experiment 2 removed the difference. Both copies of a pair trained on the same answers, fixed in advance, in the same order, and received the same number of rewards. Only one copy's rewards followed the answers, and that copy again learned a new task faster. The advantage of the copies with control over their yoked twins could be forecast before the new task began from each copy's weights. In sum, control over rewards during earlier training left models faster at learning a new task later on, and a conventional model evaluation need not show it.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The yoked design in animals and in language models. Exposure: two subjects receive the same outcomes, but only for one of them (blue) does the panel it presses control those outcomes. For its yoked partner (orange) the cable is cut, and pressing does nothing. Top: the learned-helplessness paradigm. Bottom: two copies of one model, which keep only their weights from exposure to test. Test: both subjects learn the same new task, and we compare how fast they learn it.
Comparison
Answers
Rewards
What it tells
Exp. 1: contingent and yoked copy
each samples its own
the same, in the same order; only the contingent copy’s follow its answers
whether control speeds later learning
Exp. 1: each against reference copies
each samples its own
reference copies do no reward learning
a gain from control, or a loss without it
Exp. 2: contingent and noncontingent copy
identical, written in advance
the same number per update; only the contingent copy’s follow its answers
whether control speeds later learning with the answers fixed
Table 1: The comparisons of the two experiments.
Figure 2: Prior contingency changes later learning in both experiments. a , Experiment 1, the first eight pairs. The contingent copy’s target-sequence probability minus its yoked twin’s after each number of test updates, one line per target, averaged over the two token assignments within each pair. Bands are paired bootstrap 95% intervals over the eight pairs. On the repeated-answer targets the contingent copies start behind and pass their twins by update 4. The horizontal axis places the measured update counts at equal spacing, so it is not linear. b , Experiment 1: each pair’s contingent-minus-yoked effect on expected net reward, averaged over the four targets. The line and band are the mean and its paired bootstrap 95% interval. c , Experiment 2 (Section 5 ): each pair’s contingent-minus-noncontingent effect on the three-step test task and on a one-step task, in which a copy learns a single answer (Supplementary Section S4). Open symbols are the 16 pairs; filled symbols and horizontal lines are their mean and paired bootstrap 95% interval.
Contrast
Mean difference
Bootstrap 95% CI
Checkpoints with positive difference
Contingent − yoked
3.24
[2.38, 4.09]
8/8
Contingent − reference
3.81
[3.29, 4.34]
8/8
Yoked − reference
0.56
[ − 0.22, 1.50]
6/8
Table 2: Experiment 1: the comparison with reference copies, on the eight independently trained starting checkpoints. Each row is how much more the first arm gained than the second, in points of expected net reward, averaged over the four test targets. The columns give the mean over the checkpoints, its bootstrap 95% interval, and the number of checkpoints with a positive difference. Supplementary Table S3 gives the full comparison.
In-context learning (ICL) allows language models to adapt their behavior from instructions and demonstrations in a prompt, but accuracy alone does not reveal how contextual information controls their predictions. We study the acquisition and trainability of ICL with a controlled diagnostic that separates copying a nearby demonstration from integrating information across the prompt. Across 17 models, about a third prefer the copied answer, a few are undecided, and the rest prefer the rule-consistent answer, which goes with higher accuracy and with control by the requested value rather than the closest conflicting example. Checkpoint analyses show that models begin prioritizing task-relevant prompt tokens over conflicting examples long before their accuracy improves beyond chance level. In matched training experiments, synthetic documents that define endings and then query them shift models toward compositional responses on the controlled diagnostic, whereas fine-tuning on definition exercises built from rewritten real documents improves accuracy when prompts reassign label meanings. The results suggest that ICL is not acquired as a single, uniform capability. Instead, prompt control, answer preference, construction without candidates, and transfer can develop along distinct trajectories.
Test-time updating lets a language model change persistent state after training---such as model weights, adapter parameters, or a memory module---before or while answering queries. Existing evaluations often compare systems using update count or frequency and performance measured immediately afterward. These summaries omit what is updated, where, when, and in what order. The same total can therefore hide an important difference: one system may answer after one update while another answers after two. We introduce the Control Map, an evaluation framework that records the committed updates preceding each scored answer and separately evaluates behavioral changes, immediate learning (acquisition), later recall (retention), preservation of unrelated behavior (locality), and performance in new settings. We prove when counts alone determine final state and show, under stated assumptions, how differences between pre-answer histories limit differences in average scores. Using ControlMap, our experiments reveal three insights. First, update scheduling matters: at a 760M-parameter checkpoint, 24 schedules with the same update count yield 19.7%--34.2% accuracy. Second, learning an edit does not guarantee that it lasts or remains contained: all six selected CounterFact LoRA settings learn the new information, while ROME retains edits at all 13 operating points but fails locality at each. Third, no editor performs best consistently across models, benchmarks, and tests. Evaluations should therefore report update histories and assess acquisition, retention, and locality separately.
Probes on activation vectors are widely used to detect misbehavior in language models, but their success relies on the assumption that models cannot control what their activations encode. Humans can learn, through neurofeedback, to control the firing of even single neurons, and recent studies investigated whether this ability extends to language models, reaching conflicting conclusions. No experimental design so far disentangles competence at the task from genuine access to one's own activations. We fill this gap with in-context neurofeedback sessions, in which a "subject" model is asked to maximize (or minimize) a score derived from its activations, shown back to it at every turn. In our first experiment, the sentences are generated either by the subject or by a second "writer" model, while the score always derives from the activations of the subject. We test ten open-weight models from five families, with sizes from 9B to 32B. Some models move their own scores considerably, but no more than a writer of comparable competence moves them. Is this because the task requires no privileged access, or because the subject controls its activations while processing the sentences, whoever wrote them? To answer this, we prefill a fixed sentence as the subject's reply at every turn and ask it to increase or decrease the score. Three out of ten models show small but consistent control effects. We further ask whether models can control their activations to the point of fooling an activation monitor. We make models repeat sentences a monitor would flag, such as a deceptive answer for a deception monitor, and ask them to raise or lower the monitor's score. No model learns to lower it, but one model can raise it. In-context control of a model's own activations might not yet be a threat to activation monitors, but it exists in a few models and needs to be tracked as models evolve.
Davide Baldelli, Robyn Kozierok, Mirko Bronzi +1
MATS Research · Mila – The Quebec AI Institute · LawZero