cs.CRNov 4, 2026

Signed but Steerable: Measuring and Closing the Text-Vector Integrity Gap in Offline Retrieval-Augmented Generation

Authors: Georgios Feretzakis, Alexandros Papaspyridis

Organizations: securagen.ai, Athens, Greece

Abstract

Offline retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) on edge devices is updated through signed knowledge packs that carry text and precomputed embedding vectors. A signature proves who published a pack, not that its vectors encode its text. We study this text-vector integrity gap. A verifier that recomputes vectors and accepts them within a cosine tolerance concedes a predictable share of queries to an attacker who controls the vectors: the hijack rate equals the distribution of angular retrieval margins at the tolerance (the margin law). Margins are small in five corpora and two embedding models, so an idealised tolerance at the level of floating-point noise leaves up to 5.5% of queries exposed (at most 1.2% in any corpus once exact duplicate documents are excluded), and a threshold calibrated from our CPU INT8-FP32 comparison of a small embedding model (at the empirical 0.1% quantile of honest cosines) leaves 98-100% exposed; on a Raspberry Pi 5 running a local language model, such an attack lowers correct answers from 0.75 to 0.39. Integrity audits of compressed vector stores fare no better: on a FAISS product-quantisation index over 57,638 documents, tampered vectors that all pass the audit put the attacker's document first for 25% of targets. Verifying quantisation codes instead, with ambiguity decided by the verifier, a calibrated guard band and canonicalisation, accepted every honest vector in our samples on three platforms and left the publisher no choice. We also show that common floating-point and dynamic-INT8 inference pipelines are not bit-reproducible across batch sizes or architectures, and report pre-registered negative results on abstention, context pruning and semantic screening. We release code and data.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

May 13, 2026

VectorSmuggle: Steganographic Exfiltration in Embedding Stores and a Cryptographic Provenance Defense

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.
Apr 7, 2026

LatentAudit: Real-Time White-Box Faithfulness Monitoring for Retrieval-Augmented Generation with Verifiable Deployment

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mitigates hallucination but does not eliminate it: a deployed system must still decide, at inference time, whether its answer is actually supported by the retrieved evidence. We introduce LatentAudit, a white-box auditor that pools mid-to-late residual-stream activations from an open-weight generator and measures their Mahalanobis distance to the evidence representation. The resulting quadratic rule requires no auxiliary judge model, runs at generation time, and is simple enough to calibrate on a small held-out set. We show that residual-stream geometry carries a usable faithfulness signal, that this signal survives architecture changes and realistic retrieval failures, and that the same rule remains amenable to public verification. On PubMedQA with Llama-3-8B, LatentAudit reaches 0.942 AUROC with 0.77,ms overhead. Across three QA benchmarks and five model families (Llama-2/3, Qwen-2.5/3, Mistral), the monitor remains stable; under a four-way stress test with contradictions, retrieval misses, and partial-support noise, it reaches 0.9566--0.9815 AUROC on PubMedQA and 0.9142--0.9315 on HotpotQA. At 16-bit fixed-point precision, the audit rule preserves 99.8% of the FP16 AUROC, enabling Groth16-based public verification without revealing model weights or activations. Together, these results position residual-stream geometry as a practical basis for real-time RAG faithfulness monitoring and optional verifiable deployment.
Aug 17, 2026

Coverage Is Not Containment: A Fundamental Limit of Admission-Time Defenses Against Coordinated Poisoning of Vector Retrieval

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) answers a question by retrieving passages from a vector store and trusting them as context, so anyone who can add documents can try to steer the answer. A recent, appealing defense filters poisoning at ingestion, rejecting any document that behaves like a hub. We show it -- and every ingestion-time filter -- is defeated by a coordinated adversary that injects a handful of individually unremarkable documents which together surround one target query and seize its top-k (on BGE-large / BEIR, m=10 documents take 10/10; 9.9/10 on a live HNSW index). The attack is not theoretical. Realized as ordinary fluent text and run end-to-end through a BGE-large + HNSW + Qwen2.5-7B pipeline, it makes the generator emit the attacker's planted claim in 88% of targets, versus 0% without the injection. And no admission-time defense stops it: at ingestion an attack cone is geometrically identical to a legitimate niche upload, so -- measuring this directly -- the strongest trained classifier, given every feature and thousands of examples, separates the two no better than chance, catching 4.2% of attacks at a 1% false-positive rate. We prove this limit for the entire class of ingestion-time statistics (any decision from documents and reference queries alone), and it reproduces -- and worsens -- across two corpora and five encoders. The one signal that separates an attack from legitimate niche ingestion -- a query's demand -- is invisible before retrieval, which is also the escape: a retrieval-time detector that observes demand catches 100% of the attacks at the same 1% false-positive rate. Coverage of the query space by an admission gate is not containment of coordinated poisoning; robust defense must move past the front door, to demand.