An Interaction-Aware Decision Framework for FDIC-Assisted Distressed Bank Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from the FDIC Failed-Bank Panel and the SVB-First Citizens Case
Authors: Yousef Nejatbakhsh, Malihe Aliasgari, Parsa Safaee, Sina Shokoohyar
Organizations: Department of Statistics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA · Department of Mathematical Sciences, Kean University, Union, NJ 07083, USA · Eindhoven Artificial Intelligence Systems Institute (EAISI), Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands · Department of Computing and Decision Sciences Stillman School of Business Seton Hall University Jubilee Hall 615 400 South Orange Avenue South Orange, NJ. 07079
Acquirers of failed banks weigh acquisition value, regulatory protection, risk, buyer strength, and execution difficulty jointly, because each signal's meaning depends on the others: high non-performing loans matter less when government loss sharing absorbs the losses. The proposed Spider Network Filtering Framework encodes such dependencies as four interpretable interaction rules among five dimensions, yielding graph-inspired features for a logistic model and a Pursue/Caution/Avoid decision rule. We evaluate it on 55 acquisitions assisted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 2008-2024 by acquirers with a parent listed in the United States. Six financial inputs come from regulatory reports published before each failure; two deal terms, which the winning bidder knows when it bids but investors learn at the announcement, come from the regulator's press releases. The outcome, a positive three-day abnormal return around the announcement, records the market's initial reception, not realized success. Under grouped, nested cross-validation, the Spider-enhanced model reaches a mean area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.594, against 0.615 for logistic regression on the same inputs and 0.632 for ridge regression; permutation tests that repeat the full model selection give at most weak evidence that any of them ranks better than chance. The Spider score used directly does not rank better than chance, and an apparent link between target distress and higher returns disappears against a bank-sector benchmark. Thresholds tuned for the F1 score approve most acquisitions with negative returns and realize negative utility when each costs three times what a positively received acquisition gains.
Figures & tables
Rule
Condition
Adj.
Protected Credit Risk ( Qi )
Ni≥N75 and Fi=1
+0.08
Recoverable Distress ( Ui )
Li=1 and Ti=0
+0.07
Structural-Risk Penalty ( Zi )
Ti=1 and Ci<C25
−0.10
Size-Burden Penalty ( Ki )
Mi>M75 and Ci<C25
−0.06
TABLE I: Spider Network Interaction Rules
Policy
Thresh.
Pursue
TP/FP
F1
FPR
Util.
4A: Fixed ( S~ )
0.70/0.40
3.1
2.9/0.2
0.151
0.011
0.041
4B: F1-tuned
0.55–0.80
40.2
27.6/12.6
0.734
0.629
− 0.184
4C: Cost (3:1)
0.75/0.45
11.8
7.9/3.9
0.332
0.196
− 0.071
Trivial policies
Pursue all
—
55
35/20
0.778
1.000
− 0.455
Pursue none
—
0
0/0
0.000
0.000
0.000
TABLE II: Model 4 Decision Policies ( n=55 ; Mean over 50 Repeats; Utility with B=1 , L=3 )
Own ratio
3:1
Ratio
Thr.
Pursue
TP/FP
FPR
F1
Util.
Gain
Util.
1:1
0.50
45.6
30.8/14.7
0.737
0.765
0.292
0.020
− 0.244
2:1
0.67
24.3
17.6/6.8
0.339
0.590
0.073
0.073
− 0.051
3:1
0.75
11.8
7.9/3.9
0.196
0.332
− 0.071
− 0.071
− 0.071
4:1
0.80
7.0
4.3/2.8
0.138
0.197
− 0.123
− 0.123
− 0.073
5:1
0.83
5.1
2.7/2.4
0.119
0.133
− 0.167
− 0.167
− 0.080
TABLE III: Utility Sensitivity to the Assumed Loss-to-Benefit Ratio (Model 3 Probabilities; Mean over 50 Repeats)
Model
Purpose
Output
Interpretability
Model 1
Decision baseline
Spider score
Very high
Model 2
Statistical benchmark
Probability
Moderate
Model 3
Hybrid predictive model
Probability
Moderate to high
Model 4
Executive decision rule
Category
Very high
TABLE IV: Comparative Summary of Four Models
Variable
Description (timing)
Network role
Median [IQR] or count
N
NPL ratio of the failed bank, noncurrent loans / loans (%) (last public call report)
Risk
13.96 [9.00, 17.23]
G
Deposits of the failed bank, billions of USD (same report)
Value
1.00 [0.50, 2.63]
L
Change in the failed bank’s deposits over the two quarters ending at that report (%)
Risk (via Li )
−4.54 [ −11.71 , 1.06]
T
Change in the failed bank’s NPL ratio over the same two quarters (percentage points)
Risk (via Ti )
2.80 [0.70, 6.56]
F
FDIC loss-share agreement (term of the bid; public with the FDIC’s announcement)
Protection
40 of 55
H
Bridge bank or systemic-risk exception (SVB only; public before its sale)
Protection
1 of 55
TABLE V: Variable Definitions, Network Roles, and Distribution in the Primary Panel ( n=55 )
Component
Raw value
Model value
Deposits (Dec. 31, 2022)
$175.4B
G=0.931
Value score V
—
0.931
FDIC loss share
Yes
F=1
Government support
Bridge bank
H=1
Protection score P
—
1.000
NPL ratio
0.19%
N=0.002
TABLE VI: Spider Network Inputs and Scores: SVB–First Citizens
Model
AUC [5th, 95th pct.]
Event-weighted AUC
Brier [5th, 95th pct.]
Brier skill
L2 logistic, C=1 (Model 2)
0.615 [0.535, 0.672]
0.551
0.238 [0.218, 0.266]
− 2.7%
LASSO logistic
0.518 [0.416, 0.620]
0.479
0.249 [0.226, 0.282]
− 7.6%
L2 logistic, C tuned (ridge)
0.632 [0.556, 0.684]
0.575
0.225 [0.211, 0.249]
2.9%
Decision tree
0.585 [0.448, 0.675]
0.533
0.291 [0.240, 0.362]
− 25.9%
Random forest
0.605 [0.545, 0.666]
0.569
0.231 [0.216, 0.244]
0.1%
XGBoost
0.604 [0.534, 0.656]
0.573
0.243 [0.223, 0.267]
− 5.0%
TABLE VII: Model Comparison: 50 Repeats of Grouped 5-Fold Cross-Validation ( n=55 , 51 Event Clusters)
50 partitions
Cluster bootstrap, AUC diff. [95% interval]
Comparison
AUC diff. [5th, 95th pct.]
M3 higher
Brier diff. [5th, 95th pct.]
Conditional
Refitting
M3 − Model 2 ( C=1 )
− 0.020 [ − 0.085, + 0.016]
28%
− 0.006 [ − 0.024, + 0.017]
− 0.044 [ − 0.104, + 0.001]
[ − 0.155, + 0.131]
M3 − Ridge ( C tuned)
− 0.038 [ − 0.092, + 0.010]
10%
+ 0.008 [ − 0.009, + 0.028]
− 0.056 [ − 0.115, − 0.010]
[ − 0.166, + 0.117]
M3 − LR + pairwise
− 0.038 [ − 0.085, + 0.032]
22%
+ 0.017 [ − 0.004, + 0.037]
− 0.070 [ − 0.214, + 0.049]
—
M3 − Random forest
− 0.011 [ − 0.079, + 0.076]
44%
+ 0.001 [ − 0.019, + 0.027]
− 0.050 [ − 0.188, + 0.066]
—
M3 − XGBoost
− 0.010 [ − 0.083, + 0.055]
42%
− 0.011 [ − 0.031, + 0.010]
—
—
TABLE VIII: Paired Comparison of Model 3 with Selected Baselines (Same Partitions, 50 Repeats)
Null AUC
p -value
Model
AUC
Mean
95th
1-sided
Holm
2-sided
Model 2 ( C=1 )
0.635
0.479
0.659
0.08
0.16
0.24
Ridge ( C tuned)
0.668
0.478
0.653
0.04
0.13
0.14
Model 3 ( C tuned)
0.600
0.477
0.647
0.12
0.16
0.36
Spider score (Model 1)
0.421
0.499
0.630
0.82
—
0.36
TABLE IX: Permutation Tests: Is Discrimination Above Chance?
Stage
AUC
Event AUC
Brier
A: measured inputs
0.632
0.575
0.225
B: A + Spider score
0.630
0.573
0.225
C: A + interaction rules
0.598
0.534
0.231
D: full SNFF (Model 3)
0.594
0.529
0.232
E: D without protection inputs
0.615
0.556
0.228
F: D without buyer capital
0.632
0.573
0.225
TABLE X: Ablation Study: 50 Repeats of Grouped 5-Fold Cross-Validation
Variant
Positive CAR
Model 2
Ridge
Model 3
Spider score
Primary specification
35/55
0.615
0.632
0.594
0.423
Outcome: CAR[0,+1] around announcement date
39/55
0.441
0.508
0.507
0.473
Outcome: CAR[−1,+1] around announcement date
41/55
0.572
0.601
0.591
0.425
Outcome: market-model CAR
31/55
0.642
0.648
0.647
0.409
Outcome: CAR against bank-sector index
39/55
0.277
0.280
0.413
0.505
Published inputs only (no F , H )
35/55
0.635
0.646
0.615
0.466
TABLE XI: Robustness: Mean AUC over 50 Repeats under Alternative Outcomes, Specifications, and Sample
Primary panel (55)
Other 35 deals
Component
Sign in S
AUC
p
AUC
p
Spider score S~
+
0.414
0.35
0.507
0.96
Value V
+
0.533
0.72
0.464
0.31
Protection P
+
0.454
0.54
0.464
0.71
Buyer strength B
+
0.537
0.66
0.714
0.06
Risk R
−
0.699
0.04
0.724
0.04
TABLE XII: Direction of the Spider Score and Its Components (AUC against a Positive CAR)
A. Benchmark and window: AUC (two-sided p )
Outcome
Primary 55
Other 35
SPY, reaction day (primary)
0.699 (0.04)
0.724 (0.04)
Bank-sector index, reaction day
0.514 (0.90)
0.561 (0.66)
Market model, reaction day
0.644 (0.14)
0.637 (0.22)
SPY, [0,+1] around release date
0.423 (0.47)
0.572 (0.57)
SPY, [−1,+1] around release date
0.343 (0.13)
0.562 (0.62)
TABLE XIII: Sensitivity of the Risk Component’s Association with Announcement Returns
User
Use of the framework
Acquiring bank
Structuring the review of a distressed target
FDIC / regulators
Comparing bidders and transaction structures
Risk committee
Auditing the drivers of a recommendation
Board / executives
Pursue, Caution, or Avoid deliberations
Investors
Assessing the sources of acquisition gains
TABLE XIV: Potential Users of an Interaction-Aware Decision Framework
Appendix figures & tables1 asset
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Failed bank
Parent
Announced
FDIC release
Timing
LS
H
CAR (%)
Y
Washington Mutual Bank
JPM
2008-09-25
PR-85-2008
A
0
0
9.52
1
First Republic Bank
JPM
2023-05-01
PR-34-2023
P
1
0
1.77
1
Silicon Valley Bank
FCNCA
2023-03-26
PR-23-2023
N
1
1
54.31
1
Colonial Bank
BBT
2009-08-14
PR-143-2009
A
1
0
− 3.85
0
Downey Savings and Loan Assoc., F.A.
USB
2008-11-21
PR-124-2008
A
1
0
0.71
1
Westernbank Puerto Rico
BPOP
2010-04-30
PR-97-2010
A
1
0
3.33
1
Appendix
TABLE XV: Primary Panel: Source-Verified Terms, Timing, and Outcome of the 55 Transactions