cs.AINov 4, 2026

Synthesizing symbolic models of human and machine reasoning at scale

Authors: Solim LeGris, Philipp Mondorf, Jinran Jin, Akshay K. Jagadish, Brenden M. Lake, Todd M. Gureckis

Organizations: Department of Psychology, New York University. · Department of Psychology, Princeton University. · Center for Information and Language Processing, LMU Munich. · Center for Data Science, New York University. · 

Abstract

Symbolic models offer a powerful account of cognition, but their scope has historically been limited by the need for hand-engineering and computational tractability. We show how advances in artificial intelligence (AI) can scale symbolic modeling and help overcome these engineering limitations. We introduce Behavior-Conditioned Symbolic Synthesis (BCSS)---an approach for automated search of interpretable, deterministic symbolic programs that verifiably reproduce behavior---and apply it to model both human and machine behavior across hundreds of challenging reasoning problems. Analyzing these programs reveals that both people and machines tend to oversimplify, adopt rules that are partial explanations for their observations, and misinfer dependencies between problem features. These shared signatures are modulated by available resources, with reasoning effort predicting the extent to which machines simplify and explain their observations. Together, these results point to underlying mechanisms reminiscent of satisficing in both people and machines, and illustrate how BCSS offers a general approach for interpreting and comparing rule-based reasoning of humans and black-box AI systems.

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