Synthesizing symbolic models of human and machine reasoning at scale
Authors: Solim LeGris, Philipp Mondorf, Jinran Jin, Akshay K. Jagadish, Brenden M. Lake, Todd M. Gureckis
Organizations: Department of Psychology, New York University. · Department of Psychology, Princeton University. · Center for Information and Language Processing, LMU Munich. · Center for Data Science, New York University. · Princeton AI Lab, Princeton University. · Department of Computer Science, Princeton University.
Symbolic models offer a powerful account of cognition, but their scope has historically been limited by the need for hand-engineering and computational tractability. We show how advances in artificial intelligence (AI) can scale symbolic modeling and help overcome these engineering limitations. We introduce Behavior-Conditioned Symbolic Synthesis (BCSS)---an approach for automated search of interpretable, deterministic symbolic programs that verifiably reproduce behavior---and apply it to model both human and machine behavior across hundreds of challenging reasoning problems. Analyzing these programs reveals that both people and machines tend to oversimplify, adopt rules that are partial explanations for their observations, and misinfer dependencies between problem features. These shared signatures are modulated by available resources, with reasoning effort predicting the extent to which machines simplify and explain their observations. Together, these results point to underlying mechanisms reminiscent of satisficing in both people and machines, and illustrate how BCSS offers a general approach for interpreting and comparing rule-based reasoning of humans and black-box AI systems.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: Reverse-engineering individual rules in a complex cognitive domain using programs . ( A ): Schematic task corpus and associated behavioral data. Each of the four representative ARC tasks Ti presents an agent with a small set of input–output training examples from which a hidden transformation rule must be inferred. From a test input, the agent must then construct the corresponding output grid (hidden with a grey square and “?” for illustrative purposes). We use H-ARC, a dataset of responses from over 1,700 participants to the 800 publicly available ARC-AGI-1 tasks. On the right of each task, we show 4 of the most frequent incorrect responses, and the correct response at the bottom. Under each grid, we show the associated response frequency (red for incorrect, green for correct). ( B ): Behavior-conditioned symbolic synthesis (BCSS). For each unique incorrect response, a large language model is prompted with a full specification of the domain-specific language, task grids, a reference program Pi∗ implementing the target rule for task Ti , and the observed incorrect response (here, from a human participant). It proposes k independent sets E1,…,Ek of at most j line edits to that program. The schematic edit proposals El show LLM-sampled proposals which are then applied to Pi∗ . Each proposed set of line edits is applied programmatically to the reference program to obtain a new program El(Pi∗) . A custom parser rewrites the programs such that only causally relevant code is retained (i.e., unreferenced lines of code are removed). Each new program El(Pi∗) is then executed with the test input as argument. Programs whose output reproduces the observed response are kept (green checkmark); all others are discarded (red cross). Because a response is often reachable by more than one unique program, BCSS returns a collection of programs per response rather than a single model. The individual response shown here is also shown surrounded by a red square to the right of task T1 in panel A. The constant THREE represents the color green.
Figure 2: Synthesized programs suggest people often infer rules simpler than the target rule for a given task . ( A ): A representative ARC task ( 94133066 ). Three training examples demonstrate the target rule—return the contents of the framed sub-grid under whichever of its eight rotations and reflections is consistent with the isolated colored cells scattered around it—followed by the test input for which participants construct an output grid (hidden with a grey square and “?” for illustrative purposes). ( B ): The reference program P∗ implementing the target rule for this task. Because this task belongs to the evaluation split, P∗ is itself model-synthesized rather than human-written. ( C ): Distribution of relative program length change, (L(p)−L(P∗))/L(P∗) , over all synthesized programs, shown separately for the training and evaluation splits of ARC-AGI-1. Treatment programs (blue) are those conditioned on incorrect human responses; control programs (grey) are produced by an identical procedure conditioned instead on the correct output grid. Because edits replace lines in-place and causally irrelevant code is subsequently removed, synthesized programs can either shorten, or remain the same, but never lengthen. Therefore, the control condition controls for the shortening bias attributable to the procedure itself, against which the leftward displacement of the treatment distribution should be read. The dashed line marks the median shortening of modeled responses for the task displayed in this figure. ( D ): The correct response (top row) and the three of the most frequent incorrect responses to that task, with response frequencies below each grid (green, correct; red, incorrect). For each, we show the diff with P∗ after applying BCSS, the length of the resulting program relative to P∗ (blue, retained lines; gray, removed lines; red rule, reference length), which training examples the program reproduces (green, reproduced), and its error category. A single edit can account for a large simplification: for example, replacing the final extract over the eight candidate transforms by one fixed transform renders fourteen lines of the reference program inconsequential, and they are removed. Thus, the simpler resulting program hardcodes a transform instead of exhaustively searching over possible transformations.
Figure 3: Synthesized programs suggest people infer rules that only explain some of the data they observe . ( A ): A representative ARC task ( b230c067 ). Three training examples specify the target rule—recolor every shape blue except the least common one, which is recolored red—followed by the test input for which participants construct an output grid (hidden with a grey square and “?” for illustrative purposes). ( B ): A human-written reference program P∗ implementing the target rule for this task. ( C ): Top, prevalence of each rule type among all modeled incorrect attempts. A program is a partial-match if it reproduces at least one, but not all, of the training outputs when executed on training inputs; an alternative rule if it reproduces all of them yet still fails the test example; and neither otherwise. Bottom, conditional on an attempt being explained by a partial-match program, the positions of the training examples it reproduces: the first- k or last- k example(s) shown on screen, a contiguous block of at least two examples that doesn’t include the first or last examples, or any other configuration. In both plots, bars give the posterior median attempt-weighted prevalence and error bars the 94% HDI, shown separately for the training (dark) and evaluation (light) splits of ARC-AGI-1; orange dots give the corresponding proportion for the task shown in panel A. ( D ): The correct response (top row) and three of the most frequent incorrect responses to that task, with response frequencies below each grid (green, correct; red, incorrect). For each, we show the diff with P∗ after applying BCSS, the length of the resulting program relative to P∗ (blue, retained lines; gray, removed lines; red rule, reference length), which training examples the program reproduces (green, reproduced), and its error category. The most frequent incorrect response is captured by a program that selects the rightmost object rather than the least common one, a rule that satisfies the first two training examples but not the third.
Category
Definition
Example
Attribute misselection
The correct operation is applied, but with a misselected attribute, parameter, or input value.
inferred color → hardcoded color
Scope restriction
The correct computation is applied, but only to a subset of the entities or regions where it should apply.
all objects → subset
Operator confusion
The correct class of operation is identified, but the wrong member within that class is selected.
rotate CW → rotate CCW
Transformation misselection
The correct targets are identified, but a transformation from an entirely different computational family is applied.
mirror → recolor
Sequencing
All required operations are identified, but they are composed in the wrong order or bound to the wrong targets.
( A then B ) → ( B then A )
Partial program
A subset of the required steps are executed correctly; one or more computational blocks are entirely missing.
extract + tile → extract only
Table 1: Taxonomy of error categories used to classify synthesized programs. Each category identifies a way in which programs that reproduce incorrect responses deviate from the reference program implementing the target rule for the same task. Categories are defined over structural differences between the two programs, but the classifier is also conditioned on the response grids. Categories are defined as mutually exclusive and the “unclassifiable” catch-all makes the set exhaustive. The examples in the third column are schematic illustrations of the contrast between reference and response programs that defines each category. Every synthesized program was classified by an LLM given a reference program, task grids, the synthesized program, and its execution trace on the training and test inputs, with five independent classifications sampled per program (§ 3.4 ).
Figure 4: Synthesized programs reveal a restricted set of recurring deviations from target rules . ( A ): A representative ARC task ( 7fe24cdd ). Three training examples specify the target rule—tile the input into a 2×2 arrangement in which each quadrant holds the input rotated by a further 90 ∘ clockwise, starting from the input at the top left—followed by the test input for which participants construct an output grid (hidden with a gray square and “?” for illustrative purposes). ( B ): A human-written reference program P∗ implementing the target rule for this task. ( C ): Prevalence of each error category among modeled incorrect attempts. An LLM classifier assigned every program one of seven cognitive categories, given the reference program, the task grids, the synthesized program and its execution trace (Table 1 for definitions). Bars give the posterior median of the attempt-weighted prevalence derived from a hierarchical Bayesian categorical model, and error bars the 94% HDI; the categories are mutually exclusive. Classification was performed on programs fitting responses to training split tasks only. ( D ): The correct response (top row) and three of the most frequent modeled incorrect responses to the task in panel A, with the response frequency below (green, correct; red, incorrect). For each, we show the diff with P∗ after applying BCSS, the length of the resulting program relative to P∗ (blue, retained lines; gray, removed lines; red rule, reference length), which training examples the program reproduces when executed on their inputs (green, reproduced), and its error category. The programs that reproduce these three incorrect responses diverge from P∗ in different ways: omitting the rotations and tiling the input four times, carrying out reflections instead of rotations, or correctly carrying out the rule on a restricted portion of the input.
Figure 5: Machine errors are systematic and performance-dependent. ( A ): Average accuracy across responses of large reasoning models at different reasoning efforts and humans on the training set of ARC-AGI-1. Note that GPT-OSS-120B uses a mixture-of-experts architecture and thus only has 5.1 billion active parameters during inference. ( B ): Relative shortening of programs synthesized from model errors compared with programs for correct-output controls; all model configurations exhibit a simplicity bias, which is stronger for lower-performing configurations. ( C ): The proportion of error programs that partially match or fully reproduce the support examples increases with model performance. ( D ) Schematic of the classification analysis distinguishing human and machine errors using features derived from synthesized error programs. ( E ) Within-task ROC-AUC of three fitted classifiers provides evidence of varying degrees of discriminability of human and machine errors on held-out tasks, with less performant models better discriminated from people. Classifiers are trained using linearized program-level feature vectors. ROC-AUC is computed among the errors of each of the 56 shared tasks and averaged across tasks, with error bars showing 95% task-level bootstrap CIs. Panels B and C report results on the subset of 56 tasks where both reasoning language models and people generated incorrect responses (see Appendix S5 for similar trends across all errors). All machine responses are independently sampled, and we restrict comparisons to human first-attempt responses.
Figure S1: Responses within the two-cell noise tolerance. ( A – C ) Three representative ARC tasks. Left: the training examples and the test input shown to participants (the test output is hidden with a grey square and “?”). Right: for three response grids per task, the output of the best-matching synthesized program (left column) beside the participant responses it is accepted as reproducing (remaining columns); hatched cells indicate that fewer than two distinct responses share that program. The fraction to the left of each row gives the number of participants producing that response out of all participants who attempted the task (red, incorrect; green, correct). Within each row the grids differ in at most two isolated cells (surrounded by white) against the best-match program output.
Figure S2: The two-cell cutoff separates procedural noise from rule-level divergence. ( A ) Coverage of non-trivial incorrect responses as a function of the tolerance τ , attempt-weighted, shown separately for the training (blue) and evaluation (grey) splits. Circles mark the value τ=2 used throughout ( 52.5% and 46.2% respectively). ( B ) Share of mismatched cells that are scattered singletons—no mismatched cell among their four neighbors—as a function of d , the mismatch count of the best-scoring candidate program. The steep fall immediately past the cutoff shows that small residuals are isolated misclick-like cells, whereas higher values of d indicate structured regions/objects. ( C ) Distribution of cell-level distances between incorrect responses and the correct test output, per split. Grey bars ( ≤2 mismatched cells) are the near-misses removed by the filter.
Training
Evaluation
Combined
By incorrect responses (attempts)
Incorrect responses
4,293
5,156
9,449
Filtered (all trivial)
808 (18.8%)
891 (17.3%)
1,699 (18.0%)
Near-miss ( ≈ correct)
189 (4.4%)
251 (4.9%)
440 (4.7%)
Test-input copy (identity)
368 (8.6%)
377 (7.3%)
745 (7.9%)
Training-example copy
130 (3.0%)
197 (3.8%)
327 (3.5%)
Table S1: Trivial-error filtering by split (§ 3.1 ). Counts and percentages of incorrect responses removed before modeling, under the noise tolerance criterion: i) shapes must match, ii) grids of ten or more cells tolerate up to two mismatched cells, iii) smaller grids must match exactly and iv) copies of a training example are removed only on an exact match at any size. Percentages are over the full pre-filter pool of responses of each split.
Training
Evaluation
Combined
Reference program
hand-written
synthesized
—
Proposal model
Gemini 3 Pro
Gemini 3.5 Flash
—
Tasks modeled
362
361
723
Unique non-trivial errors
2,695
3,566
6,261
Incorrect attempts
3,485
3,917
7,402
Program samples collected
40,365
53,490
93,855
Table S2: Modeling coverage and program yield by split. Unless specified, all reported numbers refer to errors modeled under the two-cell tolerance criterion. Attempt-weighted quantities weight each unique error by the number of participants who produced it. Exact-match reproduced is the percentage of errors with at least one program reproducing the grid with zero mismatched cells. Effective edits are counted after the parser removes causally irrelevant lines. Four training-split errors were missing from the synthesis run, so program samples cover 2,691 of the 2,695 training errors.
Training
Evaluation
Combined
n (attempts / errors)
1,827 / 1,274
1,809 / 1,507
3,636 / 2,781
Rule type (all modeled attempts)
Neither
76.2% [74.9, 77.4]
78.7% [77.8, 79.6]
77.4% [76.6, 78.1]
Partial match
22.1% [20.8, 23.3]
19.7% [18.8, 20.6]
20.9% [20.2, 21.7]
Alternative rule
1.8% [1.3, 2.3]
1.6% [1.2, 2.1]
1.7% [1.4, 2.0]
Consistent with ≥1 example
23.8% [22.6, 25.1]
21.3% [20.4, 22.2]
22.6% [21.9, 23.4]
Table S3: Rule types and order effects by split (attempt-weighted). Posterior median and 94% HDI. A program is a partial match if it reproduces at least one but not all training outputs, an alternative rule if it reproduces all of them yet still fails the test example, and neither otherwise. Order effects are conditional on a partial match and describe which of the training examples the program reproduces, ordered as models or participants saw them.
Figure S3: Relative length change as a function of reference complexity and error category. Partial residuals of relative length change against reference-program line count, with the posterior mean slope (dashed) and its 94% HDI (band). Annotations mark the predicted shortening at L=7 , 14 and 28 lines.
Category
γ [94% HDI]
P(>0)
% shorter [94% HDI]
Unclassifiable †
−0.369 [ −0.395 , −0.344 ]
0.000
+46.1 [ +44.2 , +48.0 ]
Partial program
−0.231 [ −0.264 , −0.198 ]
0.000
+32.3 [ +29.1 , +35.6 ]
Transformation misselection
−0.121 [ −0.150 , −0.091 ]
0.000
+21.3 [ +18.4 , +24.0 ]
Attribute misselection
+0.014 [ −0.007 , +0.034 ]
0.893
+7.8 [ +6.2 , +9.3 ]
Scope restriction
+0.045 [ −0.006 , +0.098 ]
0.947
+4.6 [ −1.1 , +10.4 ]
Operator confusion
+0.080 [ +0.041 , +0.118 ]
1.000
+1.2 [ −2.8 , +5.1 ]
Table S4: Error-category effects on relative program length ( training split). γm is the deviation from the grand mean of the seven cognitive categories, which share a sum-to-zero prior; negative γ means more relative shortening than the average error type. The unclassifiable catch-all ( † ) is held outside that constraint. “% shorter” is the absolute per-category prediction β0+γm at mean success rate and mean reference length, summed per posterior draw (grand-mean shortening β0=9.2% ); a negative value means the error programs are longer than the reference. n=3,690 programs over 1,274 errors.
Qwen3.5-27B
GPT-OSS-120B
high
mid
low
By incorrect responses (attempts)
Responses with a valid grid
689
742
2,002
3,059
Filtered (all trivial)
114 (16.5%)
90 (12.1%)
264 (13.2%)
568 (18.6%)
Near-miss ( ≈ correct)
73 (10.6%)
54 (7.3%)
84 (4.2%)
61 (2.0%)
Test-input copy (identity)
22 (3.2%)
12 (1.6%)
110 (5.5%)
354 (11.6%)
Table S5: Trivial-error filtering by model configuration (§ 3.1 ). Incorrect model responses with a valid grid removed before modeling, under the same noise tolerance criterion applied to human responses (Supplementary Table S1 ), counted by response (top) and by unique incorrect grid (bottom). Percentages are over each configuration’s pre-filter total in the same block.
Qwen3.5-27B
GPT-OSS-120B
high
mid
low
Accuracy (%)
80.63
72.28
50.96
25.02
Tasks with ≥1 error
145
173
284
344
Incorrect responses
806
1,153
2,040
3,119
with a valid grid
689
742
2,002
3,059
Attempts
575
652
1,738
2,491
Table S6: Evaluation and modeling yield by model configuration (across all tasks with errors). Accuracy is the mean over ten seeds on the 400 training tasks of ARC-AGI-1. Attempts correspond to every incorrect response that survived filtering; unique errors deduplicate identical grid outputs. Attempts modeled and errors modeled are the counts with at least one verified program reproducing the error within the two-cell noise tolerance criterion—with coverage as a percentage of attempts and of unique errors, respectively.
Qwen3.5-27B
GPT-OSS-120B
high
mid
low
Simplicity bias (relative length change vs. correct-output control)
β
−0.147
−0.153
−0.211
−0.245
94% HDI
[ −0.185 , −0.112 ]
[ −0.187 , −0.119 ]
[ −0.236 , −0.185 ]
[ −0.268 , −0.221 ]
P(β<0)
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
Rule type (all modeled attempts)
Table S7: Simplicity bias, rule types and order effects by model configuration (across all tasks with errors). β is the posterior mean relative shortening of error programs against correct-output controls, where negative values indicate shorter programs. Rule types and order effects are attempt-weighted population marginals from the hierarchical categorical model (§ 3.8.2 ); posterior median and 94% HDI, in percent. A program is a partial match if it reproduces at least one but not all training outputs, an alternative rule if it reproduces all of them yet still fails the test example, and neither otherwise. Order effects are conditional on a partial match and describe which training examples the program reproduces, ordered as models or participants saw them.
Qwen3.5-27B
GPT-OSS-120B
high
mid
low
n (errors)
197
236
713
989
Attribute misselection
61.0 [58.7,63.5]
58.4 [55.9,60.9]
45.7 [44.3,47.3]
38.0 [36.6,39.4]
Transformation misselection
13.0 [11.4,14.5]
12.6 [11.1,14.3]
11.0 [10.0,12.1]
10.1 [9.3,10.9]
Partial program
7.2 [5.4,8.8]
10.2 [8.2,12.2]
10.8 [9.6,12.0]
9.5 [8.4,10.6]
Scope restriction
3.2 [2.3,4.3]
3.9 [3.0,4.7]
2.7 [2.4,3.1]
3.0 [2.5,3.6]
Table S8: Error categories by model configuration (across all tasks with errors). Attempt-weighted population marginals from the hierarchical categorical model (§ 3.8.3 ); posterior median and 94% HDI, in percent. Error categories are the seven cognitive types of § 1.4 and unclassifiable ( † ) is the catch-all category. n is the number of errors with at least one validly classified program; one medium-effort and two low-effort errors (7 and 3 programs) had no valid classification sample and are excluded, hence 713/989 rather than 714/991 in Supplementary Table S6 .
Within-task ROC-AUC
Pooled ROC-AUC
L2 logistic regression
0.69 [0.63,0.76]
0.64 [0.59,0.70]
EBM
0.68 [0.61,0.74]
0.68 [0.62,0.74]
Hist. gradient boosting
0.65 [0.57,0.73]
0.68 [0.62,0.74]
Table S9: Human-versus-LLM source prediction (§ 3.7 ). Out-of-fold ROC-AUC on the 811 errors (144 human, 667 LLM) from the 56 matched tasks, for classifiers trained on primitive delta vectors from the errors on all tasks (651 human, 2,138 LLM). LLM errors are the positive class. Within-task ROC-AUC is computed among the errors of each task and averaged with equal task weight. Pooled ROC-AUC is computed over all errors at once. Point estimates with 95% percentile confidence intervals from 10,000 bootstrap resamples of whole tasks, shared across rows.
LLM errors
Within-task ROC-AUC
Acc. (%)
Train
Eval.
Logistic L2
EBM
Grad. boosting
Qwen3.5-27B
80.63
197
112
0.61 [0.52,0.69]
0.59 [0.49,0.69]
0.58 [0.48,0.67]
GPT-OSS (high)
72.28
236
128
0.60 [0.51,0.69]
0.57 [0.47,0.66]
0.63 [0.53,0.72]
GPT-OSS (mid)
50.96
714
221
0.68 [0.59,0.76]
0.69 [0.61,0.76]
0.68 [0.60,0.76]
GPT-OSS (low)
25.02
991
206
0.74 [0.67,0.82]
0.77 [0.69,0.84]
0.77 [0.68,0.84]
Table S10: Human-versus-LLM source prediction for each LLM configuration (§ 3.7 ). Each row reports classifiers trained on primitive delta vectors to distinguish human errors from those of a single configuration, with the same features, weighting scheme, task folds and evaluation tasks as Supplementary Table S9 . Train includes the configuration’s modeled errors on all tasks, and Eval includes those on the 56 matched tasks, on which out-of-fold within-task ROC-AUC is computed. Every row shares the same 651 human training errors and 144 human evaluation errors. Acc. is mean single-attempt accuracy (humans: 59.90%). Accuracy, reasoning effort and the number of training errors vary together across configurations, so differences between rows should not be attributed to accuracy alone. Point estimates with 95% percentile confidence intervals from 10,000 bootstrap resamples of whole tasks.
Figure S4: Language models display human-like error category profiles, but order effects are weaker and less consistent than in humans. All panels report values corresponding to the subset of 56 tasks where evaluated LRMs and people both generated at least one incorrect response. Human responses are restricted to first-attempt comparisons. ( A ) Prevalence of each error category among modeled incorrect machine errors. As with human results, an LLM classifier assigned every program one of seven cognitive categories or unclassifiable , conditioned on the reference program, the task grids, the synthesized program and its execution trace (Table 1 for definitions). Bars give the posterior median of the attempt-weighted prevalence derived from a hierarchical Bayesian categorical model, and error bars the 94% HDI. The categories are mutually exclusive. ( B ) Conditional on an attempt being explained by a partial-match program, we show the positions of the training examples it reproduces: the first-k or last-k example(s) shown, a contiguous block of at least two examples that does not include the first or last examples, or any other configuration. In both plots, bars give the posterior median attempt-weighted prevalence and error bars the 94% HDI.
Figure S5: Error-program synthesis prompt (§ 3.3 ). The model is given the full DSL specification, the task grids, the reference program implementing the target rule, and the respondent’s incorrect output grid, and returns a structured set of line edits under a fixed JSON schema.
Figure S6: Reference-program (solver) synthesis prompt (§ 3.2.1 ). Used to generate reference programs for evaluation -split tasks, which have no hand-written solver. The prompt is retrieval-augmented with five solved tasks and their human-written solvers from the training split.
Figure S7: Error-classification prompt (§ 3.4 ). The classifier sees the reference program, the task grids, the synthesized error program, and a side-by-side comparison of their behavior on the training examples, and returns one of the seven cognitive categories or the unclassifiable catch-all.
Figure S8: Evaluation prompt (§ 3.6 ). Used to collect machine responses on ARC tasks for comparison with the human data. The model is shown the training pairs and asked to complete the held-out pair.
Why do intelligent systems need to perform explicit symbolic reasoning? Computer science has traditionally regarded symbolic reasoning as a defining component of intelligence. Yet the remarkable success of modern foundation models raises a fundamental question: if increasingly capable AI systems can operate with little explicit symbolic reasoning, what role do symbolic methods actually play? This article argues that explicit symbolic reasoning is not a fundamental property of intelligence, but a computational consequence of operating on simplified models of reality. We propose the Compression Principle: every computational model is a simplified representation of reality, and explicit symbolic reasoning compensates for information omitted during model construction. From this principle, we derive the Modeling--Reasoning Trade-off: as computational models preserve richer representations of the world, the need for explicit symbolic reasoning correspondingly decreases. This perspective provides a unified explanation for both the historical success of symbolic methods and the remarkable effectiveness of modern foundation models. Paradoxically, the same development makes symbolic methods increasingly important for humans. As intelligent systems become more capable and more opaque, symbolic representations increasingly serve as interfaces through which humans specify requirements, verify behavior, regulate autonomous systems, and establish trust. We therefore argue that the future of symbolic methods lies not primarily as the computational engine of intelligent systems, but as the symbolic interface between increasingly capable AI systems and the humans who build, govern, and depend upon them.
Current agentic workflows usually involve decomposing user requests into sequences of tool calls with correctly resolved parameters, the results of which are processed through reasoning traces in the language model's context window. The prevailing route to improve such reasoning is test-time scaling, which trains models to search over long chains of thought; but the resulting capability is entangled in model weights, is not verifiable step-by-step, and is costly at inference. We present Forethought, a neurosymbolic reasoning system that instead treats reasoning as an explicit, verifiable program, that builds from a library of symbolic and neural primitives which are composed through a domain-specific language. The result are reasoning programs, which are concrete representations of the model's work, and as such can be inspected and modified before deployment. Instantiated as a tool-calling execution kernel and evaluated across five benchmarks, Forethought improves base-model accuracy by about 30% relative and outperforms vanilla prompting, reinforcement learning scaffolds, and prompt-evolution methods, enabling small models to match or exceed frontier models capabilities. In a direct comparison, a non-reasoning model augmented with Forethought competes with a dedicated reasoning model while requiring roughly three orders of magnitude less post-training investment, and remains model-agnostic and auditable.
Vishvesh Bhat, Jay Vaghasiya, Emmanuel Anaya Gonzalez
Understanding and modeling human intelligence are parallel goals shared by artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. As AI systems grow increasingly capable, in what ways do model responses resemble human responses, and where do they systematically diverge? The sheer breadth and diversity of the tasks humans can perform and think about pose a challenge for scalable and rigorous comparison between humans and models. We introduce CogGym, a scalable, unified framework grounded in cognitive science for systematically comparing model and human behavior on matched experimental trials. CogGym uses a semi-automated, human-in-the-loop pipeline to standardize diverse experimental paradigms into a task-agnostic Experiment Markup Language (EML), enabling reproducible and faithful comparison at scale. For initial release, we curate and standardize 258 cognitive experiments from 100 papers that focuses on human commonsense reasoning, and evaluate 50 large language models against human responses. We find a clear scaling trend where larger and more recent AI models better reproduce human judgments. Yet AI models' improvement on such common reasoning tasks is considerably slower than the gains observed on formal-reasoning benchmarks like math and coding, and model--human fit remains well below human splithalf reliability (R2=0.93 on text, 0.95 on image, and 0.92 on video) with the best models achieving R2=0.59 on text, 0.58 on image, and 0.43 on video experiments. We intend for CogGym to provide a living evaluation framework that continually incorporates new cognitive science experiments to characterize where model behavior resembles human behavior, where it systematically diverges, and how those patterns change as models and experiments evolve.