Harder Than the Task: From Technical to Organizational Difficulty in AI Benchmarking
Organizations: Mercor · Copenhagen Business School
Abstract
AI benchmarks have made remarkable progress in measuring the ability of AI systems to perform increasingly demanding cognitive and technical tasks. Yet, many of these benchmarks treat technical tasks as the unit of analysis, while much economically valuable work takes place within organizations, where tasks are embedded in a system of relations. Within organizations, successful task performance depends not only on solving the technical demands of the task but also on navigating the interdependence of activities, distributed knowledge, differentiated authority, temporal constraints, conflicting interests, and changing environmental conditions while the task is underway. Accordingly, we argue that organizational task difficulty constitutes a distinct and insufficiently recognized dimension of AI capability, and that existing approaches to benchmarking provide an incomplete basis for assessing how effectively AI agents can perform real-world organizational work. By drawing on organization theory, we develop a taxonomy of the structure of work that characterizes the conditions that agents face in organizational work. Applying this taxonomy to analyze existing benchmarks, we find limited and uneven coverage of organizational dimensions, with fewer than one quarter of prominent benchmarks claiming any of them. We therefore argue that AI benchmarks should increasingly move beyond the evaluation of technically difficult tasks toward the systematic assessment of agents' ability to navigate the organizational conditions under which economically valuable work takes place.
Figures & tables
| Layer | Description | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Structure of work | The organizational conditions surrounding the focal task | Task interdependence; information structure; authority structure; temporal structure; incentive structure; environmental dynamism |
| 2. Coordination requirements | The requirements placed on the connected actors based on the structural conditions | Acquisition and reconciliation of information; synchronization or mutual adjustment of inputs; decision routing and authorization; negotiation and alignment |
| 3. Governance mechanisms | The organizational means available to address the coordination requirements | Authority; communication; delegation; rules and standards; monitoring; sequencing; escalation |
| 4. Performance outcomes | The quality of focal output and whether organizational dependencies were handled successfully | Quality of the focal output; successful navigation of dependencies; proper organizational conduct (e.g., respect for decision rights, confidentiality, and task ownership); completion within resource and time constraints |
| Dimension | Definition | References |
|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | The interdependency between the focal task and other activities | Thompson (1967) ; Van de Ven et al. (1976) |
| Information structure | The distribution, accessibility, and character of task-relevant knowledge across organizational actors and information systems | Hayek (1945) ; March & Simon (1958) ; Polanyi (1966) ; Galbraith (1974) |
| Authority structure | The authority to request, decide, approve, override, and oblige | Simon (1947) ; Jensen & Meckling (1992) ; Aghion & Tirole (1997) |
| Temporal structure | The timing and order in which things must take place | Thompson (1967) |
| Incentive structure | The alignment or divergence of actors’ objectives and the consequences attached to their actions | March (1962) ; Cyert & March (1963) ; Jensen & Meckling (1976) ; Williamson (1985) |
| Environmental dynamism | The stability of the environmental conditions relevant to the task while work is underway | Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) ; Burton & Obel (2004) |
| Dimension | -bench | TheAgentCompany | Vending-Bench 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | Measure | Claim | None |
| Information structure | Measure | Measure | None |
| Authority structure | Claim | Mention | None |
| Temporal structure | Claim | Mention | Claim |
| Incentive structure | Mention | Claim | Claim |
| Environmental dynamism | Mention | Mention | Claim |
| Dimension | Claim the dimension (Layer 1) | Task requires the coordination (Layer 2) | Environment supplies a mechanism (Layer 3) | Grader checks the outcome (Layer 4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | 19 | 11 (58%) | 17 (89%) | 5 (26%) |
| Information structure | 66 | 52 (79%) | 23 (35%) | 38 (58%) |
| Authority structure | 27 | 9 (33%) | 11 (41%) | 15 (56%) |
| Temporal structure | 34 | 22 (65%) | 13 (38%) | 16 (47%) |
| Incentive structure | 44 | 7 (16%) | 3 (7%) | 4 (9%) |
| Environmental dynamism | 45 | 29 (64%) | 17 (38%) | 10 (22%) |
| Dimension | Prominent benchmarks (n = 522) | Organizational and game-based (n = 523) | Difference (percentage points) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | 19 (4%) | 165 (32%) | +28 |
| Information structure | 66 (13%) | 272 (52%) | +39 |
| Authority structure | 27 (5%) | 86 (16%) | +11 |
| Temporal structure | 34 (7%) | 176 (34%) | +27 |
| Incentive structure | 44 (8%) | 194 (37%) | +29 |
| Environmental dynamism | 45 (9%) | 179 (34%) | +26 |
| Benchmark | Dimension | Level | Supporting paper quotation |
|---|---|---|---|
| -bench | Task interdependence | Measure | “shifting from no user operation (No-User) to a collaborative setup (Default) where the agent must guide the user results in a substantial drop in pass^1 (18% drop for gpt-4.1 and 25% drop for o4-mini).” |
| -bench | Authority structure | Claim | “You should transfer the user to a human agent if and only if the request cannot be handled within the scope of your actions.” |
| TheAgentCompany | Information structure | Measure | “RocketChat is where all social interaction with peers occurs, and the low scores suggest that LLMs still lack communication skills.” |
| TheAgentCompany | Incentive structure | Claim | “After calculating that the requested items exceed the budget, the agent negotiates with the simulated colleague to reduce the request” |
| Vending-Bench 2 | Environmental dynamism | Claim | “version 2 adds real-world messiness such as adversarial suppliers, delayed or failed deliveries, and customer refund demands” |
| Dimension | Industry indices (n = 106) | Top-conference papers (n = 321) | Lab model cards (n = 166) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | 3 (3%) | 14 (4%) | 4 (2%) |
| Information structure | 13 (12%) | 40 (12%) | 23 (14%) |
| Authority structure | 7 (7%) | 12 (4%) | 13 (8%) |
| Temporal structure | 10 (9%) | 19 (6%) | 12 (7%) |
| Incentive structure | 8 (8%) | 26 (8%) | 15 (9%) |
| Environmental dynamism | 8 (8%) | 32 (10%) | 11 (7%) |
| Dimension | Prominent benchmarks (n = 522) | Organizational and game-based benchmarks (n = 523) |
|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | Claiming: 19 •human collaborator (6) •simulated user (6) •other agents or players in a game (4) •colleagues (2) •other (1) | Claiming: 165 •other agents or players in a game (108) •simulated user (26) •human collaborator (20) •colleagues (7) •other (4) |
| Information structure | Claiming: 66 •conflicting sources (25) •simulated user who must be asked (16) •other players in a game (8) •files or web pages (5) •colleagues (4) •database or system (3) •other (5) | Claiming: 272 •simulated user who must be asked (94) •other players in a game (72) •conflicting sources (55) •colleagues (19) •files or web pages (6) •database or system (6) •human collaborator (1) •other (19) |
| Authority structure | Claiming: 27 •written policy or rules (11) •confirmation from the person served (5) •named role (5) •hierarchy among agents or players (2) •other (4) | Claiming: 86 •written policy or rules (25) •hierarchy among agents or players (22) •named role (16) •confirmation from the person served (13) •other (10) |
| Temporal structure | Claiming: 34 •required order set by a process (13) •deadline set in the task (8) •turn or round limits (7) •waiting for another actor (3) •interruptions (2) •other (1) | Claiming: 176 •turn or round limits (68) •required order set by a process (58) •deadline set in the task (23) •waiting for another actor (16) •interruptions (3) •other (8) |
| Incentive structure | Claiming: 44 •adversary or attacker (12) •budget or resources (9) •user who wants what the agent should not give (6) •points in a game (4) •opponent in a game (3) •negotiation counterpart (3) •other (7) | Claiming: 194 •opponent in a game (48) •points in a game (41) •adversary or attacker (25) •negotiation counterpart (23) •budget or resources (22) •user who wants what the agent should not give (13) •other (22) |
| Environmental dynamism | Claiming: 45 •world or system changes on its own (27) •new requirements arrive mid-task (8) •other players’ moves (6) •information injected mid-task (4) | Claiming: 179 •world or system changes on its own (83) •other players’ moves (49) •new requirements arrive mid-task (37) •information injected mid-task (6) •other (4) |
| Dimension | Organizational only (n = 294) | Both (n = 94) | Game-based only (n = 135) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Task interdependence | 79 (27%) | 70 (74%) | 16 (12%) |
| Information structure | 171 (58%) | 70 (74%) | 31 (23%) |
| Authority structure | 62 (21%) | 22 (23%) | 2 (1%) |
| Temporal structure | 85 (29%) | 64 (68%) | 27 (20%) |
| Incentive structure | 82 (28%) | 72 (77%) | 40 (30%) |
| Environmental dynamism | 84 (29%) | 53 (56%) | 42 (31%) |
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