A Novel Federated Learning Framework for Defending Against Gradient Inversion Attacks

Federated Learning (FL) has emerged as a compelling paradigm for privacy-preserving distributed machine learning, allowing multiple clients to collaboratively train a global model by transmitting locally computed gradients to a central server without exposing their private data. Nonetheless, recent studies find that the gradients exchanged in the FL system are also vulnerable to privacy leakage, e.g., an attacker can invert shared gradients to reconstruct sensitive data by leveraging pre-trained generative adversarial networks (GAN) as prior knowledge. However, existing attacks simply perform gradient inversion in the latent space of the GAN model, which limits their expression ability and generalizability. To tackle these challenges, we propose Gradient Inversion over Feature Domains (GIFD), which disassembles the GAN model and searches the hierarchical features of the intermediate layers. Instead of optimizing only over the initial latent code, we progressively change the optimized layer, from the initial latent space to intermediate layers closer to the output images. In addition, we design a regularizer to avoid unreal image generation by adding a small ${l_1}$ ball constraint to the searching range. We also extend GIFD to the out-of-distribution (OOD) setting, which weakens the assumption that the training sets of GANs and FL tasks obey the same data distribution. Furthermore, we consider the challenging OOD scenario of label inconsistency and propose a label mapping technique as an effective solution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can achieve pixel-level reconstruction and outperform competitive baselines across a variety of FL scenarios.

Federated learning (FL) enables multiple data holders to train machine learning models collaboratively without centralizing raw data, making it useful in privacy sensitive domains such as healthcare and institutional data sharing. FL keeps data local to clients while communicating only model updates, such as gradients or model deltas. Nevertheless, these updates can expose private client data through gradient inversion attacks (GIAs). We study this risk for tabular FL under an honest-but-curious server threat model across FL protocols, client batch sizes, training stages, attacker assumptions, model architectures, and binary classification, multiclass classification, and regression tasks. We use MIMIC-IV and complementary benchmark datasets. Our evaluation distinguishes numerical and categorical recovery, baseline recoverability, feature level recovery, and exact match rate (EMR). We evaluate FedSGD gradients and FedAvg model deltas with an exposure aligned protocol, comparing attacked models after matched client data exposure rather than matched communication rounds. We compare multilayer perceptron (MLP), ResNet, and FT-Transformer models, and isolate architecture effects through an MLP grid over width, depth, activation, normalization, and dropout. The results show that small client batches and updates representing few distinct records are most vulnerable. Larger local batches and stronger aggregation reduce reconstruction but do not eliminate leakage. FT-Transformer is consistently harder to invert than one-hot baselines, while reconstructability also varies substantially within the MLP family. These findings identify architecture as a practical privacy variable in tabular FL. We also show that aggregate reconstruction accuracy can overstate complete record recovery in sparse data, making EMR and baseline comparisons essential.

Federated learning enables distributed information sharing and collaborative model training without exposing raw client data. However, shared gradients or model updates may still contain sensitive information, making federated learning vulnerable to gradient inversion attacks. Most existing gradient inversion attacks rely on simplified update observations, such as single-step gradients or endpoint-based matching. In practical FL, however, FedAvg produces an accumulated trajectory-dependent update after multiple local steps, rather than a gradient computed at a single model state.To address this issue, we propose NL-SME, a trajectory-aware information matching method for multi-step gradient inversion. NL-SME constructs a learnable nonlinear surrogate trajectory to approximate hidden local states and integrates trajectory-level information with calibrated gradient matching. For perturbed updates, NL-SME can further use an observed-update reliability-aware strategy to reduce the influence of unreliable components. Extensive experiments under diverse multi-step FedAvg settings show that NL-SME outperforms state-of-the-art gradient inversion baselines in reconstruction quality and update-matching accuracy. Additional evaluations on natural and medical images, as well as under fused-update observations and representative defense strategies, further suggest that observable multi-step updates may still retain reconstruction signals. These results reveal potential privacy leakage risks in federated information sharing. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/NL-SME-main/README.md.